

# Religious Security as Factor of Developing National Resilience: The Case of Ukraine

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## Abstract

*The problem of providing security in the field of religion is of utmost importance worldwide. This article examines some aspect of complicated problem of religious security as one of key factors developing national resilience in case of Ukraine. The research methodology includes process tracing, document analysis, and foresight analysis. Religious component of the national security of Ukraine is understood as a condition of religious life of the Ukrainian people which, under certain circumstances, e.g., in terms of war, may be a threat to the national interests of state, stable development of society and realization of inalienable rights and freedoms of citizens. Religious sphere appears to become an important part of the Ukrainian national resilience paradigm as a component of new public policy making.*

**Keywords:** Religious Security, National Security, National Resilience, War, Ukraine.

## INTRODUCTION

In previous studies, the problems of functioning of religious security have been tackled from different perspectives: history, religious studies, law, etc. Yet, we lack a comprehensive analysis within public administration discourse responding a question on how religion may be regarded as one of key determinatives for national resilience on axiomatic basis of public administration and public policy. Research efforts undertaken in this area—without any underestimating—have not responded completely to many issues including role of religion in national security system, implications and legislative provision of religious security, and so forth.

The problem of religious security has become very burdensome and long-lasting for a number of the Eastern Partnership countries, in particular Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. After the USSR collapsed, reforms of public administration have been taking place in the post-Soviet countries, and it is still ongoing in terms of economic and political turbulence, as well as military aggression by the Russian Federation. Currently, these countries need some new paradigms of public administration which should include a religious security component. This is especially important when developing an effective system of public administration in temporarily occupied territories in the context of their de-occupation and reintegration. The occupation and annexation of Crimea, as well as emergence of unrecognized states such as Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, the so-called “DPR” and “LPR”, etc. has certainly shifted local religious map thus making religious discrimination and religiously motivated persecution a common security challenge for the region. This challenge caused by rising assertiveness of Russia with recent President Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine and wage a full-scale war means, *inter alia*, that Europe came close to a critical period. It gives us an impetus for a comprehensive view of the situation in Ukraine in the light of the national resilience. The problem is also becoming more relevant through contemporary studies of religious freedom in unrecognized states as a quasi-state phenomenon and their interpretation from the point of view of binary logic of relations between European democratic values and ideas proposed by the so-called “Russian world” narrative.

This article examines some aspects of complicated problem of religious security as one of key factors developing national resilience in case of Ukraine. First, contemporary situation around the world (un)secularization and impact of religious component on globalization processes is explained; Ukraine’s pattern is also discussed. The issue of religious security notion, inputs, and its correlation with national resilience are

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considered further. Finally, we frame legislative provision and highlight some internal and external challenges for religious security of Ukraine, as well as draw some probable scenarios of what may happen to religious situation in Ukraine.

## Theories And Methods

There is no doubt that today the issue of state interference with religious freedom is getting of more importance for a public policy and national security. Discrimination on religious basis belongs to category of the global problems on the agenda, and it is proved by relevant statistical data. For instance, they note in recent reports by the U.S. Department of State (2016–2020) that majority of the world’s population live in the lack of religious freedom. Among the countries of particular concern, they name Iran, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Sudan, China, Russian Federation and so on. When it comes to religious security notion, one should be careful with this for some time now frequently used concept and keep in mind it to be rather conventional. The impact of religion on security is quite pronounced and may be considered twofold—in terms of including religion to prevent conflict situations or through the abuse of religion to justify and provoke violence (Mušić, 2020). In whole, security tends to be judged first through the framework of policymakers who are often biased in their vision of rising assertiveness of religious movements (especially the new ones) as a potential “threat”. Although, it is noteworthy those movements to have been eventually nourished by the states’ inability—due to their fragility or preferences—to ensure security at the appropriate level. In this regard, religion is a key factor of cultural security, efficient social support, or even alternative legal pattern for a threatened and oppressed community that seems to be non-compliant for resilience and sustainability in terms of a fragile or collapsing state.

Published Global trends and Key implications through 2035 claim that governing is getting harder. When formulating strategies in public management, we must consider that “publics will demand governments deliver security and prosperity but flat revenues, distrust, polarization and a growing list of emerging issues will humper government performance” (National Intelligence Council, 2019: 6); Bilynska et al. (2019) state that at the national level, the gap between popular expectations and government performance will grow; indeed, democracy itself can no longer be taken for granted. Analysing possible scenarios for development of the global landscape, researchers argue that all positive human capabilities can only be realized through the creation of resilient administration. “Increasing resilience at the institution level could also occur through the employment of dedicated strategic planning cells, exercises, technologies and processes that would accelerate responses during crisis” (National Intelligence Council, 2019: 66).

After the fall of the “Iron Curtain” and collapse of the USSR in many countries, where the communist regimes in due time struggled with religiosity and pursued a policy of state atheism, religion became an important component of the self-awareness for both individuals and nations as a whole. We can distinguish various manifestations of religiosity (or its lack) depending on answers to the following three questions: 1) Does a person believe in a certain superior force? 2) Does (s)he pray and perform any rituals? and 3) Does (s)he identify himself/herself with a particular denomination, religious community, or religious group? The recent survey shows that many people around the world are religious in one way or another—at least according to one of these criteria but not necessarily according to all of them (EVS, 2020; EVS/WVS, 2022; Haerpfer et al., 2022; Inglehart et al., 2022).

