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Bishops, Kings and Leviathan: Nationalism and Integralism in Light of High Church Anglican Political Thought

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Abstract

This article traces the political thought of high church Anglicans from 1580-1720. Beginning with Richard Hooker, Anglican political thought was shaped by the need to balance competing principles. For high church Anglicans, the monarchy was seen as the institution best positioned to defend this balance against what they saw as the twin threats of "Puritanism and popery." However, high churchmen also began to defend a high view of episcopacy even over against the power of the English government, introducing a tension between royal supremacy and high church Anglicanism with implications for both nationalist and integralist conceptions of the state. This culminated in the nonjurors—Anglican clergy and academics removed from their posts for refusing to swear oaths to William and Mary—defending episcopacy against both the new king and defenders of royal supremacy. The example of high church Anglicans demonstrates some perils of both nationalist and integralist approaches to politics for many religious forms of traditional conservatism.

Keywords: *Nationalism; integralism; Anglicanism; ecclesiology; Richard Hooker; nonjurors*

Introduction

With the rise of new nationalist and populist movements in recent years, both supporters and critics of these movements have assumed affinities between nationalism and a certain kind of traditionalist conservatism. Proponents see nationalism as a means of protecting local religious traditions from what they take to be an unremittingly hostile global cosmopolitanism; a biblical idea rediscovered by Protestants seeking to defend the reformation against the papacy; or the vehicle for a project that would fuse religious and political power in the state, an approach sometimes called integralism. By contrast, secular and left-wing opponents have warned against the perceived dangers of this new religious nationalism, which they associate with both the traditionalism and the ethnic politics they dislike on the right. All seem to agree that the fusion of nationalism and a religiously based traditional conservatism is a natural and mutually reinforcing one.

In seeking historical evidence for such a national fusion, the history of the Church of England seems a reasonable place to start. After all, England's reformation, so the story goes, was an act of state, and its church was a creature of that state. Evidence of this contention is drawn from the defense of royal supremacy advanced by Richard Hooker, the support of divine right monarchy of high church Anglicans during the civil war, and the persistent and, some might say, pervasive alliance between traditional religion and the increasingly powerful English state. Yet, closer examination of the Anglican high churchmen—those Anglicans most committed to preserving the traditions of the church—shows a more nuanced picture in which conflict between the high church vision of religion and the imperatives of the English state grew more, not less, intense over time. In other words, the

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longer advocates of traditionalist conservatism in religion were yoked in harness with the state, the less they liked it.

What is striking about high church conflict with first the crown and later the state, is that it grew out of two opposite trends: the state grew more national, and the high churchmen, more catholic. On one hand, the Whig revolution made the state—embodied by Parliament—supreme over even the king, and the subsequent accommodations with the nonconformists and, eventually, Catholics, transformed English identity from one based on religious conformity to one based on ethnic identification. On the other hand, high churchmen became increasingly convinced of the doctrine—which they drew from Saint Cyprian—that Bishops were essential to the church, and that the episcopal office was of divine origin, and necessary for catholicity. Yet, the more vigorous high churchmen were in asserting a traditionalist and conservative religious ideal, the more incompatible that ideal became with the increasingly nationalist orientation of the state.

An examination of high church political thought from its origins under Richard Hooker to the accession of George I clearly demonstrates this transition. Hooker's vision of a Christian commonwealth might be reasonably described as constitutional integralism, a strand of thought ably carried forward, in different forms, both by the high churchmen of the Caroline period and more typical Erastian thinkers such as the parliamentarian, lawyer and Hebrew scholar John Selden. Even as Hooker's balanced vision of polity yielded to Laud's full-throated defense of royal supremacy by divine right, high churchmen intensified their support for the equally divine authority of Bishops in the church while remaining within the confines of the doctrine of royal supremacy. While these tendencies intensified during the interregnum, two developments would prove salient during this period of powerless exile. First, under pressure from both aggressive papal proselytizing and the stricter Protestantism of the Puritans and Presbyterians, Anglican apologists drew on historic Christianity to articulate an increasingly high view of episcopacy while also affirming the authority of scripture and rejecting papacy. Second, high churchmen engaged in a long, often heated controversy with another royalist exile: Thomas Hobbes, whose vision of government and politics they abhorred. Through the conflict between Hobbes and Bishop John Bramhall, we can see the distinctions between the absolutism of Hobbes, a necessary pre-cursor for the rise of a national state, and the constitutional royalism of Bramhall, who still operated within Hooker's framework. When the restoration brought episcopacy back into the church, restoration-era Caroline divines hewed even more closely to royal supremacy at first—but, even here, they nuanced their support to maintain critical distance at those times when they perceived the king as treading too close to either Catholicism or more strict and disciplinarian Protestantism. The rise of the latitudinarians would prove particularly threatening to high church principles. With deep roots in enlightenment thought and a strong desire for social peace and de-emphasizing theological distinctions after the tumult of the civil war and interregnum, latitudinarians were characterized by both staunch support for the supremacy of the state over the church and a desire to incorporate non-conformist Protestants. Latitudinarians, therefore, rejected the views of the high churchmen, while also proving to be the truest advocates of a "national" church, as ethnonationalists might understand the term. The latitudinarian project was greatly advanced by the accession of William and Mary, and so it is unsurprising that the most extreme skepticism about state power within high church Anglicanism of the period came from those Bishops, along with their followers, who refused to swear oaths to the new monarchs and were deprived of their offices, commonly called nonjurors. In this context, the thought of the prominent nonjuror Henry Dodwell elucidates the disjuncture between high church principles and nationalism in its fullest form. At no time since perhaps that of Henry VIII was the English state more "national" than during the reign of William and Mary, and the subsequent Whig ascendancy during the rule of the

Hanoverians. It is significant, therefore, that Dodwell's critique of the deprivation of the seven Bishops extended so far as to question even the royal supremacy claimed by Henry.

