

# Analysis Of the Existence of Political Dynasties in Village Head Elections in Indonesia

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## Abstract

*Political dynasties in Indonesia have been known since the era of hereditary kingdoms, the old order, the new order, and continued into the reform era. A political dynasty is defined as a political power exercised by a group of people who are still bound by family relations. Political dynasty is considered as one aspect that can influence the process of democratization, representation and accountability in local leadership. This research aims to analyze the phenomenon of political dynasties in the context of Village Head elections in Indonesia. This research uses a qualitative approach with descriptive methods. The research results show that political dynasties in village head elections in Indonesia are influenced by several key factors. The research highlights the unclear legal rules after the Constitutional Court decision no. 33/PUU-XIII/2015, which provides an opening for dynastic political practices without clear control. Village institutions that are not yet democratic are also a major factor, allowing recruitment of village head candidates to be elitist and creating inequality in access to opportunities to become village head candidates. In addition, the strength of social networks, both formal and informal, has been shown to play an important role in forming political dynasties. The findings of this research provide insight into the impact of political dynasties on democracy and governance at the local level, indicating the need for reform in the village head election system to increase the inclusiveness, accountability and responsiveness of village leadership.*

**Keywords:** Political Dynasties, Village Head Elections, Local Democracy, Money Politics

## INTRODUCTION

Villages are the result of the interaction of various groups of human activities with their environment. Formally, villages are recognized as legal community entities that have territorial boundaries and have the authority to manage local interests (Wang & Chiou, 2019). The definition of village, as stated by Aryanti (2015), emphasizes local origins and customs which are the basis of the government system of the Republic of Indonesia. Sociological perspectives, especially those of Snarey & Keljo (2014), describe villages as "gemeinschaft," where relationships between residents are characterized by close feelings and unity. Apart from that, villages are also places where people live with social norms which include mutual cooperation, clothing identity, customs and moral life, in accordance with the views of Utami & Hasmika (2022).

In a social context, Duncan & Phillips (2010) define society as a group of people who have lived together for a long time, are able to organize themselves, and consider themselves as a social unit with clear boundaries. This understanding reflects that villages, as a form of society, have an orderly organizational structure and social norms that are respected by their members (Krishna, 2002). Therefore, villages are not only considered as geographical entities, but also as interrelated communities, maintaining local traditions, and forming a strong collective identity amidst the complexity of social life and indigenous culture (Iossfova, 2015).

The legal basis governing villages is very important in the context of village recognition by the state, and one of the main milestones is Law no. 6 of 2014 concerning Villages (Badaruddin et al, 2021). The existence of this law has striking significance, especially because the village law provides a clear and specific legal basis regarding villages, replacing previous regulations included in the Regional Government law since the reform period (Antlov, 2003). The clarity of these regulations is the basis for effective village management, strengthening village authority in managing local interests in accordance with the characteristics and needs of local communities (Bebbington et al, 2006).

The village law is expected to bring new breakthroughs in realizing village renewal towards better democratization, in line with the spirit of autonomy mandated by the constitution (Yazid & Pakpahan, 2020).

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Articles 31 to 39 of the village law, in particular, establish a new design for village head elections. One striking innovation is the implementation of a system for selecting village heads simultaneously in all districts/cities (Dewi, 2014). Besides that, regulations that limit village heads to serving a maximum of 3 consecutive or non-consecutive terms provide space for leadership rotation, allowing wider participation and avoiding the potential for excessive political domination (Rudiadi & Herawati, 2017). Thus, village laws not only provide a solid legal foundation for villages, but also provide the basis for the implementation of democratic and dynamic village governance (Hariri, 2018).

In the competition to find a leader in the village head election. The incumbent village head or previous village head will try hard to ensure that the leadership relay in the village remains within his family's family. Being a leader in the village is a matter of pride in the community (Hidayat, 2020). With a village leadership system that can only last for 2 terms of office, so that elite competition in the village head election process opens up equal opportunities to compete in the election of village head, the previous village head or family elite will not relinquish their position outside of their family so they must distributed or circular only to those who have family relations (Tokan & Ola, 2020). This is what we later came to know as political dynasty.

