Reconsidering Self and Identity According to Mullah Sadr
Ghaidaa Mohammed Hassan Abdul Razzaq

Abstract

The current study is based on a hypothesis: the Islamic philosopher Sadr al-Din al-Shirazi (1572-1641 AD), known as Mulla Sadr, reconsidered all previous Islamic philosophical discussion related to the concepts of self and identity. The focus has been placed throughout the paragraphs of this article on presenting Mulla Sadra’s views related to the self and identity, as well as his theory of knowledge and his vision about the formation of human identity through the accumulation of experience and the cognitive unity between the subject and the object, which he presented on the basis of the approach with the philosophical vision of the relationship between matter and image, which is philosophically traditional and known since Aristotle, and which was common and prevalent among people. Muslim philosophers in general. The beginning came in this study with fast and intense presentation. The legacy of the School of Transcendent Wisdom includes the most important stages of Mulla Sadra’s spiritual and intellectual development and all the historical, social, and political circumstances that accompanied the emergence of his star as a philosopher, then moving on to present his most important philosophical ideas about the human self, knowledge, and reason, and his own arguments about the immateriality of the soul. This study also addressed his most important ideas about the theory of knowledge and the independence of human cognitive abilities, as well as the influence of experience and its role in forming an identity for the mind, a variable and unstable identity that is formed gradually through accumulation and ultimately contributes to defining a special qualitative identity that emerges clearly through disparate patterns of thinking, which represents... The culmination of Mulla Sadra’s reconsideration, which distinguished him from all the Muslim philosophers before him, including Ibn Sina and his theses about the self and self-awareness.

Keywords: Ibn Sina, Al filled his chest, Self, Theory of Knowledge, The Identity, Transcendent Wisdom

INTRODUCTION

It is often done consideration of the terms Self and identity are current problematic topics that were produced during Period Modernism and post-modernism are based on considerations that these concepts related to the self and individual identity represent the most important foundations on which the intellectual and cultural structure of these eras is based. But the concept of self and some concepts closely related to it such as the concept Identity and Concept Self-Awareness are actually concepts. It belongs to modernity. In its current formulations and uses, there is debate about its roots. Its roots extend far back to Islamic philosophy, and even to Greek philosophy. With a quick review of the most important concepts related to the self in the classical philosophical space, we can find a large number of these concepts that are usually used to describe the self, whether in its narrow sense of being an individual self possessing its uniqueness, or in the broad and more complex sense of expressing the self as a narrative, social, or political structure. It is necessary to point out here. We did not find published Arabic philosophical studies that address Discussion of Sadr al-Din al-Shirazi (1572-1641 AD) known as Mulla Sadr. The concept of Self And identity, So I focused on our goal in the current study. To present this discussion and prove that he had reconsidered the propositions of the philosophers who preceded him regarding the concepts of self, identity, and self-awareness, and sought to present new and improved evidence and arguments add and expand the discussion with Islamic philosophical the Old about self and identity. Islamic philosophy. However, some arguments: Philosophical the arguments used in this reconsideration by Mullah Sadr are entirely borrowed from previous philosophers, with a slight modification that sometimes seems weak and incoherent, even unsuccessful, but it is certainly not. Never cancel Recognition. With Mullah Sadr’s philosophical seriousness, he made clear efforts to develop these central concepts and establish and strengthen the philosophical arguments on which they are based, that we are trying to emphasize here on that he developed this file. Ahem and presented on the basis of Pure theoretical philosophical foundations. And his own intuition and his transcendent wisdom philosophy. Mullah

1 University of Baghdad: College of Islamic Sciences: Department – Islamic Philosophy E-mail: Qadaa.m@cois.uobaghdad.edu.iq, Phone Number: 07906107955
Sadra is like all philosophers. His thoughts were based on the observations and arguments that had previously been concluded by philosophers before him, but of course he did not allow them to define his thinking, but rather added his own touch to them. Therefore, we will begin our study by briefly and quickly addressing the Legacy of the School of Transcendent Wisdom.