As this brief sketch of the history makes clear, an examination of high church Anglicanism can provide useful insights into the relationship between Protestantism on one hand, and nationalism and integralism on the other. The ninety-million-member Anglican Communion is the world's largest global Protestant body, and so this examination could provide insights into the trajectory of these ideas within global Protestantism. Additionally, the study demonstrates complexities in our understanding of the state's relationship to religion. Even as some scholars have elucidated challenges to religious freedom posed by the tension between individual conscience and the rights and values of religious institutions, so too, these tensions exist quite strongly in a context of national establishment. Contrary to the hopes of traditionalist conservatives and the fears of their secular opponents, the Anglican experience of establishment demonstrates that the state is at least as likely to take the side of individuals as religious institutions—whether out of genuine conviction, a desire for social harmony, or a desire to eliminate or weaken competing sources of authority. Finally, the example of high church Anglicans demonstrates some potential incompatibilities between nationalism and integralism, while also exposing the limits of the latter. The nationalist emphasis on uniting all members of the ethnic community under one state will, if religion is explicitly wedded to that state, tend to precisely corrode the principles of religion integralists seek to defend through this unity. In the case of the high churchmen covered in this study, the principles at issue revolved around the catholicity of the English reformation and the preservation of episcopacy, but similar analyses of contemporaneous Presbyterian or disciplinarian Protestant figures would likely yield similar results. And whereas integralists envision the power of the state being conformed to the values of the church, England's experience with rising nationalism raises the possibility that this process works in reverse, reducing any religious principle to a lowest-common-denominator laxity capable of being utterly conformed to the imperatives of the national state. Those seeking to defend and articulate such principles, therefore, ought to treat nationalist politics with a wary caution, and may come to wonder, as did Henry Dodwell, whether integralism is either possible or desirable in the long run.

Defining Terms

Before delving into the meat of this study, it is necessary to define three critical terms: nationalism, integralism and high church. Any definition of these three terms must be almost so cursory as to risk irritating serious scholars of each of the three fields. This is particularly true for nationalism, about which a massive body of literature quite intensely disagrees. For purposes of this study, nationalism is understood as a political project whereby the state is ideally made co-terminus with an ethnic community or "nation." Nationhood, here, is viewed partially in Andersonian terms as an "imagined community," all be it one whose contours are perhaps less susceptible to amendment than some constructivist scholars might believe (Anderson, 2006), and with some sympathy for the ethno-symbolist approach of Anthony Smith (2009). Nationalism, by contrast, is much more clearly constructed, since nationalism is inherently a political project—one that sometimes builds, but always strives after, a state. At the same time, state-builders have found nationalism to be a vitally important resource for their project. As James Scott explains, states seek to make their population more "legible"—that is, more uniform and unified in their experience, to fulfill the various tasks for which the state is created (Scott, 1998, introduction and chapter 4). Nationalism, as Benedict Anderson explains, is quite conducive to this project, as it constructs, and arises out of, a shared experience of time, space, and events—what he calls "homogeneous empty time" (Anderson 2006, chapter 2). Thus, nationalism is the process of either creating or enhancing a sense of common nationhood, for

the purpose of building or strengthening a state co-terminus with the territory envisioned as part of that nation.

Integralism, in general, involves a unified view of the state and society, wherein both are taken together as one organic and united whole. Integralists often draw explicitly on familial models of social organization, applying them to the state. For the purposes of this study, "integralism" is taken in a narrower sense, referring to a particular approach to church and state that we might usefully call Christian integralism. Eschewing models that separate the religious and political realms into distinct spheres, cities, or societies, Christian integralists err, to varying degrees, on the side of a unity between church and state whereby the latter is deputized as the enforcement mechanism of the former. Virtually all Anglican political thought before 1689 is, to one degree or another, integralist.

Finally, high church is, for the theologian, a term almost as contentious as nationalism is to the political scientist. Indeed, when applied to some of the thinkers chronicled in this study, period historians might consider it anachronistic—just as many of the earliest church fathers would not identify themselves as "patristic" or "ante-nicene" thinkers, so too many of the earliest advocates of what are today known as "high church" principles within Anglicanism would not have known, or used, the term. Thus, "high church" here refers not so much to a historical category of thinkers as a theological project or mode of thought; like many such theological currents, its contours are often more visible in hindsight than they are at the time. In general, the term "high church" can be used to describe those movements within (usually Protestant) Christian traditions that emphasize traditional liturgy, continuity with Christian history, and an aesthetic emphasizing beauty and mystery. In the Anglican context, the "high church" project sought "to distance the Church of England from the 'presumptions' of both Rome and the radical Reformation." (Clavier, p. 360). Drawing heavily on historic Christian tradition, high churchmen advocated for a more ornate liturgy, defended the importance of Bishops in apostolic succession as the proper mode of government for the church, and sought to keep the English reformation as firmly in continuity with the historic church as was possible. High churchmen were variously opposed by disciplinarian Protestants—sometimes called Puritans—as well as Presbyterians, Roman Catholics, and later those who favored a broad Protestant settlement that accommodated all comers, often called latitudinarians. That said, the intensity of this opposition depended on the direction from which they perceived the greatest threat. As will be seen in this study, high churchmen had internal differences on many points, and so the term "high church" is necessarily positional.

