The Future of Egyptian Foreign Policy Directions Towards Africa

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Abstract
The research appraised with expecting the future of Egyptian foreign policy directions towards Africa, indicating the most essential circumstances and changes that the African continent is going through, whether regional or international. The study highlighted the most serious aspects of the future direction of this strategy towards Ethiopia and Libya in particular, signifying the political will to combine and activate its relations with the countries of the continent for mutual profit and to restore its ancient role in the continent, to uncover a set of challenges facing Egypt's foreign policy towards Africa, besides reviewing future imaginations for foreign policy directions towards Egypt to accomplish with the most important consequences and suggestions.

Keywords: Foreign Policy, Confronts, Forthcoming Ideas, Africa, Orientalism

INTRODUCTION
After the collapse of the regime of previous President Hosni Mubarak in 2011, Egypt experienced three transitional phases. Throughout the first phase, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces presumed power under the control of Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi. However, the Muslim Brotherhood revolted to authority in the second phase, from June 2012 until late June 2013. The achievement of the June 30, 2013 alteration in defeating the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood, the country joined a short-term transitional phase directed by former President Adly Mansour, head of the Constitutional Court at the time, and the next phase rapidly started after President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi earned the presidential elections and ascended to authority in the country in June 2014.

The progression of anticipating the prospect of Egyptian foreign policy directions towards Africa throughout investigation and study is a demanding manner with all the surrounding circumstances. It amends that the African continent is moving through, whether provincial or international. The upcoming of Egyptian foreign policy directions concerning Africa in general, and Ethiopia and Libya in particular, varies mainly on the availability of a strong political and prevalent will in Egypt in order to consolidate and stimulate its relations with the countries of the continent for mutual assistance and to restore its historical role in the continent. In this part, we will report a group of challenges that provoke Egypt's foreign policy toward Africa, as well as reread future visions of Egyptian foreign policy directions toward Africa on the whole and Ethiopia and Libya in particular.

The significance of the research: The significance of the study is emphasized by the fact that the African continent has acquired exceptional importance among international powers and has become a source of contest between them due to its geostrategic location in the middle of the three regions of the world, its control of international trade roads and its restraint of many natural wealth and primary resources, in addition to the number of its people, which is predicted at (One billion and three hundred million people), compelling it a considerable commercial market that obtains many goods and services, in addition to its political and elective weight in international societies. The consequence of the analysis is also verified by explaining the threats and challenges affecting the Egyptian role and stressing the magnitude and manner in which international and regional variables influence Egypt's foreign strategy, as well as the magnitude of the recommended Egyptian strategy for allocating with the threats and challenges of international changes.
The research problem: The research problem is emphasized by the variety of variables concerning Egyptian foreign policy since the year 2013, making it difficult to become recognizable with all of them. From this starting point, we will discuss the most noticeable of these variables that directly affected the direction of Egyptian foreign policy, which are the global variables.

Research hypothesis: Prearranged Africa's economic, political, and geographical status, the Egyptian decision-maker, in his extraterritorial behavior, forfeited great consideration to this territory, especially Ethiopia and Libya, whether associated with the period that preceded 2013 or the political alterations that followed in the African arena. Hence, the analysis supposes that there are movements in politics. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry's approach towards Africa after 2013 has its local and international power.

Research methodology: The study will approve more than one scheme if necessary. The inductive attitude will be employed by pursuing progresses in Egyptian foreign policy trends, in addition to the expressive and systematic approach, as it is one of the methods of analysis and explanation. Lastly, the forward-looking tactic will be utilized to perform the scenes and the orientalist prediction of the Egyptian role in Africa.

Research plan: Using the above, the work will be focused based on the following points:

The first requirement: The confronts challenging the future of Egyptian foreign policy direction towards Africa
Second: The international controls of France and Russia
The second requirement is forthcoming imaginations of Egyptian foreign policy directions toward Africa.

The First Prerequisite
Challenges Confronting the Future of Egyptian Foreign Policy Directions Towards Africa

Since 2013, the future of foreign strategy in Africa has faced many challenges despite all the attempts that Egypt has tried to express and increase its role in the continent more efficiently. These challenges are divided into:

First- Internal challenges: There are a assemblage of many internal challenges facing Egyptian foreign policy towards Africa since 2013, which can be reviewed as follows:

1. Terrorism: Egypt has experience from extremism and terrorist campaigns, whether inside Egypt or outside its margins, as terrorism is characterized in three axes: the first is the internal axis, mainly the Sinai zone, where terrorist components and political Islam forces regenerate to upset Egypt’s interior stability through the use of employing terrorism to produce a state of chaos, complicate the Egyptian interior, and disperse Egypt’s political, security, and economic capabilities to overthrow it.

