

## Educational Communication Based on Qur'ānic Religious Pluralism in Increasing Religious Moderation of Muslim Students in Indonesia

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### Abstract

Religious intolerance is relatively high among students, affecting 30% to 50%. In this context, alternative learning models are offered and tested to counter student prejudice and religious intolerance. Therefore, this research aimed to provide an educational communication model based on Qur'ānic Religious Pluralism as a preventive solution to increasing religious moderation of Muslim students. A qualitative approach was used to draft the model, and in-depth interviews were conducted with students having the highest and lowest religious moderation scores. The quantitative approach used a quasi-experimental method to measure the effectiveness of the model and the analysis of the draft was achieved through Focus Group Discussion (FGD). Furthermore, quantitative data analysis used descriptive statistics as percentages (%). After eight interventions (8x100 minutes), the questionnaire was distributed and the profile of religious moderation was compared before and after the model trials (October and December 2023). Data was analyzed using comparative techniques between post and pre-test, specifically IBM SPSS Statistics 24 with Paired Samples. The results showed that the educational communication model based on Qur'ānic Religious Pluralism effectively prevented religious prejudice while increasing substantive moderation in Muslim students ( $t = 18.75$  significant at  $\alpha .01$ ). Most respondents had negative religious prejudices but cultivated tolerant attitudes after college. In the context of the implication, an educational communication model based on Qur'ānic Religious Pluralism in IRE was highly recommended. However, future research must consider the causes of consistent negative religious prejudice among a few students, even though lectures were attended using a similar learning model.

**Keywords:** IRE (Islamic Religious Education), Muslim Students, Qur'ān Religious Pluralism, Religious Moderation, Religious Prejudice

### INTRODUCTION

Religious intolerance in broader society, social media, and university campuses is reported to start with hate speech in the form of negative communication toward followers of different religions and sects. Meanwhile, hate speech originates from religious prejudice and efforts to eliminate this problem are crucial to building substantive religious moderation. Several cases of religious intolerance occurred due to the clash of ideologies, secularization, as well as the arrogance of militant religious groups and authorities (Karpov & Lisovskaya, 2008; Crosby & Varela, 2014; Fancourt, 2010; Muzakki, 2008).

The concept of intolerance, prejudice, and religious radicalism has become an important topic on the international stage due to the widespread acts of anarchism, radicalism, and terrorism in various parts of the world (Crosby & Varela, 2014; Fancourt, 2010; Muzakki, 2008). The triggers for intolerance in several countries are different and in Russia, discrimination extends to the two largest religions, namely Christians and Orthodox Muslims, driven by ideology and regional socio-political conditions. Muslim minority group accuses the authorities of showing arrogance and infringing on freedoms. Subsequently, conservative Muslim groups retaliated (Karpov & Lisovskaya, 2008) and strong secularization in various scientific disciplines in Greece created tensions (Karamouzis & Athanassiades, 2011). In the 1060s, the ideology of dogmatism and intolerance was very high within the European Union (Feather, 1967). Meanwhile, in the late 1980s, religious minorities in Pakistan were increasingly targeted by militant groups incited by political parties and fanatical Muslim leaders. Reports of the desecration of Hindu temples and Christian churches became daily news (Zaidi, 1988). According to Ahmed and Brasted, the development of sectarianism and religious terrorism in Pakistan was because the government failed to include the issue of religious identity in a conclusive constitutional solution

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(Ahmed & Brasted, 2020). In Indonesia, the phenomenon of criminalization of the incumbent governor of DKI Jakarta (2018), from an ethnic Chinese Protestant faith, was triggered by the strengthening of religious nationalism (Bourchier, 2019).

Zimmerman describes the phenomenon of intolerance as a unit connected to an international network. Some extremist movements have connectivity with other transnational groups. For example, Al-Qaeda is suspected of having strong ties and providing support to local Somali Islamic groups. Furthermore, ISIS entered the Libyan theater and the group became loyal to the leadership (Zimmerman, 2017). Salafi-takfiri, as Muslim extremists, accuse other religious groups and beliefs of being infidels (Zenna & Pieri, 2017; Olsson, 2020; Amal, 2020).

The relationship between religion and conflict was discussed in previous research. Some results focus on the destructive role because religious conflicts last longer, and are difficult to resolve. Religion has an ambivalent role since the concept can be dangerous and constructive in recognizing the potential for building peace (Deitch, 2020).