Richard Hooker and the Origins of High Church Political Thought

No figure is more aptly described as the touchstone for modern English political thought than Richard Hooker. As evidence for this contention, we need only point to the degree to which Hooker has been claimed as a forebear by almost every major strand of English political thought over the last three centuries. From contractarian liberals to advocates of the most strenuous forms of divine right monarchy; from Anglo-Catholics to Anglicans of a far more reformed inclination; from modern-day would-be post-liberals to liberalism's defenders; Hooker is claimed as an inspiration. Unsurprisingly, then, a study of high church political thought must begin with Hooker. As discussed above, whether Hooker would have considered himself a "high churchman" is highly uncertain, yet it is undeniable that high churchmen claimed Hooker as a predecessor, and operated within his intellectual framework. Still, both strict Erastians like John Selden and many latitudinarians also saw themselves as heirs of Hooker's legacy, even as they contended against high churchmen.

In matters of theology, Hooker's works are substantial, and the scholarship on them is even more so. In general, modern Hooker scholarship has revolved around the contentious issue of Hooker's debt, or lack thereof, to the continental reformation. Thus, whether Hooker was a champion of a "via media" or "reformed orthodoxy" has become something of a paradigm war in Hooker scholarship. For our purposes, however, this debate, while interesting, is relevant only in so far as it impacts his adoption by the high church tradition or explains his theory of politics. Torrance Kirby, one of the champions of the "reformed orthodox" perspective on Hooker, identified what he called "a tension of sorts within Hooker's thought between two principal traditions of Christian Platonism, the Pseudo-Dionysian and the Augustinian." (Kirby 2005, p. 36). This seeming tension between the Augustinian approach of the magisterial reformation and the more traditional and mystical Platonism of Pseudo-Dionysius may perhaps be resolved through recourse to the theorist McGrade calls Hooker's "principal philosophical mentor": Aristotle (McGrade, 2020, pp. 362-363). Hooker's political thought has clear affinities with Aristotle's golden mean—a harmonious balance achieved by holding seemingly contradictory virtues together. In so far as this is also reflected in his theology, we can understand his project as at once fully reformed and fully catholic, not only seeking to avoid the excesses of either, but to fully integrate the strengths of both into the English church.

Likewise, harmonizing competing principles in one integrated whole is key to Hooker's political thought. These principles might best be described, in modern terms, as order and liberty, or in Hooker's parlance, hierarchy and consent. Grounding both of these principles was Hooker's view of law as foundational not only to government, but nature itself (Wolin, 1953, p. 32). On one hand, Hooker's view of natural law led him to an understanding of a natural order and hierarchy in the universe that he sought to reflect in his polity. Kirby describes the polity Hooker envisions as one "whose very essence is liturgical, whose clergy are themselves likened to the angels 'in order and degree' and whose government is understood to mirror, however imperfectly, the ideal order of the celestial hierarchy." (Kirby 2005, p. 32). Yet, at the same time, Hooker's view of law led him to hold a high view of consent, which he viewed as the basis for any polity, and without which any ruler must be considered "no better than a tyrant" (McGrade 2020, p. 362). Reconciliation of these seemingly competing principles required an elaborate but central understanding of reason, which Robert Reilly credits as single-handedly reversing the rejection of reason in much of the reformation (Reilly, 2020, p. 160). Yet Hooker's concept of reason is neither a matter of pure individual intellect nor detached from community and context (McGrade, p. 363). Indeed, reason itself is integrated with tradition in Hooker's thought, such that it becomes more the product of society as a whole than that of any individual mind within it(Littlejohn 2017, p. 185). Finally, reason is limited by the pervasive effects of original sin, which blunts a natural human "thirst for knowledge" by clouding our minds and making rational thought painful and difficult (McGrade 2020, p. 364). The purpose of reason is to determine that which is good, but due to the effects of sin, it is quite difficult to determine the first cause of goodness, and so we must more often rely on the "sign" of goodness that a thing is ubiquitous (Clavier 2007, p. 368; McGrade 2020, p. 364). Thus, individual reason must submit itself to the judgments of tradition, if not in unthinking deference, then at least, as a wise guide to be heeded in any judicious reforms. Hooker saw reform not as innovation, but as the perfecting of what was already potentially good; a "method of continuity" (Wolin, 1953: 39). It is this method of preserving continuity through reform that was perhaps his greatest gift to the high church movement (Clavier 2007, p. 360).

Of course, Hooker was not unique in his embrace of both order and liberty, hierarchy and consent. Both before and after Hooker, the challenge of balancing these necessary elements in society would figure prominently in the works of many political theorists. What is unique in Hooker's work is the