First: The Heritage and School Of Transcendent Wisdom

The phrase (transcendent wisdom) was first mentioned by Ibn Sina in his book (Signs and Warnings). In the tenth type of the secrets of the verses, when he said, “Then what appears is a type of sight hidden except from those who are firmly rooted in transcendent wisdom.”[vii] But the philosophical foundation of this school goes back to Sadr al-Din al-Shirazi, known as Mulla Sadra or Sadr al-Mutalain. Who was born in the year (1071 AD) into a wealthy, ancient family that was able to provide him with an education. Devoting himself to research, study, and contemplation, he expressed many bold philosophical opinions, including his belief in the unity of existence.[viii] Because of it, he was accused of atheism and infidelity, and he decided to stay away from the people and choose isolation as a way to escape from the pressure of those who criticized his ideas and those who fought against his philosophical orientations. Mullah Sadra describes this stage by saying, “He moved away from mixing with people and opposing the people of his time, and turned steadfastly toward the cause of the causes, and he remained in this state for a long time.”[vii] The book (The Transcendent Wisdom in the Four Intellectual Books) is considered one of his most in-depth works of analysis, criticism, and study. For most of those working in Islamic philosophy, Mullah Sadra has remained widely unknown, and is even considered as one of the greatest unknowns in history.[ix] He founded a coherent and diverse philosophical school in contrast to the Peripatetic and Illuminationist schools that dominated the Islamic philosophical scene for many years. The goal of this school was to pay attention to issues of theology in new ways and in different treatments of old issues. In fact, his school reconciled the philosophies that were known in its time in a new and harmonious mixture. Where we find Islamic Peripatetic philosophy alongside Illuminati philosophy.[vii] In addition to what was translated from Greek philosophy, such as Stoic philosophy, which was very popular in Islamic philosophy, to the point that Mullah Sadra said what it means. Because he compiled a comprehensive book of what he found in ancient books, including the summary of the words of the Peripatetics, the purity of the tastes of the Orientals, and the best opinions of the Stoic sages, along with additions of his own that had not been found before in the books of the people of art and the sages of the era.[vii]. Therefore, we find that Mullah Sadra directed his criticism at Muslim philosophers in general. He criticized the Peripatetics among them for confining themselves to the method of proof as the only path to research and knowledge, and at the same time criticized the Illuminati for their contentment with the method of disclosure. His position was inclusive of both approaches because he believed that they were two approaches that were not contradictory, but rather complementary.[vii] Thus, Mullah Sadra adopted a syncretic philosophical tendency whose roots can be traced back to the era in which he lived and the turbulent environment in which he found himself. In his era, the sages and philosophers were divided into Peripatetics and Orientalists. We divided the scholars into mujahids and scholars, the Sufis into many groups, and the Muslims were divided into sects and groups that declared each other infidels. Ancient philosophies that conflict with Islam also spread, prompting jurists and modern scholars to confront those philosophies.[vii]

In the midst of this turmoil, Mullah Sadra found himself forced to search for a way to reconcile reason and transmission, between philosophy and religion, and between theology and Sufism. This is of course after studying all the philosophical doctrines and opinions, pointing out their weaknesses, and identifying the problems they contain. Mullah Sadra set out to establish a new philosophy capable of solving all problems, which is the philosophy of transcendent wisdom, in which ancient philosophies were mixed with oriental issues in a manner consistent with the principles of religious belief.[viii] After study and criticism, Mullah Sadra was able to reconcile Peripatetic and Illuminati philosophy with transcendent wisdom. He also analyzed the science of theology and was satisfied with the positive aspects and dropped the negative dialectical aspects in a logical and philosophical manner.[vii]; And he arrived at a new method with an objective mental vision.[vii]

Since the beginning of the strong promotion of Mulla Sadra’s philosophy by his students and commentators on his works in the nineteenth century, the name Muhammad bin Ibrahim bin Yahya al-Qawami al-Shirazi,
known as Sadr al-Mutalhin and Mullah Sadra, appeared. It was virtually synonymous with Islamic philosophy in the Shiite seminaries in Iran. He was revered because of his tendency to reconcile the competing philosophical, theological, and Sufi trends of his time. He presented a precise system that represented the pinnacle of philosophical interpretations through works and writings of encyclopedic dimensions. He developed a philosophy that was truly new, but at the same time drawn from basic components that were easily recognizable and whose roots were clearly traceable. I rely mainly on three inspiring philosophical traditions, the first of which goes back to Ibn Sina and his divine ideas and critical comments on them. The second goes back to the ideas of Al-Suhrawardi and his Eastern interpreters, while the third goes back to the theoretically oriented Sufi traditions that were founded on the legacy of Muhyiddin Ibn Arabi (d. 1240 AD), but the most important addition, as Mulla Sadra himself repeatedly confirms, came from the personal intuition inspiring the development of his philosophical system.(xii).