Fosnacht (2020) found that students who respect other religious beliefs are negatively correlated with acts of religious intolerance. Conversely, religious activities on campus are positively related to widespread acts of intolerance (Fosnacht & Broderick, 2020). Rockenbach and Mayhew found that religious majority and minority students in co-curricular activities had more positive worldview commitments (Bowman & Smedley, 2013). These results offered the concept of religious moderation and the development of extremist movements such as ISIS and Salafi Jihadi was triggered by logical errors in understanding the fundamental values of moderation in Islam (Haron & Hussin, 2013; Stebø, 2014; Woodward, 2017).

Religious and state leaders try to ward off the impact of misconceptions on society and students to avoid religious conflicts (Wang & Froese, 2003; Moulin, 2011). Yusuf Al-Qardhawi, President of the International Union for Muslim Scholars and the Father of Religious Moderation in the Islamic World, proposed the concept of religious moderation. Sheikh Ahmad Thayyib, Grand Mufti of Al-Azhar, promoted *wasathiyah da'wah* (religious moderation) as a bridge of unity to prevent religious intolerance (Gräf, 2007; Opwis, 2017; Warren & Gilmore, 2014). Al-Qardhawi proposed three fundamental principles, namely *at-Tawāzun* (balance), *as-Syumul* (universality), and (complementarity). Western intellectuals recommend that religious moderation education should be prioritized by policymakers (Demirel Ucan & Wright, 2019; Fosnacht & Broderick, 2020; Wang & Froese, 2020).

Indonesia is a multi-religious nation-state and the 2021 Ministry of Home Affairs census results show that the population is 273.32 million. A total of 237.60 million (86.93%) are Muslim, and the remaining 35.72 million (13.07%) are Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, and Confucian (Id.wikipedia, 2023). Religious intolerance is very high and several extensive surveys by INFID, PPIM.UINJKT, Komnas-HAM, BRIN-research-for-population, Puslitbang-Kemenag, Setara-Institute, and The-Wahid-Institute, 2015-2020) report that around 30%-50% of the community, pupils, students and teachers experience intolerance (Ma'arif et al., 2023; Rahmat & Yahya, 2022; Yahya & Rahmat, 2021; Suryana et al., 2024).

Several research have contributed to developing learning models for reducing religious intolerance. The efforts should include instilling individual religiosity and empathy among students (Fancourt, 2010; Fosnacht & Broderick, 2020; Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2018; Rahmat & Yahya, 2021). Yahya and Rahmat (2021) offered a dialogue-argumentative model, while Rahmat and Yahya (2022) provided a model for inclusive teaching materials. Fahrudin et al. (2023, 2024) and Yahya et al. (2022) offered a school typology learning model and a Sufistic approach.

In the twentieth century, religious pluralism was vital for building moderation (Soleh & Rahmawati, 2020). This concept advocates convergence, harmony, and compatibility between different religious traditions, as opposed to the concept of exclusivism. Religious pluralism refers to peaceful interactions between religious traditions within the same cultural space (Bano et al., 2023). Philosophers and theologians from various traditions advocate religious pluralism as a response to diversity (Burley, 2020; Gada, 2016). In Christianity, John Hick is considered the most prominent defender of religious pluralism (Burley, 2020). This concept is important due

to increasing religious diversity and conflict, which causes unrest in contemporary society (Bano et al., 2023). In the Islamic world, only Perennialist Muslims, such as Ibn Araby, Ismail al-Faruqi, and Abdulaziz Sachedina believe in religious pluralism as a method to realize peaceful coexistence in society (Bano et al., 2023; Bano & Ahmad, 2020).

Religious pluralism should be accepted by Muslim community because the motto of the Republic of Indonesia is *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, which articulates diversity. The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) issued a fatwa prohibiting the idea of pluralism, liberalism of thought, and secularism. This makes the individuals and institutions that promote pluralism stigmatized as a heretical and misleading group. Ahmadiyah members, who for decades could live without problems, suddenly had to experience violence. Mosques and centers for learning activities were destroyed by anarchic-inclined masses (Soekarba, 2018; Ma'arif et al., 2023). Many Ulama and Muslim intellectuals rejected MUI fatwa, including KH Abdurrahman Wahid (President of the Republic of Indonesia 2000-2002) and scholar Nurcholis Madjid (Basya, 2011).

Considering the importance of religious pluralism approach in building student religious moderation and bridging objections from the MUI, an IRE learning model is proposed based on Qur'anic religious pluralism. Some Muslim students who were exposed to extreme views were influenced by a misunderstanding of the terms "believers, infidels, heaven, and hell," claimed as the rights of people with specific Islamic identities by blaming non-Muslims and Muslims outside the mainstream. This extreme perspective is shaped by the proliferation of Salafi-jihadi ideological content on social media platforms, disseminated by particular individuals. Correcting students' misperceptions in understanding the propositions of the Al-Qur'an and Hadith towards correct understanding is the main aim of this research. An educational communication learning model is offered based on Qur'anic Religious Pluralism using the theory of Howard Giles (Miller, 2002; West and Turner, 2007). This theory is based on the premise that speech, vocal patterns, and actions are adjusted to accommodate religious mindset when a lecturer interacts.