theoretical approach he uses to argue for their integration into a coherent whole. He begins with the premise that a commonwealth, by virtue of existence possesses authority to govern itself: "every independent multitude, before any certain form of regiment established, hath, under God's supreme authority, full dominion over itself" (Hooker, 1888, Bk. 8, chap. 2). This is close to a kind of proto-nationalism, and thinkers such as Wolin (1953) read it as such. Yet, we must insert a few caveats that will remain relevant for several future thinkers in the Hookerian mold. First, when Hooker speaks of "multitudes," "peoples," or "commonwealths," he rarely does so in ethnic terms. Rome—a multi-ethnic empire—is treated as analogous to England in ways no modern nationalist would countenance. Second, the modern nation-state that is both the necessary pre-cursor and the desired end state of any "nationalist" program is not present in Hooker's thought. Hooker might, with far more justification, be seen as an integralist. Littlejohn argues that Hooker's integralism is rooted in his Christology: just as, in Christ, the divine work of creation and the human work of redemption are united, so too, in a Christian polity, the divine work of the church and human work of the state ought not be separated (Littlejohn, 2017, p. 222). For Kirby, the origin is more Aristotelian and platonic, with the prince serving as the "unmoved mover of the constitution" around whom the state, analogous here to the Aristotelian cosmos, naturally orbited (Kirby, 2005, p. 32). Yet, as always seems to be the case with Hooker, caveats are necessary. First, Hooker's integralism is conditional. In Hooker's words: "We hold, that seeing there is not any man of the Church of England but the same man is also a member of the commonwealth; nor any man a member of the commonwealth, which is not also of the Church of England; therefore as in a figure triangular the base doth differ from the sides thereof... so, albeit properties and actions of one kind do cause the name of a commonwealth, qualities and functions of another sort the name of a Church to be given unto a multitude, yet one and the selfsame multitude may in such sort be both, and is so with us, that no person appertaining to the one can be denied to be also of the other" (1888) (Bk. 8, chap. 1). In short, Hooker's advocacy for an integrated union between church and commonwealth is premised on the notion that "there is not any man of the Church of England, but the same man is also a member of the commonwealth." Indeed, Hooker (1888) makes this point even more explicit as he examines antiquity: "when whole Rome became Christian... if it be held that the church and the commonwealth of Rome did then remain as before; there is no way how this could be possible, save only one, and that is, they must restrain the name of the Church in a Christian commonwealth to the clergy, excluding all the residue of believers, both prince and people." (Bk. 8, chap. 1). Hooker (1888) extends the metaphor of the triangular unity further: "members of a Christian commonwealth have a triple state; a natural, a civil, and a spiritual" (Bk. 8, chap. 1). Hooker's approach is almost typologically trinitarian: naturally, human beings enter into societies that grant them a civil state, and if all of them are Christian, both the individuals and the commonwealth as a whole possess a third, spiritual state. In other words, it is by consent—in this case, the consensual adoption of Christianity by all the people—that a polity makes itself eligible for the integralist vision of society Hooker believes to be best.

Second, Hooker's vision of integralism is firmly constitutional. While the sovereign is the source and commander of the state, his authority is far from unbounded. McGrade describes Hooker as "emphatically not a supporter of the divine right of kings" (McGrade 2020, p. 363). Royal supremacy is affirmed, to be sure, as something that "God through Christ" might sufficiently enlighten " a free Christian state or kingdom, where one and the selfsame people are the Church and the commonwealth" to embrace (Hooker, 1888: bk. 8, chap. 3). However, the logic Hooker uses to argue for royal supremacy is more consent of the people than divine right: "forasmuch as the light of reason doth lead them unto it, and against it God's own revealed law hath nothing: surely they do not in submitting themselves thereunto any other than that which a wise and religious people ought to do"

(Hooker, 1888: bk. 8, chap. 3). Royal supremacy is also limited to a positive right of protecting the church only: "for the received laws and liberties of the Church the king hath supreme authority and power, but against them, none" (Hooker, 1888: bk. 8, chap. 2). The sovereign has total authority to uphold the church, a great deal of authority to determine ecclesiastical policy in those areas not prescribed in God's law, but no authority whatsoever to work against the church and its liberties. To ensure institutional limits on royal supremacy Hooker also balanced the authority of kings with that of parliament, even as the authority of Bishops was meant to be balanced by that of the parliament of clergy: the convocation. Hooker saw constitutionalism and integralism as not only compatible with, but also necessary for, one another. As Littlejohn explains: "For Hooker, a modest civil state that restrains religious disputes in service to the public good is only possible in a polity that acknowledges the kingship of Christ." (Littlejohn, p. 128).

Before concluding our discussion of Hooker, something must be said regarding his view of episcopacy. As was typical of his thought, this view was balanced and complex. To quote him directly: "The ruling superiority of one bishop over many presbyters in each church, is an order descended from Christ to the Apostles, who were themselves bishops at large, and from the Apostles to those whom they in their steads appointed bishops... for which cause presbyters must not grudge to continue subject unto their bishops, unless they will proudly oppose themselves against that which God himself ordained by his apostles, and the whole Church of Christ approveth and judgeth most convenient. On the other side bishops... [cannot say that] the absolute and everlasting continuance of... (their authority) any commandment of the Lord doth enjoin; and therefore, must acknowledge that the Church hath power by universal consent upon urgent cause to take it away." (Hooker, 1888: bk. 7, chap. 5). Here again, Hooker harmonizes his core political principles of hierarchy and consent, order and liberty. His position is not a full acceptance of jure divino episcopacy, nor is it a fully Erastian argument that rulers could do as they pleased where church government is concerned. Episcopacy, for Hooker, is a divinely-instituted tradition which, while neither necessary for salvation nor essential for the existence of the church, nevertheless retains sanction both from divine origin and, almost as important for Hooker, the universal testimony of tradition. Nor does Hooker necessarily always support rulers against Bishops, as his approving discussion of those Presbyters who remained loyal to John Chrysostom even when he was deprived of his position by the emperor makes clear (Hooker, 1888: bk. 7, chap. 7). Thus, the will of a king or Emperor could not be sufficient, in and of itself, to remove a Bishop, meaning that "universal consent" must have some broader base than simply royal command. And, in the absence of a commonwealth in which the members of the church and citizens of the state were synonymous, it is doubtful that Hooker would permit any disestablishment of episcopacy. As in all of his thought, Hooker evinces here a preference for careful balance in government, appealing first to scripture and, where scripture makes no clear argument, to individual or collective reason—the latter, of course, embodied in tradition. His genius as a thinker was not only to hold in tension principles, modes of thought and institutions others (at the time and later) believed to be irreconcilable, but to unite them to one another, using Aristotelian logic and a firm grasp on Christology and trinitarian theology. If there is a coherent case to be made for integralism in the Christian context, Hooker made it. Yet, whatever merits it may have in theory, the harmonious and balanced Christian commonwealth Hooker envisioned never materialized in practice, leaving behind, instead, various contending parties who sought either to preserve, reform, modify, or entirely erase it.