The important observation is that Mullah Sadra’s philosophical career is closely intertwined with the cultural policy of the early Safavid state, as Mullah Sadra was born in the year (1571 AD) or in the year (1572 AD) and left his homeland of Shiraz in his early twenties to pursue the study of philosophy and Islamic sciences, which he began on his own and arrived in Isfahan. The Safavid capital, historians state that he has attained a level of Islamic knowledge and sciences that was unprecedented among his contemporaries. This was complemented by a deep education in philosophy at the hands of one of the most original thinkers, Mir Muhammad Baqir Astarabadi (d. 1631 AD), known as the Mirdamad, who is often referred to as the third teacher after Al-Farabi and Aristotle.(xiii). It seems that the brilliance of Mullah Sadra's star in cultural circles faced great opposition from the most conservative and traditional scholars, so he decided to retreat and isolate himself in the small mountainous village of Kahk near the city of Qom, where Mullah Sadra states that there he largely freed himself from the burdens of social life and focused on the practices of... Asceticism and meditation, and as he mentions in the Four Intellectual Books, his efforts in prayer and asceticism led to a series of axioms that he relied on to oppose the idea of his teacher, Mirdamad, which revolves around considering essence as the basis for metaphysics, with what is known as the famous theory of the origin of essence or the priority of essence, which Mullah Sadra later developed by resorting to an alternative. It is based on the presence that strongly adhered to writing about throughout all the years of his career, which culminated in him obtaining a prestigious position in Shiraz, where he remained until his death in Basra, on the seventh Hajj trip, most likely in the year (1635 AD).

Mulla Sadra's works number more than fifty works, ranging from multi-volume summaries to brief treatises on carefully defined topics. What he wrote can be divided into two main groups: a number of works on Islamic sciences, and a number of works with a practical moral orientation, and the book (The Transcendent Wisdom in the Four Intellectual Books) is included in this category and is our primary source in this study.(xiv).

Although he modeled his work on the philosophical model of previous philosophers, which is based around presenting a philosophical interpretation of the world, he abandoned the classical model known for its emphasis on metaphysics and metaphysics at the expense of the natural sciences. Although research into the divine is one of his first priorities(xv). Other philosophical works of interest to us here are the book (The Principle and the Resurrection) in (1606 AD), which is a relatively early work in which he talks about the origin of the universe from God and its return to Him. There is also the Book of Feelings, which includes a brief presentation of Mulla Sadra’s theory of existence as a basis for metaphysics in (1628 AD). Likewise, the book of divine evidence in behavioral approaches and the book of Arshish wisdom between the years (1631-1634), which is a late work in which Mulla Sadra focuses on otherworldly matters. He also wrote several small treatises on philosophy, as well as his comments onaWorkersaIbn Sina, Al-Suhrawardi, and other previous philosophers.

What is noticed isanaMost ancient Arab and Western studies on Mulla Sadra tended to emphasize the Sufi aspects of his thought and downplay them. The importance of his endeavor and his continuous philosophical and analytical production, which appears clearly in his works, but a number of studies published after the year (2000 AD) began to consolidate the image of the original and profound philosopher. When reading the works of Mulla Sadra, it is difficult not to realize and notice the analytical novelty that he enjoys. Therefore, I preferred to present a study in reconsidering the self, identity, and self-awareness according to Mulla Sadra KaAn indication that he should be read first and foremost as a philosopherF.
Self-talk According to Mullah Sadra