## **METHOD**

### **Research Design**

This research was related to the development of educational communication models in IRE learning. A new learning model was produced based on Qur'anic Religious Pluralism and the model was tested in several classes. The qualitative approach prepared a draft model and in-depth interviews with students who have the highest and lowest moderation scores. Furthermore, a quasi-experimental method was used to measure the effectiveness of the model.

### **Research Respondents**

The research population was students participating in IRE courses at private Islamic and the largest state universities in West Java, Indonesia. The samples were selected purposively, namely experimental classes (IRE with an educational communication learning model based on Qur'anic Religious Pluralism), totalling six classes with 200 students. The respondents interviewed in depth were 10 students each with the highest and lowest religious moderation scores.

### **Research Instrument**

The research instrument for religious moderation questionnaire is in the form of Yes - No to each statement, totalling 16 items. A Delphi test was conducted on 5 experts who approved 16 items, which were tested for validity and reliability through the IBM SPSS Statistics 24. The validity was tested through Pearson's two-tailed correlation bivariate analysis, while reliability used the alpha scale analysis model. The results showed that 13 and 3 items were significant at alpha .01 and .05, respectively. Furthermore, the reliability of  $r = 0.76$  was significant at alpha 0.01.

Prejudice and intolerance of Muslim students towards other religions is as follows:

Muslims automatically believe while non-Muslims disbelieve.

Muslims will go to heaven, while non-Muslims will go to hell.

Christians and Hindus disbelieve because of the concept of three Gods, namely Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as well as God Brahma, God Vishnu, and God Shiva.

Non-Muslims are not eligible to become Governors and Regents in Muslim-majority areas.

Meanwhile, Muslim students' prejudice and intolerance towards minority schools of thought are as follows:

Ahmadiyya are not Muslim, because of the belief in the existence of a Prophet after the Prophet Muhammad.

Ahmadiyya should not develop teachings in Indonesia.

Shi'a are infidels because Imam Ali is glorified more than the Prophet Muhammad, and other accusations.

Shi'a should not develop teachings in Indonesia.

The example item includes "Christians are disbelievers because of the concept of three Gods" (-). This item is a negative prejudice, because the God of Christianity, the creator of the universe is only God the Father. Another example is that "Ahmadiyya is still considered Islam" (+).

### Analyzing of Data

Qualitative data analysis of the two-stage draft model was carried out. First, theoretical testing of inclusive IRE teaching materials and religious moderation should be based on the Al-Qur'an, hadith and the views of credible Ulama. Second, the Delphy test of the teaching materials was approved by seven IRE and Associate Professors.

Quantitative data analysis used descriptive statistics in the form of percentages (%). After 8 interventions (8x100 minutes) the research instruments were distributed and the profile of religious prejudice was compared before and after the intervention (August and October 2023). Data was analyzed using comparative techniques between post and pre-test results, specifically the IBM SPSS Statistics 24 with Paired Samples T Test.

### *Implementation of educational communication based on Qur'anic Religious Pluralism*

To implement educational communication based on Qur'anic Religious Pluralism in intervention classes, lecturers need to carry out five learning stages. First, oral communication should be conducted by asking students to discuss the status of faith and disbelief of the People of the Book based on residual knowledge (1x100 minutes). Second, QS Ali Imran/3:110, 113-114,199 should be opened concerning the status of faith (2x100 minutes). Third, student mini-research must be carried out on the Al-Quran and moderate scholars regarding the relationship between religious identity regarding faith, disbelief, heaven and hell with Qur'anic Religious Pluralism approach (2x100 minutes). Fourth, student mini-research must consider Al-Quran verses about the basic teachings of Shi'a (Imamah) and Ahmadiyya (khataman nabiiyin, etc.) as well as writings by moderate scholars (2x100 minutes). Fifth, the need to build substantive religious moderation should be discussed.