As for the second axis, the close neighborhood involves of the Zionist entity and Gaza to the east and Libya to the west, as well as northwest Sudan, which acts as a bridge for terrorism to cross from Libya to Sudan or Egypt by exploiting the period of Sudan’s preoccupation with the transitional phase that occurred after the end of the authority of President Omar al-Bashir. The third axis is secondary pass-porting, which exemplifies the defeated remnants of ISIS from Iraq and Syria via Turkey to Libya.

Egypt acted to confront this dangerous occurrence through an integrated vision, the first of which is safeguard dealings and the rule of law; the second is the growth dimension and its ability to control the spread of this phenomenon, and the third is international and regional organization and their solidarity to oppose terrorism.

2. Confronts on the borders: The instability in Egypt’s adjacent countries, whether with Libya or Sudan, creates a threat to Egyptian national security and increases the risks to which Egypt is unprotected, namely the collapse of the state in Libya, the spread of weapons and equipped groups that refuse to come under the authority of the state, and the inability of the Libyan parties to undertake the situation on the ground, as there has become a security blankness on Egypt’s western borders.

The increase of violence between the various Libyan groups led to the creation of an environment for external interference in the region, which made the Libyan arena a theater for these local and international interventions.
The consequences witnessed by the Libyan arena had their repercussions on neighboring Libyan nations, especially after the revolution of June 30, 2013, and the fall of the Brotherhood’s rule, which was banned by the Libyan Islamic groups supported by Turkey. At this time, Egypt converted to a major regional player in the interactions of the Libyan arena, and it expended all means to protect the security of its borders and prevent preoccupation with interior Libyan threats against Egyptian government.

3. The confront of water security: Ethiopia’s relevance in building dams dates back to before 2011, as Ethiopia appropriated advantage of the unstable internal circumstances in Egypt after the uprising of January 25, 2011, to undertake the progression of building the Grand Ethiopian Recovery Dam in April 2011. The distribution of water and water security is at the forefront. Egyptian agenda of interests required to create many steps to overcome this issue through its movements with the Nile Basin countries, especially Ethiopia. However, these activities did not show direct results in the course of the Egyptian-Ethiopian negotiations.

The Nile River is the major and only source of water for Egypt, and without it, Egypt becomes a wasteland country, and any decrease in water has severe consequences for Egyptian water sanctuary. After the alteration of January 25, 2011, successive governments tried to deal with the issue of water and the Renaissance Dam temporarily until the political situation in Egypt stabilized. Through, the condition became more complicated, and the process of building the dam accelerated during the era of former President Mohamed Morsi and after President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi presumed the presidency in Egypt in 2014. Egypt sought to supply multiple performs to push the talks on the Renaissance Dam towards a point approaching a solution by activating summit diplomacy on the one hand and concealing the political character of the technical talks on the dam by connecting the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs beside the Ministry of Water Resources. However, the Ethiopian situation did not show any suppleness in this crisis, which is continuing until now.

**Second: Exterior challenges:** There are an assembly of external confronts facing the Egyptian foreign policy orientations towards Africa since 2013, which are as follows:

1. **Economic challenges:** They are identified by the economic dependency of African countries on international powers through their reliance on economic aid and assistance, which delays the freedom of African commercial movement, in addition to the wrecked infrastructure that most African countries suffer from, including Egypt in the arenas of information, communications, transportation, energy, and weak partnership between the public and private subdivisions and obstacles to investment transfer, as African markets represent only 5% of the capacity of Egyptian exports.

Additionally, competition with the main powers that have a weighty presence on the continent, such as the United States of America, China, and other Asian and European powers, as these authorities are associated with developed economic relations with African countries, which constitutes an complication to Egyptian interests in the continent.