In order to shed light on Mulla Sadra's ideas about the self, we must begin by saying that he stands on common ground with the philosophers who preceded him, asaTake a quick look at his discussions of knowledge and reason as well as the arguments regarding the immateriality of the soul in the psychological section of his bookTranscendent wisdom. It suffices to show that he borrows most of the arguments designed by Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi about the self and self-awareness, and then reproduces them with new versions of his own. For example, the Birdman argument, the argument for the stability of self-consciousness, and the argument for the unity of thought and the ego. Mulla Sadra's reliance on these arguments represents one of the most enjoyable features in reading the second chapter of the psychological section of the Book of Books. In his attempt to prove the immateriality of the animal soul, Mulla Sadra states that one of the proofs that the animal is not the sensory structure is that if we assume that the animal was created at once, He is a perfect creature, but his senses are blocked from looking at the outside, and he is created in such a way that he floats in the open or in the open air, so that the air does not collide with him and he does not feel any characteristic, and his limbs are separate so that they do not touch each other. In this case, he realizes himself that it is him and ignores all his external and internal organs. Or rather, it confirms itself without confirming a position, direction, or organ. Thus, it is clear that what a person is aware of is different from what he is ignorant of, and his identity differs from that of all other organs.

Although the argument is reassigned to the case of animals instead of humans, the context of the argument clearly reveals that Mullah Sadra is reading from Ibn Sina's book Al-Shifa, but he replaces humans with animals. It must be pointed out here that this replacement is an unsuccessful choice because the argument loses all the plausibility that the original argument had. Ibn Sina's innovative argument, called the Birdman, was based on the availability of self-consciousness, and the Birdman was merely a way of bracketing aspects of our own experience that would normally prevent us from directing our attention to the kind of primitive self-consciousness that each of us has because of our common human nature. . We differ from animals in many respects, the least of which is in terms of cognitive abilities, and as a result, experience in the case of animals is useless as direct evidence from which the human condition can be inferred and measured. Self-awareness is closely linked to man's being an intellectual self, as Ibn Sina saw before. Therefore, applying the same argument to animals in an attempt to prove the immateriality of the animal soul, which does not have intellectual capabilities, makes it a weak and incoherent argument. asaThere is another note: Mullah Sadra speaks of this argument as proof rather than an indicationaAnd a warning or hypothesis as presented by Ibn Sina.

The question that may arise here is: Why did Mullah Sadra borrow Ibn Sina's Birdman hypothesis by adding this unfortunate substitution, when he replaced humans with animals and signs with proof?

To answer, there are two possible reasons for Mulla Sadra’s less and weaker approach in terms of accuracy and rationality to this intellectual hypothesis. The first is that, by the seventeenth century, this hypothesis had become an established part of the tradition of psychological studies, and some early commentators, such as Ibn Kammunah, tried to Increase the strength of the argument by developing it into a demonstrative syllogism. Based on this, Mullah Sadra may have considered this hypothesis worthy of being called proof. The second reason is that Mullah Sadra believes that animals perceive themselves in the same sense that humans perceive them, and this can be inferred by the perception of pain and pleasure. The animal perceives pain and pleasure by initially observing its behavior, and therefore it must be aware of itself in addition to its awareness of the object that causes the pain and pleasure. In both cases, Mulla Sadra's step remains an important departure from Ibn Sina and his original idea, but it does not mean that the phenomenon upon which Mulla Sadra's self-awareness was based is different from Ibn Sina's, but rather that this approach indicates Mulla Sadra's different application of the phenomenon. Instead of Ibn Sina's attempt to understand the individual existence of man as an intellectual, and therefore immaterial, entity, Mullah Sadra seems to have believed that the phenomenon of self-consciousness must be a primary feature of a much broader scope of mental existence that is limited to human existence.
Independence The Capabilities Cognitive to for Pleasures

With Mulla Sadra, this expansion of the scope of self-awareness becomes clearer in a later chapter designed to discuss the idea of the independence of the self’s cognitive abilities from its physical tools. To prove this idea, Mulla Sadra introduces To discuss The following:

When a person's external powers and physical senses are weak due to sleep, loss of consciousness, or anything else, he often finds himself hearing, seeing, and smelling. He feels all these sensations in himself. He has in himself all those powers and tools without deficiency. What can be blamed here is that this evidence is as if it is based on intuition that contradicts the bird-man hypothesis, and at the same time it appears The reader’s mind immediately comes to the mind of the sleeping and drunken man who appeared in Ibn Sina’s signs and warnings while he was talking about the flying man. As for Mulla Sadra, we have here the claim that even in such seemingly unconscious states, one will still be aware of his ability to perceive, and this is evidence of absolute immaterialism not only from a philosophical standpoint, but also with regard to the imaginative and even perceptual mode of mental existence. When we are immersed in Perception that requires our full attention. We may not notice that perceptions themselves are patterns of our existence. The ability to perceive and the act of perception exist within us.

Mulla Sadr formulated the issue more clearly when he said that what he means is that his soul in itself is sight for perceiving the visible, and hearing for perceiving the audible, as well as all types of sensible objects. In itself, He is hearing, sight, smell, taste, and touch for their own sake. The human soul is physical in occurrence and behavior, spiritual in survival and reasoning, so its behavior in bodies is physical, and its reasoning in itself is spiritual. It descends to the level of the senses when it perceives tangible things. When it sees, it is a seeing eye, and when it hears it is an aware ear. The self is all its powers and has two aspects, mind and nature. Everyone who returns to his conscience finds that this present identity of his is neither his past nor his future identity. They are different matters for one self. From the above it appears that the sense is united with the sensed, for the self is the sense of all the senses.

Although Mullah Sadra acknowledges the validity of the Bird Man argument, and thus the concept of self-awareness on which it depends, he supports this aspect of the Ainanavian heritage on two important conditions. First, the scope of self-awareness must be broader and include both thinking and semi-thinking beings (humans and animals). Secondly, there is a need to reconsider and fully evaluate the issue of whether self-awareness is separated from its other components, such as human experience and expertise.

Ibn Sina resorted to distinguishing between the stability of self-consciousness and the intermittency and difference of all acts of consciousness related to the body. If the self is physical, it must be aware of the organ in which it resides, and it is indispensable to its existence whenever it is aware of itself. However, since we do not perceive through perception any An organ, not to mention our lack of awareness of the entire body, even though we are always aware of ourselves, so the self is immaterial. This argument appears repeatedly in the psychological section of the books, with additions and modifications from the original text of Ibn Sina, especially in the passage in which Mulla Sadra entered into a debate that had been sparked by a dispute between the interpreters of signs and warnings by Ibn Sina, Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (1150-1210 AD) and Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (1150-1210 AD). 1201-1274 AD), in one of the counterarguments, Al-Razi challenged the validity of Ibn Sina’s reasoning by saying that it is assumed that the human self is always aware of all its attributes and what accompanies those attributes, which seems unreasonable in accordance with human experience, for the simple fact is that sometimes I am not Being aware of the body is enough to prove that my body does not belong to me. Al-Razi argued that the essence of the self is not clear to the self once it is aware of itself. The self is not transparent in all respects. Abu al-Barakat al-Baghdadi pointed out earlier that the self, despite its constant awareness of itself, some tasks in the body, such as digestion and growth, are rarely given to it. They are their own perceptions. In his defense of Ibn Sina, Al-Tusi relied on distinguishing between two types of components of experience. In order for the self to be aware of the nature of its relationship with the body and the possibility of its separation from it, it must compare and relate explicitly to the body, and this comparison requires information obtained through the work of the senses, and therefore it is It is not necessary, innate, or
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given in advance. On the contrary, self-awareness of itself is considered necessary, innate, and given in advance of every experience.