**Table 1. Stages of educational communication based on Qura'ni Religious Pluralism**

Stage	Types of Communication	Forms of Activity	Lecturer Activity	Students Activity
First	Oral-dialogic communication (1x100 minutes)	Discussion about the status of faith/disbelief of Muslims and People of the Book (non-Muslims) based on ready knowledge.	The lecturer asks students to discuss the status of faith/disbelief of Muslims and People of the Book (non-Muslims), based on students' ready knowledge (without opening cell phones/notes). Issues discussed: 1. Who are the People of the Book?  2. If there are People of the Book who convert to Islam?  3. Is every Person of the Book certain to be an infidel?	Each student answers according to residual knowledge. The answers, as in previous classes, are usually under the general trend of Muslims, as follows:  1. People of the Book: (a) Jews and Christians, (b) non-Muslims. 2. Non-Muslims who convert to Islam are called mu'allaf, not People of the Book. 3. Every People of the Book is an infidel.

			<p>4. Are there any among the People of the Book who believe?</p> <p>5. Does every Muslim automatically believe that no one disbelieves?</p> <p>6. Do Muslims have to be kind and tolerant towards the People of the Book?</p>	<p>4. The People of the Book may be good but always remain unbelievers.</p> <p>5. Every Muslim automatically believes. There are no Muslims who are infidels.</p> <p>6. Muslims must be kind and tolerant towards the People of the Book from among the dhimmi (good) infidels. However, there is no need to be tolerant of harbi infidels (who are hostile to Islam).</p>
Second	Oral-dialogic communication (2x100 minutes)	Discussing the message of QS Al-Taubat/9:100-101 and QS Ali Imran/3: 113-114,199 regarding the status of the faith of Muslims and People of the Book.	<p>1. In the first 20 minutes, the lecturer asks students to open QS Al-Taubat/9:100-101 and QS Ali Imran/3: 113-114,199 concerning the status of the faith of Muslims and the People of the Book and asks students to analyze the concept carefully.</p> <p>2. After 60 minutes, the lecturer asks each student to comment on the results of the reading: (a) Who are Muslims called infidels in these verses? (b) Who are the People of the Book who are called straight, faithful and pious in these verses?</p> <p>3. In the last 20 minutes, the lecturer asks students to conclude: (a) What is the character of Muslims who have been sentenced to infidels by Allah? (b) What is the character of the People of the Book who are called upright, faithful and pious by Allah?</p>	<p>1. In the first 20 minutes, each student opens QS Al-Taubat/9:100-101 and QS Ali Imran/3: 113-114,199 concerning the status of the faith of Muslims and People of the Book. Each of them studied it carefully.</p> <p>2. For 60 minutes, each student presents the results of reading about (a) Muslims who are called infidels in these verses, and (b) People of the Book who are called upright, faithful and pious in these verses.</p> <p>3. In the last 20 minutes, students with the guidance of the lecturer concluded: (a) An infidel Muslim is a person who claims to be Muslim, but his heart and deeds are not Islamic; (b) People of the Book who are upright, faithful and pious are non-Muslims but hearts and deeds are like those of pious Muslims.</p>
Third	Oral-dialogical and written communication (2x100 minutes)	Mini student research on the Qur'an and moderate scholars regarding the relationship between religious identity (Islam vs non-Muslim) regarding faith, disbelief, heaven and hell with Qur'anic Religious Pluralism approach.	<p>The first time the lecturer provided short training on the implementation of Qur'anic Religious Pluralism. The two lecturers mentioned several moderate religious scholars and blogs. Then give small (written) mini-research assignments to small groups about the following verses of the Qur'an, then students are asked to present, discuss and conclude (in class) the following problems:</p> <p>1. QS Al-Taubat/9:100-101 (about the people around the Prophet Muhammad SAW, some were believers, while others were unbelievers).</p> <p>2. QS Ali Imran/3:113-114,199 (among the People of the Book some are upright, believers, activists of good, anti-evil, prostrate, and pious).</p> <p>3. QS Al-Baqarah/2:62 and Al-Maidah/5:69 (about Muslims, Jews, Christians and Shabi'in who believe in Allah</p>	<p>Students attended training on Qur'anic Religious Pluralism as well as several moderate religious scholars and blogs. Outside of class, small groups of students conducted mini research on the meaning of verses from the Qur'an, also from moderate religious scholars/blogs. In class, the following problems are presented, discussed, and concluded:</p> <p>1. QS Al-Taubat/9:100-101 contains the message that among Muslims today there are believers and unbelievers.</p> <p>2. QS Ali Imran/3: 113-114,199 contains the message that among the People of the Book today some are upright, faithful, good people, anti-bad things, prostrate, and pious).</p> <p>3. QS Al-Baqarah/2:62 and Al-Maidah/5:69 contain the message that among Muslims, Jews, Christians, and Shabi'in today some believe in Allah, believe in the Last Day, and do good deeds)</p>