2. **The existence of non-African international and regional authorities:** There is a convincing occurrence and influence of those countries on the African continent, whose effect increased after the decline of Egyptian influence before 2013, as it delivered the opportunity to enhance their presence and strengthen their political, security and economic associations, especially in the Nile Basin countries, which has become a threat to national security. Among those Egyptian powers are Turkey, Iran, and the Zionist entity. These countries acted a substantial and pivotal role and continue to play in the issue of building the Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. They are also developing Ethiopian negotiation strategies with Egypt and playing an essential role in the field of water projects such as building dams and establishing lakes. This is also the circumstance with regard to Turkish intervention in the Libyan disaster and the threat it poses to secure Egyptian Nationalist

3- **Safeguarding the Red Sea:** One of the prevalent challenges facing Egypt is defending and securing the Red Sea with the Bab al-Mandab Strait, which is considered the southern arrival to the Suez Canal and is reproduced as one of the most important international shipping corridors. At the same time, it is counted one of the most essential sources of Egyptian income.

Egypt requests to defend the Red Sea from Bab al-Mandab in the south to the Suez Canal in the north to protect navigation and fortify Egypt’s foreign trade amidst regional and international powers entering to control.
navigation in the Red Sea. Egypt has understood the seriousness of this and set out to establish the Southern Fleet Command in 2017 and announce An Egyptian naval base in Halayeb to secure a strong military occurrence competing with the military presence of regional international powers.

4. Stress in relationships between Egypt and a number of African nations: There is tension in associations between Egypt and a number of African nations such as Ethiopia, especially concerning the issue of the Nile River and the Renaissance Dam and Egypt’s assertion that the waters of the Nile River for it are a matter of life or death.

The Second Requirement

Future Visualizations of Egyptian Foreign Policy Commands Toward Africa

Supporting and firming up the Egyptian-African rapprochement at this stage is the focus of Egyptian foreign policy orientations towards Africa, as the African landform in general, and Ethiopia and Libya in particular, occupied an almost central weight in Egypt, especially after the revolution of June 30, 2013.

To check future visions of Egyptian foreign policy directions towards Africa, the request was divided into:

First: The scene of advancement: Regardless the many confronts and crises facing Egyptian foreign policy in Africa, it acquires many elements of progress and effective influence in the political, economic, security, and cultural fields, occupying a distinguished position on the African continent and achieving a qualitative breakthrough in Egyptian-African relations, especially since Egypt has historical platforms. There is a difference in the nature of this role dependent on the internal, regional, and international situations and the differences in the processes and means available at each historical stage.

Egypt has given urgency to reinforcing its associations with its strategic African depth, which now requires a great deal of awareness of the challenges, threats, and risks surrounding its nationwide security. On the profitable level, the worth of trade exchange between Egypt and African countries boosted to reach $8.6 billion during the year 2022, based on the Central Group for Public Mobilization and Statistics and compared to $5.4 billion in 2013.

Egypt has expanded many of its official tools at the level of the intelligence of state and other official institutions, as well as the tools of popular mediation, including systematizing and hosting conferences and technical forums to enhance, consolidate, and support its role in Africa. To highlight the visit and effectiveness of this role, Egypt announced its openness to all African countries. It stated the strengthening of its relations with these countries and coordination with them in all fields.

The collection of Egypt to lead the African Union in 2019 is an recognition by the AU countries of the development of Egypt reinstating its leadership role on the continent, which Egypt has converted into many of its positive movements and speeches continentally and internationally.

As for the interior Egyptian level, there is an arrangement to reinforce and upsurge the effectiveness of the Egyptian role through launching many initiatives and cooperation projects with the countries of the African continent in several fields, including health, economy, education, administrative reform, military and security training, as well as reformulating the Egyptian state institutions in a way that confirms this style, such as creating a committee for African affairs in the Egyptian People’s Assembly, allocating a sector for African affairs in all government institutions and ministries, and establishing the Egyptian Agency for Development as a mechanism to support African human ministries.

The attempts taken by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi since he expected power in 2014, his mutual visits with African countries, and his conferences with leaders, forerunners, and officials of African countries in Egypt confirm his keenness to renovate Egypt’s position on the African continent.