Political dynasty refers to a cycle of power that continues from one family member or lineage to the next (Fiva & Smith, 2018). In political dynasties, power is often passed down through generations, with family members taking leadership roles without involving democratic processes or fair elections (Tadem & Tadem, 2016). In contrast, political dynasty refers to a situation where power is consolidated by a particular group, such as an elite family, with the aim of maintaining and gaining power. In this context, members of these groups tend to dominate the political stage to achieve their interests, which can be detrimental to democratic principles (Ruud & Islam, 2016).

Political dynasties are of particular concern in countries that adopt a democratic system. This practice is considered to violate democratic values, such as justice for society, providing equal rights to all citizens, freedom of opinion, fair law enforcement, and preventing corruption, collusion and nepotism (Teehankee et al, 2023). The presence of political dynasties can damage the essence of democracy by creating inequality in political participation, hindering the development of an inclusive society, and endangering the integrity of democratic institutions (Aspinall & As'ad, 2016). Therefore, limiting and rejecting political dynasties is important to ensure the realization of a democratic political order and government with integrity (Muslikhah et al, 2019).

The phenomenon of political dynasties at the local level, especially in village head elections, is still relevant and deeply rooted in the context of the implementation of direct elections for the first time in Indonesia in 2005 and the implementation of regional autonomy in 2001 (Hidayat et al, 2019). Unfortunately, the democratization process brought about by these two events has been exploited by a number of local elites to launch political dynasties. The emergence of these elites often occurs in the context of power reorganization, which reflects the return of elite political influence to the democratic era (Sutisna, 2017). With the implementation of a decentralized government system and regional autonomy, local elites were able to consolidate their power by utilizing symbols of power to mobilize popular support (Prayudi, 2016).

Local elites who hold power in the area of village head elections use various strategies to secure their position (Ukhwaluddin & Subekti, 2022). They utilize their wealth and political skills to win public support, carry out political manipulation, make offers, and mobilize the voter base by exploiting their hereditary origins and customary laws that are believed by the local community (Jayadi, 2019). Thus, political dynasties at the local level not only create political domination, but also influence other aspects of life, including economic and social within the community (Bimantara & Harsasto, 2018). This phenomenon shows the need for an in-depth study of the impact of political dynasties on village head elections in order to understand how local power dynamics can influence the democratization process at the village level.

Political dynasties have the potential to foster a culture of corruption. But preventing political dynasties is by making legal regulations that are annulled by the Constitutional Court, as well as political work to prevent the proliferation of these dynasties (Prianto, 2016). Political dynasties are clearly contrary to the democratic culture that is growing in our beloved country and will emasculate our democracy. Because political dynasties definitely ignore competence and track records. In fact, political dynasties can castrate the role of society in determining

leaders. Starting from the political culture of kinship, the practice of political dynasties is increasingly prevalent ((Tristana & Priyatno, 2017).

In time, the practice of political dynasties will disrupt the process of checks and balances between state institutions. The function of mutual control will certainly not be fully realized if office posts are controlled by people closest to the political dynasty (Pahrudin, 2018). In fact, to instill democratic values, the control function is important. If control of the government is weak, a collusive and corrupt culture will occur. What is sad is that political dynasties are deliberately framed in the context of democracy (Halim & Hakim, 2020).

This research aims to analyze the existence of political dynasties in village head elections in Indonesia with a focus on the causal factors and their impact on the democratic system at the local level. Thus, it is hoped that this research can contribute to academic literature related to local politics and become a reference for the government and decision makers in designing policies that support democratization and prevent the practice of political dynasties at the village level. It is also hoped that the research results will provide a better understanding for the community, so that they can be more aware of the importance of supporting a fair and inclusive democratic system.

## **METHOD**

The method used in this research is a qualitative research method, because this research aims to investigate, discover, describe and explain a social phenomenon that is occurring in society. This qualitative method will produce descriptive data in the form of written or spoken words from people and observable behavior (Yulianah, 2022). Qualitative research can be evaluated accurately if all stages are followed properly. So that readers really understand the nature of the problem discussed by the researcher and readers can provide an assessment of what the researcher wrote. In order for qualitative research to be perfect, what must be taken into account are the established rules which include: meaningfulness, conformity between observations and theory, generality, consistency and accuracy of evidence. Research was carried out through library studies and literature studies by studying several books, journals, laws and regulations, magazines, newspapers and other articles related to political dynasties to expand theories and enrich data. This data analysis was carried out using qualitative analysis, namely by interpreting the symptoms that occurred. Once collected, the data is then managed according to the needs of the analysis to be carried out.