			and the Last Day and do good deeds).	
Fourth	Oral-dialogical and written communication (2x100 minutes)	Mini student research on Al-Quran verses about the basic teachings of Shi'ism ( <i>Imamah</i> , etc.) and Ahmadiyya ( <i>khataman nabiyyin</i> , etc.) as well as writings by moderate ulama about both.	<p>The lecturer first mentioned several moderate religious scholars and blogs. The two lecturers gave (written) mini-small group research assignments about the basic teachings of the Shi'a (<i>Imamah</i>, etc.) and Ahmadiyya (<i>khataman nabiyyin</i>) in the Qur'an as well as the writings of moderate scholars. In class, students are asked to present, discuss and conclude the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What is the criticism of Sunni Muslims, specifically anti-Shia groups, towards Shi'a teachings? Is it true that Shiite teachings have no basis in the Qur'an? Is it true that the Shi'ites are heretics and infidels?</li> <li>2. What is the view of moderate Islamic scholars/blogs (Amman Risale) regarding Shi'ism?</li> <li>3. What is the Sunni Muslim criticism of Ahmadiyya teachings? Is it true that Ahmadiyya teachings have no basis in the Qur'an? Is it true that Ahmadiyya is heretical and infidel?</li> <li>4. What is the view of moderate Islamic scholars/blogs (results of the world conference of scholars at Al-Azhar, Egypt, etc.) regarding Ahmadiyya, is it permissible to accuse Ahmadiyya of being infidels and outside of Islam?</li> </ol>	<p>Students listened to the lecturer's explanation about several moderate religious scholars and blogs. Outside of class, small groups conducted mini research on verses from the Qur'an relevant to Shi'ites and Ahmadis, as well as about the Islamic status. In class, the following problems are presented, discussed, and concluded:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Criticism of the Shi'a, specifically: (a) glorifying Imam Ali more than the Prophet, (b) Imamate theology, (c) there is no pillar of faith in angels, books and qadha-qadar, (d) there is no first creed in pillars of Islam.</li> <li>2. The treatises of Amman, NU, Muhammadiyah, and several moderate ulama stated: Shi'a=Sunni, both are Islam.</li> <li>3. The main criticism of Ahmadiyya is the belief in the existence of a Prophet after the Prophet Muhammad, who was the <i>Khataman Nabiyyin</i> (last/final Prophet).</li> <li>4. The results of the world ulama conference at Al-Azhar in Egypt must not be accused of infidelity. Furthermore, when a person accused of being an infidel has 99 characteristics of infidelity but still has one characteristic of Islam, then must be declared Muslim. Ahmadiyya has many Islamic characteristics.</li> </ol>
Fifth	Oral-dialogic communication (1x100 minutes)	Discussion about the need to build and form substantive, not symbolic, religious moderation.	<p>The lecturer asked small groups of students to discuss and present the need to build and form substantive, not symbolic, forms of religious moderation. The issues requested to be discussed are as follows:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. What is the form of religious moderation towards non-Muslims, is it limited to respecting the presence or allowing them to build houses of worship and allowing best cadres to run for governor/regent/mayor in Muslim-majority areas?</li> <li>2. What is the form of <i>ukhuwah Islamiyah</i> with the Shi'a and Ahmadiyya, whether it is limited to respecting the presence or to allowing them</li> </ol>	<p>Small groups of students discussed and presented the need to build and form substantive, not symbolic, forms of religious moderation. With the guidance of the lecturer, forms of religious moderation were discussed and presented as follows:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Religious moderation towards non-Muslims is not limited to respecting presence but also building places of worship and allowing the best cadres to run for political position in Muslim-majority areas.</li> <li>2. Brotherhood of Islam with the Shi'a and Ahmadiyya, not only respecting the presence but also establishing mosques and religious educational institutions.</li> </ol>


to build mosques and religious educational institutions?

## RESEARCH FINDINGS

Student's religious moderation profile is shown before the results of the model effectiveness are reported.

### Student Religious Moderation Profile

Religious moderation profile before and after the model trial can be seen in the following chart.



n = 200 Muslim students

**No. Tolerance towards non-Muslims**

1. Allah may designate humble non-Muslims who have noble morals as believers (+).
2. Every Muslim does not automatically believe (+).
3. Heaven is only intended for Muslims, even those who are arrogant and have bad morals (-).
4. Muslims who are arrogant and have bad morals can be thrown into hell (+).
5. Non-Muslims who are humble and have noble character will still be thrown into hell (-).
6. Non-Muslims who believe in Allah, the Last Day, and do good deeds can enter heaven (+).
7. Hindus are infidels because they believe in the Trimurti (God Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva) (-).
8. Christians are pagans because they believe in the Trinity (God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit) (-).