From Hooker to the Caroline Divines: Divine Right Kingship, Jure Divino Episcopacy, and the Cracks in the Christian Commonwealth

Even at the time Hooker's works were written, visible cracks were becoming apparent in the Christian commonwealth he envisioned. Thus, in a sense, the war for Hooker's legacy began before his death. Arguments for episcopacy by divine right emerged in Hooker's time from John Bridges, Dean of Salisbury, Hadrian Saravia, an emigre cleric from the Netherlands who was very close to Hooker, and, most significantly, Richard Bancroft, Archbishop of Canterbury (Haivry 2017, p. 390). As James I came to the throne, support for jure divino episcopacy intensified, strongly abetted by the king himself. Divine right monarchy is often interpreted as a kind of proto-absolutism, perhaps because of the absolutist direction in which some supporters of the Stuarts, discussed below, eventually moved. However, as understood by most divine right theorists, it was less an absolute submission of all forces to the king under all circumstances than a polemical argument against papal critics of the reformation (Prior 2003, p. 33). Nevertheless, the theory of divine right, either in episcopacy or kingship, was a decisive break with the balanced position of Hooker, since the implication of divine right was that consent was not required. It also put defenders of episcopacy on an intensifying collision course with the growing presbyterian movement, which saw their own vision of polity as equally jure divino.

The man most associated with "divine right monarchy" in the minds of political theorists is probably Sir Robert Filmer. This is not because Filmer made the most robust or effective argument for this position—in fact, quite the opposite. As Filmer scholar James Daley explains it was John Locke who made Filmer the exemplar of divine right monarchy, primarily for the purpose of undermining any opposition to Locke's own project in the process (Daley 1979, p. 166-167). Nevertheless, Filmer is important because his influence has been magnified by Locke's work, and many subsequent critics of Locke have, indeed, drawn on Filmer's premises. At the heart of Filmer's thought was omnicompetent sovereignty, which Filmer saw as originating in Adam by divine right, and from which all political authority must derive (Daley, 1979: p. 13). There is a kind of familism in Filmer—but it is a familism that reduces the complex and balanced understanding of the family found both in scripture and naturally in society to a naked patriarchalism more akin to the absolute authority of a Roman pater familius than the complexities of that mystery which, as Saint Paul says, "refers to Christ and the church" (English Standard Version Bible, 2001, Ephesians 5:32). In addition, the kind of unqualified absolutism advocated by Filmer certainly lacks the Christological and Aristotelian balancing of principles in tension found in Hooker's thought. Both Filmer and Locke cited Hooker in support of their positions, yet both extracted elements of his thought—a strong sense of the ruler's sovereignty for Filmer, a high view of consent for Locke—without taking the project as a whole.

Filmer, then, could be a pre-cursor for a kind of religiously infused nationalism, since the omnicompetent sovereignty he envisions might readily translate to the state, and since he also blesses it with the imprimatur of scripture. Yet, Filmer was not typical of the defenders of divine right monarchy, particularly those of a high church orientation. Even the most absolutist high church Anglican, the anti-parliamentarian and magna carta skeptical Archbishop William Laud, affirmed a belief in jure divino episcopacy. In his words: "I will say, and abide by it, that the calling of bishops is jure divino, by divine right. And I say further, that from the Apostles' time, in all ages, in all places, the Church of Christ was governed by bishops. Now this is made by these men as if it were contra regem, against the king, in right or in power. But that's a mere ignorant shift, for our being bishops jure divino, by divine right, takes nothing from the king's right or power over us. For though our office be from God and Christ immediately, yet we may not exercise that power, either of order or

jurisdiction, but as God hath appointed us, that is, not in his Majesty's or any Christian king's kingdoms, but by and under power of the king given us so to do. No man can libel against our calling (as these men do), be it in pulpit, print or otherwise, but he libels against the king and the state, by whose laws we are established. Therefore, all these libels, so far forth as they are against our calling, are against the king and the Law, and can have no other purpose than to stir up sedition among the people." (Laud, Works, vi, p. 42-46, quoted in Jackson 2007, p. 57). Thus, while he saw no contradiction between his absolutism and jure divino episcopacy, he nevertheless affirmed the latter in a way Filmer's omnicompetent sovereignty would not permit.