## **RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

### **FACTORS THAT CAUSE POLITICAL DYNASTIES TO OCCUR IN VILLAGE HEAD ELECTIONS IN INDONESIA**

In the government system in Indonesia, the village government is the lowest government unit that is directly related to community life. The village head is a person who has been elected democratically through direct election by the local community who has voting rights based on existing regulations (Arsjad, 2018). The village head has great authority in carrying out village government. In its implementation, a village head is assisted by several village officials such as the head of affairs, village officials, and the BPD, they establish relationships with each other (Sugiman, 2018).

In the context of village head elections in Indonesia, the phenomenon of political dynasties is often the main concern, indicating the continuation of power from one family or lineage to another individual. This practice of dynastic politics has become a common occurrence, where village leadership is often passed down from generation to generation or held by certain family members. This creates complex political dynamics, where village head elections do not always reflect open and democratic competition, but are more related to blood relations and family political heritage. This phenomenon creates challenges in realizing a village head election system that is based on meritocracy and fair community participation, triggering questions related to transparency and integrity in the democratization process at the village level. The following will explain several factors that cause political dynasties in regional head elections in Indonesia.

### **LEGAL RULES THAT ALLOW THAT TO HAPPEN**

Indonesia is a country that has many dynastic politics. This dynastic politics has been present in Indonesia since ancient times and continues to take root until now. This is one of the impacts of the lack of transparency in the recruitment of political party candidates and the absence of strict regulations regarding dynastic politics. In article 7 letter (r) of Law Number 8 of 2015 concerning Regional Elections, it regulates the existence of Dynasty Politics which states that: "Prospective candidates have no conflict of interest with the incumbent. The purpose of this article is that there is no blood relationship, no marriage ties, and has no lineage. In essence, the purpose of publishing this article is as a legal rule for regional election candidates who have incumbent families and to prevent the occurrence of dynastic politics or political dynasties (Padli, 2022).

The ruling of the Constitutional Court (MK) no. 33/PUU-XIII/2015 highlights the incompatibility of Article 7 letter (r) of the Regional Head Election (Pilkada) Law with the 1945 Constitution (UUD 1945). The decision stated that the article was contradictory because it did not have a binding legal character and was not in accordance with the principle of forming legislation which must have a permanent nature in law. As a legal basis, the formation of laws should prioritize the function of legal certainty and guarantee justice for society. Social systems that fall within the realm of law are considered to have an important role in maintaining social order and implementing regulations. Therefore, the task of law as a working tool of the social system is to achieve justice and uphold the values of legal interests.

The role of law is also explained in the context of legal certainty, which is one of the legal principles that supports legal action and law enforcement. Legal certainty is an important principle to ensure that society has equal access to the law, and that legal rules are applied consistently. Therefore, the Constitutional Court's decision emphasizes the importance of having a legal basis that is in accordance with the principles of legal certainty in every law formation, including in the context of regional head elections, in order to support the creation of a fair and just legal system.

Through the Constitutional Court decision Number 33/PUU-XIII/2015, it indirectly provides support for incumbents to carry out dynastic political practices without any restrictions previously regulated by legislators. This ruling can be considered a green light for incumbents, especially those who have wealth or are elite, to use it as a legal basis. The phenomenon of dynastic politics also increased rapidly after the decision, as can be seen from the data that the number of regional head candidates who have a kinship relationship with the incumbent increased sharply from 52 in 2015 to 158 in 2020. The absence of binding formal rules regarding dynastic politics after the Constitutional Court decision no. 33/PUU-XIII/2015 creates inconsistencies with the theories and principles of democratic government adopted in Indonesia. The practice of dynastic politics is more suitable to be applied in the context of a monarchical state, where the selection of leaders involves the practice of nepotism and lineage. This mismatch raises concerns about the continuity of democracy in Indonesia, because dynastic politics can result in the concentration of power in certain groups, detrimental to the principles of healthy competition and equal access to leadership.