**No. Tolerance towards Muslim minority**

- The Ulama Conference in Al-Azhar, Egypt, stipulated the prohibition of takfir (accusing them of being infidels).
1. In my opinion, this includes the prohibition of *takfir* in Ahmadiyya (+).
  2. In my opinion, Ahmadiyya is still considered Islam (+). The closure of Ahmadiyya mosques is correct because
  3. Ahmadiyya, as a heretical Islam, should not develop in Indonesia (-).
  4. We must not allow Ahmadiyya to build mosques around us (-).
  5. I agree with a group of Muslims who like to disrupt the commemoration of the Day of Ashura (Shi'a religious day) (-).
  6. I agree with the Amman Treatise (the result of the World Ulema Conference) that Shi'a Islam = Sunni Islam; both are Islam (+).
  7. I agree with K.H. Said Aqil Siraj (NU), KH Din Syamsudin (Muhammadiyah), and Habib Quraisy Shihab (Al-Quran interpreter) that Shi'a Islam = Sunni Islam; both are Islam (+).
  8. Shi'a is a heretical and infidel Islamic group (-).

**Chart 1.** The result of pre-tests of students' religious moderation


Chart 1 above shows that before the intervention, the average student religious prejudice score was 44% (low). The average score for religious prejudice against non-Muslims is 37% (low), and against minority Islamic schools of thought, 52% (medium). The order of students' religious prejudice towards non-Muslims is as follows:

- a. Christians are pagans because they believe in the Trinity (God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit) = 15% (very low).
- b. Hindus are infidels because they believe in the Trimurti (God Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva) = 20% (deficient).
- c. Non-Muslims who believe in Allah, the Last Day, and do good deeds can enter heaven = 40% (low).
- d. Muslims who are arrogant and have bad morals can be thrown into hell = 42% (low).
- e. Heaven is only intended for Muslims, even those who are arrogant and have bad morals = 43% (low).
- f. Allah may designate humble non-Muslims with noble morals as believers = 44% (low).
- g. Non-Muslims who are humble and have noble character will still be thrown into hell = 44% (low).
- h. Every Muslim automatically believes 46% (low).

Meanwhile, the order of students' religious prejudice against minority Islamic schools of thought is as follows:

- a. The Ulama Conference in Al-Azhar, Egypt, stipulated the prohibition of takfir (accusing them of being infidels). I believe this includes the prohibition of takfir in Ahmadiyya = 40% (low).
- b. We must not allow Ahmadiyya to build mosques around us = 40% (low).
- c. In my opinion, Ahmadiyya is still considered Islam = 42% (low).
- d. The closure of Ahmadiyya mosques is correct because Ahmadiyya, as a heretical Islam, should not develop in Indonesia = 43% (low).
- e. Shi'a is a heretical and infidel Islamic group = 60% (medium).
- f. I agree with the Amman Treatise (the result of the World Ulema Conference) that Shi'a Islam = Sunni Islam; both are Islam = 61% (high).
- g. I agree with K.H. Said Aqil Siraj (NU), KH Din Syamsudin (Muhammadiyah), and Habib Quraissy Shihab (Al-Quran interpreter) that Shi'a Islam = Sunni Islam; both are Islam = 61% (medium).
- h. I agree with a group of Muslims who like to disrupt the commemoration of the Day of Ashura (Shi'a religious day) = 63% (medium).

Meanwhile, after the intervention, the average student religious prejudice score is as shown in Chart 2 below.



n = 200 Muslim students



No.	Tolerance towards non-Muslims	No.	Tolerance towards Muslim minority
1.	Allah may designate non-Muslims who are humble and have noble morals as believers (+).	1.	The Ulama Conference in Al-Azhar, Egypt, stipulated the prohibition of takfir (accusing them of being infidels). In my opinion, this includes the prohibition of <i>takfir</i> in Ahmadiyya (+).
2.	Every Muslim does not automatically believe (+). Heaven is only intended for Muslims, even those who are arrogant and have bad morals (-).	2.	In my opinion, Ahmadiyya is still considered Islam (+). The closure of Ahmadiyya mosques is correct because Ahmadiyya, as a heretical Islam, should not develop in Indonesia (-).
3.	Muslims who are arrogant and have bad morals can be thrown into hell (+).	3.	We must not allow Ahmadiyya to build mosques around us (-).
4.	Non-Muslims who are humble and have noble character will still be thrown into hell (-).	4.	I agree with a group of Muslims who like to disrupt the commemoration of the Day of Ashura (Shi'a religious day) (-).
5.	Non-Muslims who believe in Allah, the Last Day, and do good deeds can enter heaven (+).	5.	I agree with the Amman Treatise (the result of the World Ulema Conference) that Shi'a Islam = Sunni Islam; both are Islam (+).
6.	Hindus are infidels because they believe in the Trimurti (God Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva) (-).	6.	I agree with K.H. Said Aqil Siraj (NU), KH Din Syamsudin (Muhammadiyah), and Habib Quraisy Shihab (Al-Quran interpreter) that Shi'a Islam = Sunni Islam; both are Islam (+).
7.	Christians are pagans because they believe in the Trinity (God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit) (-).	7.	Shi'a is a heretical and infidel Islamic group (-).
8.		8.	