Even as Laud argued for a kind of divine right integralism, his contemporary, the parliamentarian John Selden, developed several aspects of Hooker's synthesis in a direction favorable to both nationalism and integralism. Indeed, of all of the figures covered in this study, Selden probably comes the closest to an actual fusion of nationalism and traditionalism, all combined with a kind of Erastian integralism. However, Selden was a political antagonist to many high churchmen (though on good terms with several of them personally), and in fact, if there is a later school of thought that might claim him as a forebear, it would probably be the latitudinarians of the restoration to early Hanoverian periods. Thus, Selden is worth discussing as a path not taken by high church Anglicans, and because, even in his fully Erastian vision, tensions between nationalism and integralism emerge. Selden was a lawyer, well-versed in England's common law tradition, a parliamentarian, and a widely respected scholar of Hebrew. His thought has many affinities with that of Hooker, including: "marked reticence from assigning jure divino status to any particular arrangement in church or state, the viewing of the clergy as a vital element of political society, and the essentially unitary view of church and state (for which both men were accused of Erastianism)." (Haivry 2017, p. 395). Also, like Hooker, Selden embraced tradition, which he defined as continuity through change over time, as the hallmark of all successful political institutions (Haivry 2017, p. 304). Even more than Hooker, Selden placed great weight on the importance of nationalism, to the extent that he often made much of what he perceived to be a tendency, throughout English history, to defend traditional national institutions over against more universalistic or imperial ones (Haivry 2017, page 305). Yet nationhood, for Selden, was not primarily a matter of ethnicity or dissent so much as culture and customs, language, religion and law in particular (Haivry 2017, p. 296). Selden also made firm distinctions between the nation and the state, and there is evidence that he believed there were some national customs that ought to be legally binding even if they differ from the laws or authority of the state (Haivry 2017, p. 312). Selden's conception of church and state is firmly integralist, and is premised both on his commitment to the idea that Christianity had firm Jewish roots, and his opposition to any form of clerical supremacy over, or ecclesial independence from, the state (Haivry 2017, p. 401). Central to Selden's Jewish scholarship is his insistence that the ancient Jewish polity made no distinction between the civil and religious spheres, and his equally firm belief that Christians ought not do so either (Haivry 2017, page 400, see also page 450). In practical terms, he supported parliamentary supremacy over the church (Haivry 2017, p. 398), but actively worked to preserve what he saw as beneficial human traditions like episcopacy (Haivry 2017 p. 443-444), and clerical representation in parliament (Haivry 2017, p. 446). His integralism was a function of his constitutionalism, for he saw religion as part of the English constitutional tradition, and believed integrating it into the political space was necessary to the preservation of this constitutional order (Haivry 2017, pages 455-456). Selden's argument about the place of the church in the ancient English constitution influenced later high churchmen. In short, both Selden's nationalism and his integralism were derived from his traditionalist English constitutionalism. He represents perhaps the most mature expression of the Erastian elements of Hooker's consensus. Yet, Selden was not a high churchman, did not accept jure divino episcopacy or

the project of integrating catholic elements with the reformed heritage, and believed parliament had the absolute authority to abolish episcopacy, but ought to reform it instead.

In the wake of Laud's execution and the Stuart exile, Anglicanism itself was not guaranteed to survive in its post-reformation form. Beset by disciplinarian Protestants on one hand, and the Roman Catholicism of the French court on the other, Anglicanism in general, and high church Anglicanism in particular, seemed a project doomed to an ignominious end. Yet it was during the interregnum that the high church project took on its mature form, as talented men like Henry Hammond and John Bramhall defended the Anglican synthesis on its own merits (Rose, 2011, p. 18). In so doing, they argued that their own ecclesiology of equal jure divino Bishops, drawn from the church father Cyprian, more accurately and truly maintained catholicity than did the papacy (Rose 2011, p. 18). In the realm of political thought, however, the chief antagonist of the Anglicans was neither a parliamentary presbyterian nor French Roman Catholic, but another royalist exile: Thomas Hobbes. Like Filmer before him, Hobbes was an absolutist who embraced the idea of omnicompetent sovereignty. Yet, where Filmer drew on Genesis, Hobbes drew on nature, and his system was professedly indifferent as to whether this sovereignty was exercised by a monarch, an aristocracy, or some other form of government (Jackson, 2007). Notwithstanding both the similarity of Hobbes and Filmer's conception of sovereignty and the persistent claim that high churchmen were all essentially Filmerian, Anglican divines were almost entirely critical of Hobbes, and often quite vociferously so (Raylor, 2010).

Hobbes' particular antagonist was Bishop John Bramhall. The conflict between the two men originated with a dispute over free will versus determinism, yet the main point at issue between them was omnicompetent sovereignty versus jure divino episcopacy (Jackson 2007, p. 4). Under the conditions of the interregnum, defense of jure divino episcopacy was necessary to the preservation of Anglicanism against the equally jure divino claims of presbyterian and papal ecclesiology. It was also, as Hobbes quite correctly pointed out, a direct threat to the absolute power of the sovereign. After all, a bishop, if he held his authority directly from God, could threaten eternal punishments against those who disobeyed their authority that no civil authority could match (Jackson 2007, p. 5). Of course, the omnicompetent sovereignty Hobbes envisions need not be vested specifically in a king, let alone in the person of Charles I or II, making Hobbes' own royalism suspect (Jackson 2007, p. 54). By contrast to Hobbes, Bramhall takes a moderate position, which Jackson (2007) describes as "constitutional royalism" characterized by limited, constitutional monarchy (Jackson 2007, p. 62). This is certainly an evolution away from the absolutism of Laud, easily demonstrated by the two men's shifting understanding of magna carta. Laud viewed both magna carta and the common law descended from it with a particularly jaundiced eye and did not think it could be ultimately binding on a king (Parry 2017). Bramhall, by contrast, referred to it as "the Englishman's jewel and treasure" (Jackson 2007, p. 62), and argued that a king could not command anything contrary to the laws of the land, or that might cause injury to a third person (Jackson 2007, pp. 62-63). Thus, even as they became more firmly committed to jure divino episcopacy, Bramhall's argument with Hobbes shows a marked turn away from Laud's flirtation with absolutism, and toward constitutionalism—in effect closer to Selden, notwithstanding the latter's parliamentarian and Erastian sympathies, than Hobbes or Filmer.