Mulla Sadra's assessment of this debate is admirably clear in its intensity. Mulla Sadra rejects Tusi's distinction as based on insufficient evidence, and sticks to a well-established discussion of self-consciousness without indicating any urgent need to reject the phenomenon, because in fact he understood the phenomenon. Self-awareness as understood by its predecessors, Muslim philosophers, although it has reopened debate and debate against models of self-awareness based on thinking in the Avicenna heritage, where Ibn Sina's arguments appear in two different contexts in the Book of Travel. Mulla Sadra reproduces the same Ainnæan ideas in the chapter dedicated to showing that the action of the mind in self-reflection is identical with the mind itself, and therefore is temporarily simultaneous with it. The argument is preceded by a closely related statement stating that human perception and action cannot be described and talked about except in the first person. When Man is an act, any action. His purpose and goal is not to perform an action in the absolute, but rather it is an action resulting from the immediate awareness that occurs in him. The same applies to movement. Whoever is saved from an enemy, or gets rid of heat or cold, his salvation is not from an absolute enemy, but rather From an individual enemy, nor from absolute heat, but from individual heat that harms him and causes damage to himself. Thus, knowledge of the occurrence of hostility or heat and cold requires knowledge of it, and the same applies to the satisfaction of desires. A human being satisfies a desire that is specific to him alone, and all of this is derived from our knowledge of ourselves. A person's knowledge of himself is the first and oldest knowledge and it is always present and the self is never devoid of it. That is why Mullah says. This means that knowledge is the necessary attribute of all our common actions and all our fears. Every human being, as an intellectual entity, is always conscious. It is clear that this modified version of the Sinawi argument is derived from the book “Signs and Warnings” to clarify the same point that Ibn Sina had previously made in this context. The difference is that Mullah Sadra presented to us the idea of the flying animal for the purpose of arguing about the immateriality of the animal soul, relying on a logical analogy. Which is based on the assumption that the animal constantly realizes itself and not by acquiring knowledge from the outside.

The Identity of The Mind and The Unity of Experience

The traditional argument about the unity of experience appears extensively often in the psychological part of the book, and we notice it first in a chapter that aims to show the unity of the soul despite its distinct capabilities. Here, Mulla Sadra's discussion of the Ainnæan theory reaches its climax when he presents three proofs to confirm the unity of the soul: from the subject to the known, the knowing self, and knowledge itself, respectively. He says that this means is that you do not doubt when you see things and hear sounds and perceive intelligible things that are one in terms of number. If the perceiver of intelligible things were different from the one who perceives tangible things, you would not have perceived the essence of your self. Thus, the one who perceives them all is one self. Otherwise, you would be two entities instead of one self, and so is the case. With desires and feelings.

In fact, Mullah Sadr believes that the idea of unity derives its strength from the external world and the processes that support our experiences in it, as the type of self-awareness depends on the type of common phenomenal truth presented by Ibn Sina in his discussions, while Mullah Sadr defined it in a way that appears modern through his clear distinction between objective things and events. Which can be described personally such as physical processes and qualitative experiences that are personally experienced. In the same vein, Mullah Sadr followed his predecessors, Muslim philosophers, in saying that mental existence, or the world of self-conscious experience, is ultimately self-existent and completely independent of the data of the body. This is because the body is only a tool that the soul, after reaching the level of mental existence, can leave behind, not only at the level of thought but also at the level of perceptual experiences that are essentially based on perception. In the last part of the Book of Travels, Mullah Sadra devoted a long section to emphasizing the idea that "every human individual has one self, which is his soul." This was explained as follows:

Each one of us knows by his intuition and conscience, and without the need for proof, that his self is one and not multiple, and he knows that he understands, perceives, feels, desires, moves, and settles, and is characterized by a group of attributes and names, some of which are of the category of the mind and its states, some of which
are of the category of imagination and senses and their states, and some of which are of the category of the body, its events and whims, and with This is self-evident, but most people cannot distinguish it from a cognitive standpoint, and they may deny this unity when they conduct research and scrutiny, except for those whom God has helped with light from Him. Otherwise, how can the one who is unable to unite himself be able to unite within. Porphyry of Tyre’s intention to speak with disdain and Sufi

According to Ibn Sina, we have no choice but to deny the unity of knowledge and consider it merely a suspicious innovation, which Ibn Sina attributes to his book Al-Shifa, and it is clear that he has reservations about Ibn Sina's claim that identity is the soul, that entity whose functions are studied in psychology and that the self that One realizes it is self-evident.