**Chart 2.** The result of post-tests of students' religious moderation

Chart 2 shows that the average student religious prejudice score was 62% (medium) after the intervention. The average score for religious prejudice against non-Muslims is 60% (medium), and against minority Islamic schools of thought, 64% (medium). The order of students' religious prejudice towards non-Muslims is as follows:

- a. Christians are pagans because of the believe in the Trinity (God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit) = 41% (low).
- b. Hindus are infidels believing in the Trimurti (God Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva) = 41% (low).
- c. Non-Muslims who believe in Allah, the Last Day, and do good deeds can enter heaven = 64% (high).
- d. Non-Muslims who are humble and have noble character will be thrown into hell = 64% (high).
- e. Muslims who are arrogant and have bad morals can be thrown into hell = 64% (high).
- f. Heaven is only intended for Muslims, even those who are arrogant with bad morals = 64% (high).
- g. Allah may designate humble non-Muslims with noble morals as believers = 64% (high).
- h. Every Muslim automatically believes 80% (very high).

Meanwhile, the order of students' religious prejudice against minority Islamic schools of thought is as follows:

- a. The Ulama Conference in Al-Azhar, Egypt, stipulated the prohibition of takfir. This includes the prohibition of takfir in Ahmadiyya = 55% (medium).
- b. Ahmadiyya must not be allowed to build mosques = 60% (medium).
- c. Ahmadiyya is still considered Islam = 55% (medium).
- d. The closure of Ahmadiyya mosques is correct because heretical Islam should not be allowed to develop = 66% (high).
- e. Shi'a is a heretical and infidel Islamic group = 68% (high).
- f. According to Amman Treatise (the result of the World Ulema Conference), Shi'a and Sunni are Islam = 69% (high).

- g. There is an agreement with a group of Muslims who disrupts the commemoration of the Day of Ashura (Shi'a religious day) = 69% (high).
- h. According to KH Said Aqil Siraj (NU), KH Din Syamsudin (Muhammadiyah), and Habib Quraisy Shihab (Al-Quran interpreter), Shi'a and Sunni are Islam = 70% (high).

*The effectiveness of the model in countering religious prejudice and increasing religious moderation*

After implementing an educational communication model based on Qur'anic Religious Pluralism, there was a prejudice reduction and increased moderation.

**Table 1. Statistical test results of the model effectiveness**

Group	Mean 1	Mean 2	t-test	Remark
1. post-pre religious moderation	5.03	3.01	18.750	Significant at alpha 0.01
2. post-pre moderation towards non-Muslims	6.43	4.15	17.330	Significant at alpha 0.01
3. post-pre moderation towards Muslim minority	11.46	7.16	22.838	Significant at alpha 0.01

n = 200 students

After the implementation of the educational communication model based on Qur'anic Religious Pluralism, there was a significant increase in religious moderation scores (t = 22,838 significant at alpha .01). By analyzing chat 1-2, the pre-test and post-test scores = 44 (low) and 62 (high), respectively. Therefore, there was an increase in the score of 18 within the different aspects. In the element of religious moderation towards non-Muslims, t = 18.750 (significant at alpha .01). In chats 1-2, the pre-test and post-test scores for tolerance towards non-Muslims = 37 (low) and 60 (medium). There was an increase in the score of 18 and in the aspect of religious moderation towards minority Islamic schools, t = 17.330 (significant at alpha .01). By analyzing chats 1-2, the pre-test and post-test scores for tolerance of minority Islamic sects = are 52 (medium) and 64 (high) due to an increase in the score by 12.