William and Mary, Episcopal Deprivation, and the Triumph of the Latitudinarians

With the restoration, the recovery of Anglicanism seemed miraculous, and indeed, at no point after Charles II would the Anglican Church abandon episcopacy. Nevertheless, restoration-era Anglicans

held views of the monarchy that were closer to Bramhall than Laud. As Rose (2011) summarizes the attitudes of Anglican Bishops after the restoration: "Bishops could see themselves as agents of a godly monarch, but they also challenged the ecclesiastical prerogative when it was (not) employed... as the agent of their godly ideals" (p. 19). Here, restoration-era Anglicans hearken back to Hooker's argument that the authority of the sovereign over ecclesiastical matters extended only so far as to promote, support, and uphold the liberties of the church, and in no way to contradict or undermine them.

In the 1680s, high church Anglicans would find reason to be grateful for the critical distance they maintained from the monarchy. First, James II, an openly acknowledged Roman Catholic, assumed the throne, and promptly sought to encourage toleration of "popery" in alliance with nonconformists. For high church Anglicans, this was a return to the twin threats of "Puritanism and popery"—a cynical use of nonconformists to weaken the established church in preparation for a restoration to Rome. Yet, worse was to come. As James' commitment to Rome was made more and more evident—and as he stretched his constitutional authority to its limits—Parliament invited William and Mary to enter England with an army to help their Protestant neighbor. As his army disintegrated around him, James II fled, leaving William and Mary, along with Parliament, in control of the country.

Three options were considered: restoring James with conditions, a regency, or crowning William and Mary directly (Griggs, 2011: p. 69). In the end, the decision was made—largely by the parliamentary Whigs but with William's support—that William and Mary would be crowned jointly. For high church advocates of divine right monarchy, this posed a problem, as all of them had taken oaths to James. Thus, six bishops (including William Sancroft, the Archbishop of Canterbury) along with 400 other clergy and the entirety of the Episcopal Church of Scotland, refused to take the oath to the new king, and were deprived of their positions by Parliament. This created the nonjuring schism, the first schism in the history of Anglicanism. Ultimately, it would also indirectly lead to the birth of the Anglican Communion, as the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States would receive apostolic succession through the Scottish nonjurors, thereby establishing a precedent of independent provinces in communion with the Church of England.

William proved quite suspicious of high churchmen—perhaps an unsurprising development given that the bishops who refused to swear oaths to him were all high churchmen—and so he began to advance candidates to the episcopacy with a very different orientation. The latitudinarians were thoroughly Erastian—meaning they firmly subordinated the authority of the church to that of the state. On the other hand, they favored a broad toleration of nonconformists and other dissenters, as well as cooperation with Protestant bodies on the continent. The latitudinarians were, in essence, ideal leaders for a church defined less by historically grounded principles and more by the limits of the nation. In essence, Selden's Erastian vision of the national church was now triumphant, with appropriate modifications to ensure that nonconformists and dissenters were included. Yet, where Selden favored integration of the church, rather than a more direct supremacy over it, the Whig governments of William and Mary and George I went further than Selden would have countenanced, not only in their deprivation of Bishops, but in King George's later suspension of convocation, the assembly of clergy within the church that functioned as the ecclesiastical equivalent to parliament. In essence, the new, powerful state exerted a sovereignty over the church of which Hobbes would have doubtless approved. Latitudinarianism promised, in James Scott's (1998) phrase, to make the Church of England "legible"—comfortably fitting the church into the needs and desires of the state as a service to be provided to the people of the country.

What is fascinating about the high church reactions to this new state of affairs is the underlying approach they adopted, and the wide variety of solutions proposed to ameliorate them. Some high churchmen, like Francis Atterbury, attempted to address the new realities through active and aggressive use of the convocation (Cornwall, 1999: p. 44). Others, such as Dr. Henry Sacheverell, would use public preaching to try and influence public opinion against the "dangerous" compromise with nonconformists proposed by the latitudinarians. Underlying both of these reactions was a new sentiment, found also in the Tory opponents of the new settlement, that the new English state represented a dangerous concentration of power: Hobbes' leviathan made manifest. Sirota (2014) calls this a "country" or "constitutionalist" mode of high churchmanship, summarizing it as follows: "The Church of England, the convocation, the universities, the cathedral chapters — bearers of the so called 'rights of the clergy'-were all enshrined in an ancient constitution allegedly under assault by the unchecked royal supremacy, along with the 'Leviathan Whigs', and Williamite bishops who colluded in its aggrandizement." (Sirota 2014, p. 87).