To conclude this discussion about Mulla Sadra’s re-application of the Sinai argument for the unity of experience, we would like to take a quick look at a counter-argument previously presented by Abu al-Barakat al-Baghdadi, quoting it from al-Razi in the Oriental Investigations, to the effect that: If the soul is the sole agent of all actions in the body, then our perception of ourselves as individual entities behind our experience and actions is a general and comprehensive awareness of all the processes that take place in the body, including growth, digestion, and the like, which Ibn Sina previously considered to be merely unconscious vital processes. This is a type of challenge that Mulla Sadra addresses by presenting three metaphysical principles of his own. The first is called effective science, meaning science that is effective if it produces an effect, whether it includes knowledge of that effect or not. This principle expresses the way in which non-material things exist, such as the human soul, which acts as a cause. Its existence and knowledge of itself produce effects in the material world.

The second principle states that knowledge in the general sense is a perfection appropriate to the mental level of existence and is therefore something that physical existence is devoid of. As for the third principle, it states that knowledge and its subject matter are not identical in terms of their levels of existence. Internal vital processes exist at the lowest level of material existence, and their existence is knowledge, not in itself or even for itself, but rather knowledge in relation to a subject capable of knowledge such as a human being.

These principles allow Mulla Sadra to say that the selves that we perceive are the true agents of even unconscious vital processes, even though they do not perceive these processes in the same way that they perceive themselves or their actions, such as thought, perception, and intentional action. This is because the self’s awareness of itself and its innate desire for its own perfection leads to Subconscious actions. In this sense, the soul, with its knowledge of itself, is aware of the reason for these actions, just as it understands the reason for its conscious actions. Mulla Sadra’s principles also show that he approaches the phenomenon of self-consciousness within a new conceptual framework and that he adheres to the tradition of continuous discussion that remains within the framework set by Ibn Sina’s definition of self-consciousness. Despite all the additions, the concept of self-awareness according to Mullah Sadra amounts to the same very narrow meaning presented by Ibn Sina and Al-Suhrawardi as merely awareness of the existence of the self, a fixed awareness that does not change and cannot be advanced.

The Self and Cognitive Unity

Mulla Sadra's theory of knowledge can be briefly described as a sustained attempt to rehabilitate the ancient theory of knowledge as a unity between the subject and the object in the actual act of knowledge, the first version of which dates back to Aristotle and his theory of the mind, from which he is famous for saying that the mind is all intelligibles. Then, at a later time, the theory of cognitive unity became part of the Neo-Platonic theory of the mind as a single, indivisible entity, even though it has an internal structure that is multiple and differs in aspects and levels. But this theory, which Ibn Sina later formulated, suffers from several problems, including that it contradicts the logical intuition according to which I am fully capable of perceiving or understanding different things at different moments of time, if at a certain time I know a thing or being and I am identical with it, while at another time I may know another thing or being and also be identical with it. According to Ibn Sina, we have no choice but to deny the unity of knowledge and consider it merely a suspicious innovation, which Ibn Sina attributes to Porphyry of Tyre’s intention to speak with disdain and Sufi
Mulla Sadra made a clear distinction between the two possible descriptions of perception. We can, of course, describe perception as that process that takes place in the senses, but such a description will not fully express the empirical reality or express the phenomenon in a mental manner, and based on that, perception of mental existence is an indivisible act, because the subject exists in unity with the object as a self-aware of this object, while the object, on the contrary, exists as a mere object of being. This is what Mullah Sadra confirms in a simple comparison that he presents at the end of the chapter dedicated to discussing cognitive unity, where he shows that the relationship between the subject and the object is very similar to the relationship between matter and image. Therefore, it must be distinguished from relationships that exist independently, such as the relationship of a house with its inhabitants. In this case, relationships are not binding. It is not necessary and can exist and remain just as it can dissolve and cease, while the relationship between the subject and the object is like the relationship of a father to his offspring and the relationship of matter to the form. Matter cannot exist without the presence of the form, just as the form needs matter in order to remain. Likewise, just as there cannot be an object of knowledge without a subject that knows it, the subject also needs a thing or subject that it can know.

Finally, Mulla Sadra’s interpretation of mental existence denies any causal power for things outside the mind even in the case of awareness of the highest principle that is the origin and content of the soul itself. Therefore, according to Mulla Sadra, mental existence is completely separated from matter, although its tools have a spatial, physical structure and location, and are similar to material things, but their outputs are not physical and spatial, but rather experimental in the sense that they are a matter of imagination or perception.