## DISCUSSION

Before the intervention, religious prejudice of students was negative. The results support previous research, where around half are intolerant (Yahya & Rahmat, 2021; Rahmat & Yahya, 2022). In East Java, most students view the importance of religious moderation for national and state life. However, about 20-25% of the 500 students were intolerant and sympathetic towards religious radicalism movements. Even though the concept is relatively small, this initial factor is counter-productive for the life of the nation and state. Religious intolerance was influenced by several preachers who supported intolerance (Sugihartati et al., 2020). The results describe Indonesian Christian students who are ready to have formal relationships with followers of other religions. However, limited numbers are prepared to have unique relationships such as marriage (Suleman, 2016). The Center for Religious and Cross-Cultural Research at Gadjah Mada University found that 95.4% acknowledged the importance of religious moderation for peaceful life. This normative acceptance does not necessarily mean tolerance in everyday interactions (UGM Cross-Cultural Studies, 2008). According to the pre-test results students reject non-Muslims becoming regional leaders in Muslim areas. The results of this research are in line with the results of The Wahid Institute, where there was an increase in violations of freedom of religion. The highest breach of religious liberty is the prohibition or limitation of activities (The Wahid Institute, 2011). Research by the Ministry of Religion in 2018 reported that of 13,600 respondents in 34 provinces, only 50.03% were willing to visit followers of other religions (Ministry of Religion Research and Development Center, 2019). Setara Institute also ranked West Java Province as the most intolerant region over the last 12 years. There were at least 629 incidents related to violations of freedom of religion and belief in the province (Setara Institute, 2019). The Wahid Institute in 2014 reported several prominent cases of religious intolerance, including sealings and attacks on churches (The Wahid Institute, 2015). Research conducted by CSIS in 23 provinces reported that 68.2% refused to build houses of worship of other faiths even though individuals lived in the same environment as followers of different religions (Suleman, 2016). Approximately 38% of Muslim students in Jakarta rejected non-Muslim teachers (Yasmine et al., 2007).

The results show that the educational communication model based on Qur'ānic Religious Pluralism has proven to be effective in countering religious prejudice and increasing substantive moderation among students. The model has proven to be more effective in increasing religious moderation towards non-Muslims than towards minority Islamic sects. This learning model differs from the conventional type, where the lecturer directly explains the topic, accompanied by questions and answers with simple discussions. The educational communication model based on Qur'ānic Religious Pluralism allows students to discuss problems, and form small teams to conduct inquiries. The lecturer invited students to discuss the meaning of Muslims, People of the Book (non-Muslims), believers, and unbelievers, which is misunderstood. These meanings were explored in the Al-Qur'ān and were not related to religious identity.

Students accuse Christians and Hindus of being infidels because of the concept of three Gods. After conducting mini research on credible and moderate religious blogs, it was discovered that God in Christianity and Hinduism is only one God (not three). In Christianity, God the Son and the Holy Spirit are holy creatures, while God Almighty is only God the Father in Hinduism. God Vishnu and Shiva are synonymous with Angel Michael and `Izrael in Islam, while Almighty God is Brahma. The mini research on the Qur'ān changed the understanding of the meaning of Islam, infidels, and non-Muslims from being discriminatory to pluralistic. With the small survey, students no longer accuse these two religions of having three Gods. Therefore, the educational communication model based on Qur'ānic Religious Pluralism has succeeded in eliminating religious prejudice and intolerance among Muslim students.

Analytical research regarding religious intolerance have become a severe concern for educational practitioners as an effort to instil individual religiosity and piety (Fancourt, 2010; Fosnacht & Broderick, 2020; Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2018; Rahmat & Yahya, 2022). The IRE learning model based on the Al-Qur'ān has proven effective in increasing Muslim students' understanding, strengthening theology and tolerant attitudes towards other religions (Rahmat et al., 2019). Furthermore, learning models such as dialogue-argumentative (Yahya & Rahmat, 2021), inclusive teaching materials (Rahmat & Yahya, 2022), and IRE based on religious maturity (Suryana et al., 2024) have proven effective in increasing religious moderation and countering prejudice.

Students also obtain information that Shi'a and Ahmadiyya have Quranic arguments using the learning model. This was supported by several verses from the Qur'ān on Imamate. The meaning of *Khataman Nabiyyin* was also discovered as the most excellent and superior Prophet. The results are consistent with Ma'arif et al. (2023), where several Ulama understand the Ahmadiyya style of religious thinking. According to Fahrudin et al. (2023), many students understand the Shi'ite religious way of thinking by implementing the madhhab typology method.

## CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the educational communication model based on Qur'ānic Religious Pluralism in IRE learning was successful in preventing religious prejudice while increasing substantive moderation among Muslim students in Indonesia. Before college, most Muslim students had negative prejudices against non-Muslims and minority Islamic schools of thought. After implementing the learning model, positive religious prejudices and tolerance were reported in the groups.

The implication was that an educational communication model based on Qur'ānic Religious Pluralism in IRE was highly recommended. However, future research must analyse the causes of consistent negative religious prejudice among a few students.

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