Unsurprisingly, it was the nonjurors who made the sharpest break with Hooker's synthesis. The most explicit argument for separating the church and commonwealth that Hooker had joined together came from the lay nonjuring pamphleteer Henry Dodwell. For Dodwell, the church was a separate society from the commonwealth—and moreover, one over which the sovereign's authority was very limited. As Dodwell argued: "But he that denies the church as a society with a spiritual authority, does as effectually contribute to the ruin of all other fundamentals at once, as he does to the ruin of a house, who subverts the foundations of it" (Dodwell cited in Cornwall, 1999: p. 44). Indeed, Dodwell argued that the Church of England's Erastian synthesis actually held the potential to undermine Anglicanism altogether, for a Roman Catholic monarch and parliament could just as easily deprive Bishops tomorrow as a Protestant one had done today (Cornwall 1999: p. 45). Yet, Dodwell also began to openly question the underpinnings of royal supremacy itself, ultimately coming to view the deprivations of the bishops as an inevitable development of erastianism, and blaming Henry VIII explicitly (Cornwall, 1999: p. 46-47). He was more favorably disposed to Elizabeth I, finding her more modest title of "supreme governor" more congenial to the autonomy of the church (Cornwall, 1999: pp. 62-63). Still, Dodwell and his fellow nonjurors rejected many of the elements of Hooker's synthesis. While the nonjurors did not reject an alliance between church and state, they were firmly set against any interference by the state in the business of the church (Cornwall, 1999: p. 51). Dodwell was more explicit in his rejection of Hooker's argument that a Christian country ought not separate civil and ecclesiastical authority, citing as precedent the medieval tensions between church and crown that existed throughout the history of Christendom (Cornwall, 1999: 52). Indeed, Dodwell made clear his view that the state needed the church more than the reverse: "The Church can subsist by her own Principles, if she will be true to them, without the support of external power. The State cannot subsist without force, nor secure her possession of a coercive power, without the support of Religion. Thus, even in point of necessity, the church is more necessary to the State, than the State to the Church" (Dodwell as cited in Cornwall, 1999: p. 53).

It could perhaps be argued that Dodwell, and the nonjurors generally, were an irrelevant outlier. Yet, three realities run against that argument. First, as Rose (2011) argues, "The ideas that the nonjurors made explicit after the Revolution were being thought (and preached and published) beforehand" (p. 11). We can see the seeds of Dodwell's separation reflected in the fears Hobbes expressed in his critique of Bramhall. Second, the less drastic measures adopted by the more conventional high churchmen failed. With the accession of George I, the Tories, in whom Sacheverell and the public preachers rested their hopes, were resoundingly defeated in the parliamentary election—a defeat from which they would not recover for decades. As for the convocation, it was suspended by George I

when it appeared as though convocation would censure the king's favorite, the latitudinarian bishop Benjamin Hoadley, for his denial of apostolic succession. Thus, at the time, high churchmanship failed. Yet this leads to the final argument for the relevance of the nonjurors: their influence outlasted them. The debt the Protestant Episcopal Church, and all-American Anglicans, owe to the nonjurors is obvious, and likewise extends to any provinces in the modern communion operating in a framework of disestablishment. As for the Church of England, the subsequent Oxford movement arose in response to a somewhat similar government action: the abolition of several Irish bishoprics by an act of Parliament in which, for the first time, non-Anglicans could vote. In response, John Keble would preach his famous sermon on the Irish bishops question. Undeniably, the Anglo-Catholics were closer to Dodwell's conception of two societies than to that of any of the other thinkers discussed in this study, and, while beyond the scope of this study, an examination of their movement demonstrates a deep debt to the nonjurors.

Conclusion: Lessons for the Modern Traditionalist Right

Several conclusions relevant to traditionalist conservatism flow from this study of high church Anglican political thought. First, any traditionalist conservatism that holds certain principles jure divino may find difficulty accommodating those principles to nationalism. Nationalism is permissive of certain kinds of traditionalism, to be sure, yet when those traditions interfere with something the state wants to achieve, they may be pushed aside. With its necessary veneration of a state that is at once territorially bounded but, within those bounds, possessed of unbounded sovereignty, nationalism is, from the perspective of church principles, leviathan personified, and leviathan, as Hobbes' dispute with Bramhall made clear, has no place for any principle to be held jure divino. Second, clear differences emerge between nationalism and integralism. The Christian integralist conceptions of the state held by thinkers such as Hooker and Selden relied on maintaining a fine balance between church and state, even within an integrated hole. If integralism is not to simply become another form of state supremacy over religion, then a certain amount of institutional authority must be retained in the church. Yet, even in the relatively balanced and constitutional polity of England, the state's will to power eventually broke this institutional independence for an extended period of time. Christian conceptions of integralism require a limited state in almost the same ways, and to almost the same degree, as does liberalism itself. Finally, even Hookerian integralism has distinct limits as a modern model. As Richard Hooker himself affirmed, any scheme for a national church or an integralist state is impractical when the population is not universally Christian. Given the religious pluralism of most Western democracies, then, traditionalist religious conservatives are not well-positioned to effectively embrace Hookerian integralism to any meaningful degree in Europe or North America. None of this is to say that Hooker, and those who came after him, are not relevant for traditionalist conservatives today. Indeed, if the specifics of Hooker's model are, by its own lights, inapplicable to modern Western societies, his method of applying tradition and theology in the search for a political order capable of balancing seemingly opposing virtues remains as relevant as ever for thinkers motivated by tradition and faith. Thus, rather than seeking to recreate Christian integralism—a project impossible in many or most cases—traditionalist conservatives might consider this Hooker'ian method as a means of developing context-specific solutions for the unique challenges of the twenty-first-century.

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