The impact of the ruling of the Constitutional Court and the absence of provisions specifically regulating political dynasties have significant implications for village head elections in Indonesia. The Constitutional Court's decision which does not specifically regulate restrictions on dynastic politics opens up a gap for this political practice to develop without clear control. Without specific provisions, village head elections in Indonesia become vulnerable to domination by elite groups or families who seek to take advantage of blood relations or family ties to maintain and pass on power. This unclear regulation creates inequality in local political competition, threatening fundamental aspects of democracy such as fair competition, equal access for each candidate, and active community involvement in the village head election process. Therefore, it is necessary to establish stricter provisions to overcome the negative impacts of dynastic politics and ensure the continuation of healthy democracy at the village level.

## **INSTITUTIONS IN VILLAGES THAT ARE NOT YET DEMOCRATIC ASSUME THAT RECRUITMENT OF VILLAGE HEAD CANDIDATES TENDS TO BE ELITIST**

Village institutions that are not yet democratic are one of the main factors causing the emergence of political dynasties in regional head elections in Indonesia. This factor can be seen from the recruitment of village head

candidates, which tends to be elitist. In many cases, the village head recruitment process in villages is still influenced by traditional and non-democratic factors. Limited community access and participation in village head elections often occurs because village institutions have not fully implemented democratic principles (Heriyanto, 2022).

First, weaknesses in the institutional structure in villages often create limited opportunities for the general public to participate in the selection process for village head candidates. This process is often concentrated in the hands of elite groups or institutional structures that lack transparency, making participation difficult for ordinary citizens. This factor creates inequality in access to opportunities to become a candidate for village head, favoring certain elites to maintain power. Second, the existence of nepotism and clientelism practices in village institutions is also the main cause of limited democratization at the village level. Village head elections influenced by family ties or personal closeness often benefit existing political dynasties, while communities without such ties find it difficult to compete in the local political arena.

Third, the lack of understanding and education about democracy among village communities also plays a role in the weakness of village institutions. The lack of knowledge regarding the importance of active participation in village head elections can make people tend to be passive and less critical of the political dynamics occurring in their village. Fourth, economic constraints also play an important role in determining who can participate in village head elections. Candidates who come from families with wealth or strong economic influence are more likely to run, while economically challenged individuals or groups have a harder time competing.

Fifth, weak supervision and regulation in the village head election process in villages that are not yet democratic can create an opening for the emergence of political dynasties. The lack of strict rules and effective law enforcement provides space for practices that are detrimental to democratic principles, including the dominance of certain groups or families. Finally, cultural and traditional factors can also contribute to weak democratization at the village level. Contains values that preserve power in certain groups or families as cultural inheritance, which then forms social norms and order at the village level. Overall, undemocratic village institutions provide a fertile foundation for the emergence of political dynasties in regional head elections in Indonesia. Improvements and reforms in village institutional structures need to be carried out to encourage more active participation, transparency and fairness in village head elections, maintaining democratic principles which should be the foundation of government at the local level.

## **NETWORK POWER**

The concept of social networks as a dimension of social capital is a theoretical basis that focuses attention on relationships between individuals or groups in a society. Social networks involve ties established through trust, norms, and cooperation that can form close and mutually supportive relationships. In this context, trust acts as the main glue in social networks, guarded and maintained by the norms that regulate interactions between network members (Owa & Leda, 2023).

The importance of the work element in the concept of social networks explains that these networks are not only formal, but also contain dimensions of cooperation and mutual support. Through the medium of social relations, individuals or groups can work together in various contexts, such as economic, social or political. Thus, social networks are not just static structures, but also include interaction dynamics that can form collaboration and positive dependence.

Formal social networks reflect structured patterns of social relationships within a particular field of work or organization. In the context of village heads and village apparatus structures, the use of positional authority is key in forming formal social networks. Village heads often use their power to place relatives or individuals who have close relationships with them in strategic positions in the village apparatus structure. This forms an organized network with a specific goal, such as building political power or strengthening the influence of certain groups at the local level.