Thus, just as the soul perceives itself in the same way, it perceives many of its perceptive and driving forces in a non-mental way. In fact, the idea that our faculties are given to us and are immediately present is a somewhat familiar idea and is originally from Suhrawardi’s introduction of the concept of knowledge as presence, and Mulla Sadra’s reliance on Suhrawardi on this point is due to the great similarity between the arguments he presented and those presented by Suhrawardi. However, instead of talking about the similarities, we will focus on Mulla Sadra’s development of the idea of inherited matter. The first thing to note is that Mulla Sadra’s formulation is not completely clear with regard to a person’s awareness of his cognitive powers. He asks here: Are these powers and abilities realized simply by one’s awareness of oneself? That is, in the sense that they are the necessary components of oneself, or are they perceived on their own as a direct result of their operation, such that awareness of them is structurally similar to self-consciousness?

Mulla Sadra believes that through the operation of cognitive abilities, one is necessarily aware of them. This idea is very consistent with Ibn Sina’s flying man hypothesis. This hypothetical thought experiment depends on the existence and functioning of these abilities. Mulla Sadra supports this idea with five arguments and a lengthy explanation to provide the key that reveals the mystery, as the first four arguments deal with the immediacy of sensory perception in general terms. While it deals with the fifth argument, which is based on Mullah Sadra’s intuition, and he calls it “the Arshiya argument.” It is the most important and can be explained as follows:

The soul, at the beginning of its creation, is devoid of conceptual and corroborative knowledge. There is no doubt that using tools such as the senses is an optional act, not a natural act, and depends on knowledge of those tools. Here, Mullah Sadra denies innate knowledge, pointing out that acquiring knowledge requires thoughtful use of cognitive faculties and abilities, because if a person is not aware of those abilities, and if he completely lacks innate knowledge about how they work, then he will never necessarily begin to learn, because “the first knowledge of the self is its knowledge of itself, then its knowledge of its powers and tools, which are the external and internal senses, and this is present knowledge.” The soul is the truth of man, and ignorance of this truth leads to misery and misguidance, and knowledge of the soul is only achieved through knowledge of the heart. Thus, Mullah Sadra does not consider reason alone sufficient as a path to the truth. Heart knowledge is necessary to fully, accurately and completely comprehend the truth.
In the end, after all the previous discussion, arguments, and evidence that Mullah Sadra presented to reinforce his vision about the self and identity and reconsider these two concepts through which he left the common ground that united him with Ibn Sina and the Muslim philosophers who agreed with him, Mullah Sadra rejected the idea of stability and constancy of the self and found that the arguments presented Regarding this, what qualifies the self to remain one throughout change in the sense of continuity is not appropriate for his point of view, which rejects any direct idea of stability in the human self. Mullah Sadra does not deny the reasonableness of the human intuition that our selves remain the same despite the change that occurs to them, but he views identity as a characteristic that gradually gives it continuity of change. That is, he talks about the qualitative change of the self that takes place gradually, and is similar to the gradual dimming that occurs. It takes place when a person sits under a tree at dusk, notices that the shadows become more dense with time, and realizes that his ability to intellectually distinguish between degrees of shadows is included in a single process of change, which may be divisible and divisible by the mind, but in reality it is one in itself. Thus, our selves are very similar to a dense shadow, where I cannot distinguish between two stages in the temporal development of my being, because the whole development has been continuous since the beginning, and I, as an individual, perceive and understand myself as a continuous existence that remains a single process despite comprehensive changes.

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(See: Ibid., p. 73.


(The philosophers who preceded Mullah Sadra discussed psychology in the study of natural sciences, as Ibn Sina did, for example, in the book Al-Shifa. However, Mullah Sadra separated the study of psychology from natural sciences and made it the title of the fourth volume of the book. This indicates that he considered this topic to be a study of the divine. See: Al-Shirazi, Sadr Al-Din: The Treatise of the Three Principles (The Heads of Satan in the Relationship of the Jurist to the Sultan), study and investigation by: Ahmed Majed, Dar Al-Ma’arif Al-Hikmitya, Beirut 2008, p. 23.


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