Summit diplomacy started its gain to exercising an effective and influential Egyptian character on the continent, which experienced it to assume a non-permanent membership in the Security Council representing Africa for the years 2016 and 2017, in addition to membership in the African Peace and Security Council for the North African region, in addition to the Egyptian President’s presence at most of the African summits.
As for the water catastrophe between Egypt and Ethiopia, the discussions between Egypt and Africa are still maintaining a veneer of sober diplomacy, but in the arguments of the representatives of the two countries, there is an intelligence that has become difficult to hide, and in light of the existing conditions that are not devoid of external interference, both international and local, as some countries have tried to utilize these situations to have a vital impact on the international arena, which was the largest segment for the United States of America.

Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan extended a contract after several negotiations between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Water Resources under the administration of the United States of America and the World Bank throughout the period 28-30 January 2020 on the following topics:

1. A schedule containing the filling and operation plan.

2. As well as practices for dealing with droughts and prolonged droughts during scarce years during operation.

Egypt approved that its participation in the meeting called for by the United States on February 27/28, 2020, approached to conformity a final agreement on the regulations for filling and maintaining the Renaissance Dam and implementation of the obligations included in the Declaration of Principles agreement concluded between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia in 2015. The function it played added to the United States and the World Bank and their protection of the intensive round of negotiations to formulate the final version of the agreement, which includes particular rules for filling and functioning the Renaissance, a coordination mechanism, a binding mechanism for resolving disputes, addressing the safety of the Renaissance Dam, and completing environmental studies.

The Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation also began the fourth conference of the irrigation ministers of Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia on June 14, 2020. Based on the statement, the discussions that took place between the three countries reflected that many significant subjects are still question to rejection by the Ethiopian side, most notably Ethiopia's objection to the items that give a legally binding character to the agreement or establish a legal mechanism to resolve disputes that may arise between the three countries, in addition to Ethiopia's negation to deal with the technical points raised by the Egyptian side regarding measures to confront drought and years of water scarcity. Egypt emphasized the necessity of sacrificing these elements, followed by significant elements in the agreement. Any agreement connected to the existence of the Egyptian people and the Sudanese people alike.

Thus, the description of the relations between Egypt and Ethiopia becomes clear which were described by attraction at times and repulsion at other times, which would affect the nature of the relations between the two countries, containing the economic relations that were characterized by cooperation that aims to accomplish mutual economic benefit between the two countries. The scene of development includes two directions. The first direction is a type of tension between the affairs between the two countries, and these results from each party's observance to a point of view that is entirely contradictory to the other party and far from rapprochement. Simultaneously, the Egyptian party follows to the acquired historical rights to life and does not ignore them. In this way, we find that Ethiopia does not essentially identify these agreements and rights that Egypt claims it acquires.

As for the other route, it is represented by an effort to cooperate between the two countries to remedy the existing crisis between them, which is the Renaissance Dam crisis. There are provincial and international efforts to prevent the events from reaching a more critical stage, so several parties are trying to play the role of mediator. For instance, Sudan is a party to the disaster as it is one of the Nile Basin countries, but it is less harmful. The influence of the dam on it will be more beneficial than on Egypt.

As for the forthcoming of Egyptian foreign policy directives towards Libya, this scene stipulates that the Egyptian approach is characterized by the development of the state of Egyptian foreign orientation and intervention in the Libyan crisis because it represents exceptional importance in the foreign political perception. Consequently, this possibility stems from a central pillar, meaning that France will reinforce its position as a significant factor in the conflict. Managing the Libyan crisis through a set of data:

1. Egypt is working to attain this possibility through its mediation efforts in order to reach a political settlement that ends the conflict between the Libyan parties, as Cairo was keen for the solution to come from the parties.
Therefore, Cairo held many times representatives of social services such as tribes, Libyan social councils, and institutions. Such as the Libyan Congress, the National Army, and the Government of National Accord, this was within the agenda of Egypt's efforts to play the role of mediator between the Libyan parties.

2. The regenerating of the Egyptian embassy in Libya on 1/24/2012, after it was locked for security reasons. This specifies Cairo's support for the democratic transformation process and reaching a peaceful solution to the Libyan crisis.

As for Egypt's role in attaining security and peacetime on the African continent, Egypt's post of the African Union in 2019 provided the opportunity to complete its role in promoting peace and security on the African continent, but the victory of Egypt and African countries in confronting the threats and challenges related to issues of peace and security depends on the extent of countries' cooperation and assistance to Egypt. If it succeeds, these countries will confront challenges, and this will be the beginning of achieving development and the goals that the African Agenda 2063 seeks to achieve in all fields. Egypt will regain its role in the African continent.