Formal social network factors also have a significant impact in the context of voter mobilization. By building relationships and a kinship base through formal social networks, village heads can use their influence to direct voters' opinions and even mobilize them to support certain candidates. Political games that focus on exploiting

these formal relationships can provide significant advantages in gaining voter support and increasing vote share. In a broader context, understanding the dynamics of formal social networks within the village apparatus structure is important for designing more transparent and equitable policies. Efforts to minimize nepotism and ensure that the placement of individuals in village apparatus structures is based on qualifications and competencies can help create a more just and democratic governance environment at the local level.

Informal social networks include informal relationships between individuals, involving aspects of brotherhood, friendship, feelings and certain needs. In the context of political participation, relationships in informal social networks play an important role in opening access to wider political networks. Moreover, through involvement in social activities through various social groups, individuals can open channels of information and communication regarding public issues, which in turn can increase citizens' awareness regarding these issues. Participation in social groups can also provide opportunities to engage in political mobilization. People who are active in social groups tend to have higher involvement in political activities, including support for certain candidates or political parties. Close relationships in informal social networks provide opportunities to discuss and deepen understanding of political issues, thereby increasing the possibility of active participation in the political process.

Additionally, involvement in social activities, also known as civic engagement, is positively correlated with political activity. Individuals who engage in social activities are more likely to engage in political activities, such as voting in elections, getting involved in political campaigns, or even running for political office. The practice of inheritance and the phenomenon of "local dynasties" in village bureaucracy are aspects that influence community management at the local level. In inheritance practice, there is a tendency where a number of key positions in village management matters are inherited from one generation to the next. This creates a dynamic where individuals who have family ties to previous village officials or heads have a greater opportunity to occupy strategic positions in the village bureaucracy.

The importance of close relationships with village chiefs laid the foundation for the phenomenon of "local dynasties." The village head often plays a key role in determining who occupies important positions in the village. People who have a close relationship or kinship with the village head tend to dominate the village bureaucratic structure, filling various important positions in the management of the local community. This phenomenon can create inequality in opportunities to access important positions in the village. Residents who are not related to the village head or village officials have greater difficulty in occupying strategic positions. The practice of inheritance and the dominance of local dynasties can also have an impact on the quality of public services, because it may sacrifice aspects of meritocracy and competence in village management.

## **CAPITAL POWER**

Capital is a type of symbolic power that can be seen or shows various things very well, so that it makes many people believe it. There are several capital theories developed by Pierre Bourdieu in controlling the social conditions of society. Among them, social capital and economic capital. Social capital, in the context of village head leadership, refers to the overall resources associated with having a network of institutionalized and mutually respectful social relationships, and being able to survive in these relationships. Maintaining stable relationships in society creates respect and a positive reputation among group members, building and maintaining trust between individuals. Basically, social capital is formed through full trust from the community, diverse social interactions, and mutually supportive networks (Field, 2016).

In this case, an incumbent Village Head usually has built significant social capital. The village head is a figure who is respected and recognized by the community because he has a strong influence in local society. The Village Head's social capital is manifested through activities such as recitations, celebrations and social activities, such as mutual cooperation. Active involvement in these activities not only strengthens connectedness between residents, but also creates strong social bonds within the village community. With the bonding established by the Village Head and his family through various activities, an atmosphere of mutual understanding and cooperation is created between the community and the village head. The social capital possessed by the village head is key in smoothing the running of government and maintaining the stability of relations between the

village government and its citizens. In this way, social capital becomes a strong foundation for the smooth leadership of the Village Head and the sustainability of social harmony in the village environment.

Economic capital in a political context, especially in direct village head elections, refers to the financial support needed to support various aspects of political campaigns and activities. The use of economic capital includes payments to political parties, campaign costs, and efforts to achieve victory in elections. This economic capital can come from the candidate's personal funding sources or be obtained from donors who support certain political goals. In political contestations involving village head elections, the amount of economic capital becomes very relevant. The costs required are not only to support the implementation of the campaign, but are also important for building relationships with potential supporters. Economic capital is key in mobilizing support at various stages of a campaign, especially leading up to and during the implementation of the campaign itself. Economic capital in politics acts as a "cog" and "lubricant" for the political machine. This capital allows village head candidates to manage campaigns effectively, provide campaign facilities and needs, and build a strong support base. Therefore, the presence of economic capital can provide village head candidates with a competitive advantage, enabling them to compete better and increasing their chances of winning in elections.