Egypt was also able to accomplish many of the goals of the Africa 2063 Agenda, as Egypt stressed on more than one continental and international opportunity the importance of the 2063 agenda in supporting the African continent in many sectors, most notably the infrastructure, energy, and African free trade zone sectors. Egypt is also functioning to provide support to African countries to help them achieve the targeted development plans within the framework of the African Union Agenda 2063; on the other hand, Egypt announced that its concept for the National Development Agenda 2030 is consistent with the goals and ambitions of the continent's Agenda 2063, especially in the areas of empowering women and supporting youth. In this framework, Egypt seeks, through cooperation with the countries of the African continent, to activate agenda 2063 substances in many areas, such as coordinating political understandings on common matters such as corridors, combating illegal immigration, activating security cooperation, increasing Egyptian economic involvement in Africa, and linking roads, ports, railways, and airports.

It is obvious from the above that in order for Egypt's role to be operative and influential in the African continent, Egypt must deal effectively with the issues of the African continent, especially the subjects of the Nile Basin countries, and activate cooperation with them in all fields by monitoring their capabilities, competitive advantages, and areas of strength, and how to promote from them and rely on them. It has to meet Egypt's needs and vice versa for Egypt and its resources.

**Second: The scene of continuousness:** concerning to this scene, the Egyptian movement in the African continent continues with the same achievements it has reached today, with the remaining obstacles and challenges that weaken Egypt's position on the continent, as it will continue on the same path in light of its limited economic resources, especially since global political and economic changes have not come in a way that reaches Egypt's interests due to the rise of regional powers opposing with the Egyptian role.

The issues of the rise of these powers in the regional theater could create the Egyptian role in the African continent more vulnerable. The countryside of the international system and the global services active in it are coupled with the prevalence of the concept of interdependence and international competition, which makes the authority of countries depend on their international standing on the African continent. As for the disaster between Egypt and Ethiopia, Egypt has approved the principle of cooperation with Ethiopia with the aim of continuing the flow of the Nile River waters to its lands. Because Egypt is the only country among the Nile Basin republics that hangs on the waters of the Nile River by (85%) and it suffers from water poverty in light of the increase in Egypt's population.

The extension of the law between Egypt and Ethiopia permits Egypt to profit from joint projects on the one hand and recognize Ethiopia's demands on the other hand, which cooperatively makes the water debate possible, but within a specific framework of factors, the most important of which are:

1. Collaboration is linked to the ability to stimulate a set of integrated mechanisms based on the right to development and non-harm.
2. Investing in inheritance based on conflict-based and trust-building initiatives.
3. The prospect of increasing total water imports.

In this perspective, we can depend on many levels, including the development dimension adopted by many Nile Basin countries with regard to the optimal use of dialogue, non-harm, and modifying ways of cooperation.

Ethiopia is in extreme need of putting words into action, which is what Egyptian President Sisi conveyed when he said that Ethiopia must translate its verbal pledge after harming Egypt in the waters of the Nile River. More critically, do not reduce Egyptian-Ethiopian relations to the waters of the Nile River, as Egypt and Ethiopia can create an economic market. It is massive, as the population of the two countries is approaching two hundred million people. They are awarded with significant economic and human resources that would empower them, if there is a serious political will, to jointly advance the continent of Africa in general. The Egyptian tactical role in Africa, in general, and Ethiopia, in particular, is a challenging matter and involves an extended period, given the size of the internal and external challenges facing Egyptian foreign policy, as we explained in the second chapter. However, the size of the prospects and capabilities before the Egyptian decision-maker must be reconsidered.

It is possible to visualize some corrective approaches to building a long-term diplomatic strategy towards Ethiopia, including the following:

A. Intensifying the volume of cultural relations between Egypt and Ethiopia.
B. Remain away from media sensationalism in dealing with some matters, including the Renaissance Dam crisis.
C. The necessity of working to progress a balanced and long-term diplomacy towards Ethiopia in particular and Africa in general that brings within it the features, mechanisms, and goals of all change in the styles, practices, and institutional structures concerned.

As for the Libyan catastrophe, Egypt acted to find a solution to this crisis, so it required searching for consensus with active international forces that influenced the Libyan crisis, so it worked to find a consensus with France, after which it became an effective international force in the Libyan crisis. This agreement came as a result of the Turkish military intervention in 2019. In Libya, which instigated a threat to Egyptian national security, French President Emmanuel Macron referred to Cairo’s pledges to bring security and stability to Libya.

It also succeeded to provide indirect assistance to the Operation Dignity team, facilitate its meetings in Cairo, and provide political support to the Tobruk House of Representatives, Egypt performed to assist the Libyan government (Abdullah Al-Thani) in international forums.

Egypt was powerful to progress its vision of the features of the national conversation in Libya, as the Foreign Ministry’s statements at the Spanish Forum on Libya September 16-17, 2014, indicated that the dialogue does not include terrorist groups. These preparations reveal the desire to expand Egypt’s options between direct intervention and establishing a framework for political dialogue that guarantees eliminating forces that oppose the Egyptian role in Libya.

Third: The scene of weakening: This situation is the third and last, as it gives a pessimistic picture of the Egyptian foreign policy direction toward Africa. The confronts and crises that Egypt faced on the African continent and its inability to solve many crises and problems due to limited economic capabilities, as well as the connection of many influential African regional powers to the policies and interests of major international powers.

In addition to the limitation of Egyptian contribution in resolving many crises and disagreements in its eastern region, especially in Sudan, Egypt's failure to present itself as an influential regional power and the diminishment of its strategic substance to the major powers, especially the United States of America.

The reason for the weakening in the Egyptian role in the Libyan crisis is due to a set of evidence and data, which are as follows:

1. The development of some international and regional powers in Libya and their appearance as a competitor to Egypt enhances the possibility of a decline in the Egyptian role in Libya through the growth of the Turkish presence in Libya, which was greatly strengthened after the military involvement in Libya in 2019. The Turkish
intervention is not in Libya and its growth into North and West Africa. It reproduces Turkey's efforts to stop and weaken Egyptian influence and consolidate this through establishing new ties with North African countries regarding combating terrorism, the power of Turkish investments in Libyan oil and gas exploration projects, and the signing of the Freedom Border Demarcation Agreement with the Government of National Accord on November 27, 2019, in addition to the role of the United States. The United States of America and its positions are always in conformity with Turkey's positions.

There is great aggression towards Egypt on the part of Turkey, and this hostility is due to the Islamic policy obeyed by US President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his continued assistance for the Muslim Brotherhood.

2. The view of the Libyan neighboring countries: It is evident that since the meeting of the Libya Neighboring Countries Committee on July 25, 2014, in Tunisia, there have been no influential trends in support of international intervention, and in its statement of August 25, 2014, it has leaned towards the importance of taking into account the political aspects in resolving the Libyan crisis without external intervention, but the issuance of a joint statement between the foreign affairs of Egypt and Libya, which focuses on disarmament and the dissolution of armed militias, redirects the difference in the Egyptian position from the positions of other neighboring countries. This variation was evident in Egyptian commonality with the government of Abdullah Al-Thani and the numerous joint meetings and announcements of plans to form and train the Libyan army. However, the majority of countries' opinions in Neighborhoods designate rejection of external interference.

3. The problem confronting Egyptian foreign policy towards Libya, which led to a decline in the Egyptian role in Libya, and according to the Egyptian vision towards the Libyan crisis, is that it reflected a military solution to be a resolution to the crisis. At the same time, all other global and provincial paths, including Libya's neighboring countries and even inside Libya, are based on refusal of military intervention. At this time, Egypt's opportunities appear limited in adopting different perceptions within the framework of the United Nations, the European Union, and the statements issued regarding the start of the national dialogue and discussing the constitutional status of the House of Representatives. These positions will direct to consequences that include a decline in the Egyptian military role in the Libyan crisis.

As for the upcoming of the Egyptian tactic towards Ethiopia, within the framework of this vision, it can be said that the relationship will impair between the two countries and supervise towards further escalation between the two countries and that there will be no common understanding, cooperation, or point of view that can be brought closer between the two parties, as each party has a point of view contradictory to the other. The other, and far from reunion, while the Egyptian side stands on the historical and life-acquired rights of the Nile River and does not neglect them in any way, we find that Ethiopia does not basically identify these rights and agreements that Egypt claims to have and that these agreements were not a party to them. Therefore, they are not binding, as all of these contracts were unfair and only respected Egypt's rights and benefits.