### **UNHEALTHY DEMOCRACY**

In village head elections, the phenomenon of fraud often appears, and one of the common forms is the practice of money politics. Money politics includes giving or promising bribes to certain individuals or groups so that they exercise their right to vote in a certain way during general elections. This practice involves structured methods, involving certain parties who use money as basic capital to achieve victory. Village head candidates who are involved in money politics use their sources of power to gain as much support as possible. Money or other goods become the main instrument in mobilizing the masses and ensuring that the votes of certain groups will be tilted in their direction. This practice not only harms the integrity of the democratic process, but also creates inequality in democratic opportunities for society (Yuningsih & Subekti, 2016).

Money politics can also trigger a cycle of inequality and corruption in village government structures. Village head candidates who successfully manipulate election results with money politics may be more likely to continue detrimental practices in village governance after being elected. Therefore, serious handling of money politics is necessary to ensure the integrity and sustainability of democratic processes at the local level. Preventive measures such as law enforcement, voter education, and increasing transparency can be a solution to overcome this problem and build a fairer village head election system.

During the campaign period, village head candidates see it as a crucial opportunity to gain support that can strengthen their position in the election. Unfortunately, the campaign period is also often an arena for various forms of fraud. Power is a key element in leadership, and village head candidates tend to use various methods to maintain or gain power. In an effort to maintain power, some village heads may engage in deviant behavior, such as money politics. This practice generally begins when candidates register, where they provide bribes or financial rewards to certain individuals or groups to ensure their support. Money politics creates inequality in democratic competition, ignoring the essence of the people's voice which should underlie village head elections. Deviant behavior such as money politics not only harms the integrity of village head elections, but can also produce low-quality leadership. Public understanding of the negative impacts of money politics and the importance of fair participation in elections is key to combating this behavior.

### **THE IMPACTS OF POLITICAL DYNASTIES IN VILLAGE HEAD ELECTIONS IN INDONESIA**

Elite circulation in the context of changing political leadership is one of the conditions for the realization of a healthy democratic climate. In dynastic politics, family or close relatives are the right tools to form strong power. Power is the ability to influence other people to act as desired by the person giving the order. Village government also has power exercised by the village head as the highest office holder in the village. So that power remains with them, they maintain power by nominating their wives, children and other relatives to be involved in a government. The following are some of the impacts of dynastic politics in village head elections:

#### **INEQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY**

Dynasty politics, with the dominance of family or lineage in the world of politics, creates significant inequality of opportunity for candidates who are not part of the dominating political family environment. In the context of village head elections in Indonesia, candidates who are related to previous village heads or come from families with political influence can gain support more easily and have better access to resources and political capital. Candidates from outside the political dynasty often face significant obstacles in running for office. They may find it difficult to compete with candidates who have strong support from dominant political families. This unequal competition can hinder the participation of candidates from the wider community, especially those who have ideas and visions that have the potential to enrich leadership dynamics at the village level.

In addition, dynastic politics tends to create networks and patronage that are difficult for candidates from outside the circle to access. Candidates from political dynasties are usually able to leverage relationships and support that have been built up over many years, giving them an edge in gaining financial support, voters, and access to power structures in the village. As a result, the creation of inequality of opportunity can be detrimental to society as a whole. A lack of diversity in candidates can result in a lack of innovation and new ideas in village leadership. This creates a risk of stagnation in village development and an inability to address new challenges that may arise.

### **DEPENDENCE ON FAMILY INTERESTS**

Village heads who are elected through dynastic politics are often faced with the risk of prioritizing the interests of their own family or descendants over the general interests of the community. Within the scope of village leadership, strong dependence on family networks can give rise to conflicts of interest that are detrimental to justice and sustainable development at the village level. First of all, village heads who have a dynastic political background may be exposed to internal pressure to provide benefits and facilities to family members or related groups. This can lead to inequality in resource allocation, where development projects and programs tend to favor certain areas or groups associated with the political dynasty.

Second, the tendency to prioritize family can also be detrimental to democratic processes and participatory community involvement. Decisions made by village heads associated with political dynasties may not reflect the aspirations and needs of the community as a whole, but rather focus on the internal interests of the dominating family. Furthermore, unequal allocation of resources can also create inequality in village development. Uneven projects can increase social and economic disparities between rural areas, ignoring urgent needs in areas that may not have ties to political dynasties.

Fourth, dependence on family networks can be detrimental to the principles of transparency and accountability in managing village resources. Decisions and actions of village heads who are more inclined towards family interests may be difficult to account for to the community as a whole. Finally, this negative impact can continue at a higher level in hampering village development and progress. A lack of equality and fairness in resource allocation can be an obstacle to achieving sustainable development goals at the local level.

### **LACK OF LEADERSHIP ROTATION**

The impact of dynastic politics which creates a lack of leadership rotation at the village level can have significant consequences for the dynamics and quality of leadership at the local level. First of all, continued domination by one family or group of families in the position of village head can prevent the formation of a variety of new leadership ideas and approaches. The lack of leadership rotation creates monotony and stagnation in village development, where the policies and programs implemented tend to reflect the same patterns of previous village heads. This can limit innovation in village governance and prevent the possibility of adopting more effective solutions to community problems.

Furthermore, a lack of leadership rotation can also hold back the development of more inclusive leadership. Leadership that is consolidated within a family or family group may be less inclined to involve leaders from outside the environment. This condition can harm participation and representation which should reflect the diversity of local communities. The continued lack of leadership rotation can hinder leadership responsiveness



to the changing needs of society. In facing social, economic or environmental changes, varied and dynamic leadership can provide more effective and responsive reactions to the challenges faced by villages.

In overcoming the lack of leadership rotation caused by dynastic politics, it is necessary to implement mechanisms or regulations that facilitate wider inclusion of various elements of society in the village head election process. Reforms in the election system and village leadership regulations can open up space for more inclusive participation and ensure healthy and quality leadership rotation. Efforts to encourage diversity in leadership at the village level need to be an integral part of broader democratization reforms in Indonesia.

## **CORRUPTION RISK**

Dynastic politics can increase the risk of corruption because it opens up opportunities for abuse of power for the benefit of the family or limited groups. Family-bound village heads may tend to prioritize awarding contracts or projects to family members, which could increase the risk of collusion, nepotism, and corruption. First of all, involving family members in government projects or contracts can create opportunities for village heads to provide financial benefits to their own families. This can lead to unfairness in the allocation of public resources and harm the communities who should benefit from these projects.

Second, the practice of collusion and nepotism can damage the integrity and effectiveness of village government institutions. Appointing family members without consideration of qualifications and competence can ignore the principles of justice and meritocracy in the management of resources and public policy. Furthermore, the risk of corruption increases when the village head's policies and decisions are more influenced by family relationships than the public interest. Decisions based on family connections rather than merit and community needs can create an environment where corruption becomes easier and harder to police.

In dealing with the risk of corruption caused by dynastic politics, efforts are needed to strengthen monitoring and transparency mechanisms in the management of village finances and projects. Policy reforms that limit direct involvement of village heads' families in government projects and encourage good governance principles can help reduce the risk of corruption and increase accountability in village leadership. Efforts to empower communities to monitor and report corrupt practices are also a key step in building clean governance and integrity at the village level.

## **CONCLUSION**

Political dynasties in village head elections in Indonesia are influenced by several main factors. First, the unclear legal rules after the Constitutional Court decision no. 33/PUU-XIII/2015 provides an opening for the practice of dynastic politics without firm control. Second, village institutions that are not yet democratic cause the recruitment of village head candidates to be elitist, creating inequality in access to opportunities to become a village head candidate. Traditional and non-democratic factors still influence the selection of village head candidates. Third, the strength of social networks, both formal and informal, plays an important role in forming political dynasties through village institutional structures and informal social relations. Dynastic politics in village head elections has a significant impact on democracy and local government governance in Indonesia. This phenomenon developed along with direct elections in 2005 and the implementation of regional autonomy in 2001. Dynasty politics created unequal opportunities for candidates from outside the dominant political family, hampered inclusive participation, and encouraged less responsive leadership. The risk of corruption also increases due to opportunities for abuse of power in the interests of certain families or groups. With the dominance of family members in government projects or contracts, the risk of collusion, nepotism and corruption is greater. Dynasty politics also hinders leadership rotation at the village level, creates stagnation in village development and hinders the development of inclusive leadership.

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