At the same time, Cairo miscarried through the construction of the dam to alter the course of its construction, which had become a fait accompli, and had no choice but to allocate with this issue through legal and diplomatic means.

The military implement is not reflected an essential tool in Egypt's policy towards the water crisis. However, as an alternative, it is waved as a means of stress or a tool of deterrence, as military behavior is a last option if the negotiations reach a dead end. However, from a realistic standpoint, it is difficult to carry out any military action towards the Renaissance Dam. This would have urgent consequences for the three countries: Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan. In practice, Egypt selected the negotiating path and cooperative relations over escalatory paths or military action through the summit meeting between President Sisi and Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn and the signing of the Declaration of Principles Agreement.

In actuality, and throughout the concessions period, Ethiopia exhausts Egypt's ability to negotiate until the complete achievement of building and filling the reservoir until Egypt is placed before a fait accompli. At the same time, Egypt constructed a mistake in signing the Document of Principles and the Khartoum Agreement, as with this signing, it accepted the reality it wanted. Ethiopia forced it internationally, and it would have been
better for Egypt to follow to its share of the water in agreement with what was decided by the water agreements between the Nile Basin countries and that Ethiopia's construction defies the international legal framework to regulate the construction of dams on international rivers.

CONCLUSIONS

First: Results

Foreign strategy has taken multiple factors to bring countries closer together. Some of them are associated to the nature of the current security threats to the Egyptian state, others are linked to international and regional agendas in the Middle East and Red Sea regions, which inherently affect Egyptian national security and some of them, are linked to Egyptian requirements and the economic and social repercussions according to global indicators. The study revealed the consequence of taking into account the political aspects in resolving the Libyan crisis without external interference. However, the issuance of a joint declaration between the Foreign Ministry of Egypt and Libya, which focuses on disarmament and the dissolution of armed militias, reflects the difference in the Egyptian opinion from the positions of other neighboring countries. This change became clear in Egyptian solidarity with the government of Abdullah Al-Thani. The frequent joint meetings and announcement of plans to form and train the Libyan army, but the majority of the positions of neighboring countries shows a rejection of external intervention and work to assist the Libyans.

As for the forthcoming of the Egyptian approach towards Ethiopia, within the framework of this vision, it can be thought that the relationship will worsen between the two countries and supervise towards further escalation between the two countries and that there will be no common understanding, cooperation, or point of view that can be brought closer between the two parties, as each party has a point of view contradictory to the other. The other, and far from reunion, while the Egyptian side stands on the historical and life-acquired rights of the Nile River and does not overlook them in any way, we find that Ethiopia does not fundamentally identify these rights and agreements that Egypt claims to have and that these agreements were not a party to them.

Second: Recommendations

In light of the situations and scenes mentioned about the future of Egyptian foreign policy directions toward Africa, there is a trend toward the first path. This tendency is likely to escalate in light of the current African conditions, as Egypt is considered one of the prominent African countries in its regional environment, according to indicators. Then:

Egypt's ability to weaken the crises it has gone through, including the internal crises, the power of the Egyptian state institutions, its national unity, and national integration, with the exception of known terrorist groups in Egypt.

Egypt retains many cards through which it can change and influence the African continent, such as political, economic, security, cultural, and religious factors.

Arab and African encouragement for Egypt, especially after the revolution of June 30, 2013.

There has become understanding among the ruling political class, even at the comparative level, of the importance of the African continent.

The state of negligence and the difference in African views towards some African concerns, such as terrorism, organized crime, militancy, and indebtedness.

Egypt acted to advance its relations with African countries in general, especially the countries of the African Century and the Nile Basin countries.

Enhancing advantage of the disagreement in interests and the intertwining of international relations between international powers with the goal of achieving a kind of balance. In this case, the Egyptian method in Africa will be practical and influential.

Work with influential international controls on the African continent in order to decrease the degree of their support for African regional powers competing with Egypt.
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This is with respect to the forthcoming of Egyptian foreign policy directions towards Africa in general. However, with regard to Ethiopia, and occurring to the researcher’s opinion, the second prospect is more likely for several reasons, including:

1. The Renaissance Dam disaster between Egypt and Ethiopia is still ongoing.
2. International and regional positions have created to negatively affect the two countries, as the international and regional parties are not earnestly seeking to resolve the crisis between the two countries because the tension and insecurity in the region are in their interest.

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