It would be at least careless to deny impact of religious component on contemporary globalization processes. Obviously, the influence of religions will increase, and even may be comparable with the influence of public institutions. Over the course of the decade from 2007 to 2017, governmental restrictions on religion—through laws limiting religious beliefs and traditions, common policy and specific actions by public officials—have increased significantly throughout the world and stayed at the highest level in 2019, the most recent year for which data is available (Pew Research Center, 2021). In this regard, the problem of providing security in socio-humanitarian sphere, in particular field of religion and ethnic relations, is of utmost relevance for the whole world. Inattentiveness or underestimation of humanitarian components of security can lead to increase of uncertainties, threats and crisis events at both national and international levels.

There are two basic conceptual approaches to security issue. The first one is based on problems of the value of freedom and personal security. The followers of this approach (King and Murray 2001–2002; Liotta and

Owen 2006; McCormack 2011) somehow believe the security of state and society is not objective *per se* but only a function of ensuring freedom and security of everyone. Norris and Inglehart (2011) imply the meaning of religion to society primarily by feelings of existential security and threats posed by physical and personal risks. The content of the second approach is to highlight the security of state and society. In this case, the starting point is that the state guarantees the security to both individual and society (Deng, 1995; Chappuis 2011; Siegle, 2011). That is, security may be provisionally divided into human security and national security of society and state. The latter one has been observed mainly considering the so-called “hard security”, i.e., protection of society and state from external armed attacks or internal disturbances, acts of terrorism within the boundaries of states. This approach is also being applied today, for example, in activities by think tanks (e.g., RAND, Atlantic Council, etc.). Regarding the concept of human security, it is fairly recent in science and provides six components of personal security: 1) economic security (i.e., provision of material conditions for the development of the individual); 2) food security; 3) medical security (access to health care and disease protection); 4) environmental security; 5) personal security (security against threats such as tortures, wars, criminal assaults, drug abuse, suicides and even road accidents); and 6) community security (preservation of traditional ethnic group cultures), political security (political rights and lack of political pressure).

As foreign (say, Balkan) experience shows, the long-term effect of any of three key factors that could lead to serious internal conflict in the society—socio-economic, language or religious—may result in the collapse of previously united states. Regarding the internal sphere of threats to national interests, religious component has the largest manifestation due to strengthening separatist sentiment in some regions of Ukraine, political confrontation and interregional disproportions in the population living standards. As for characteristics of threats by the national security areas, religious component is a keystone for political, social, information, international and regional ones (Table 1). At the same time, it has an impact and may significantly increase the chance of other threats to national security of Ukraine in the most important spheres of public life (Petryk, 2005).

**Table 1. The Impact of Religious Component on Threats to The National Security of Ukraine**

Political sphere:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– ideological support by foreign religious centers of infringement on constitutional order, state sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state</li> <li>– development of mechanism for intervention of other states through the means of religious influence in both internal and external affairs of the state</li> <li>– violation of human rights, in particular freedom of conscience and religion, both within the country and abroad</li> <li>– non-execution or inadequate execution of legal decisions of public authorities and local governments, in particular regarding the transfer of religious buildings and property</li> </ul>
Economic sphere:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– support by foreign religious centers of economic isolation of the state, blocking the processes of integration into the European/world economic systems</li> <li>– commercialization of religious organizations, production and sale of unlicensed products, avoidance of taxes and other mandatory payments, violation of labor legislation, etc.</li> <li>– uncontrolled inflow of foreign currency and material assets into the country under the guise of supporting missionary and charitable activities</li> <li>– activities of shadow economic structures “under an umbrella” of religious organizations</li> </ul>
Social sphere:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– oppression of social activity of citizens, narrowing down their worldview orientations, disruption of established social and family ties</li> <li>– using religious factor for socio-political confrontations between specific social groups of the population and regions</li> <li>– a direct threat to life and health of the population due to the spread of various forms of “non-traditional treatment”, “healing”, witchcraft and occultism</li> </ul>
Military sphere:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– violation of principle of “separation wall” between church and state as a kind of uncontrolled “cooperation” of specific religious organizations with law enforcement agencies and as finally politicization of the latter with a decrease in level of combat capability of military administration of the state</li> <li>– establishment and operation of illegal paramilitary groups under pretext of the need to protect faith and church</li> </ul>
Information sphere:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– inhibition of Ukraine’s entry into the world information space, fabrication of fakes and disinformation about one or another state by foreign religious centers</li> <li>– foreign expansion of information through religious channels</li> <li>– leakage through religious channels of information constituting a state, official, corporate secret, as well as confidential information that is the property of the state, legal entities or individuals</li> </ul>

The religious component of national security of Ukraine should be understood as a condition of religious life of the Ukrainian people (its state-church, internal and external church relations), which is or, under certain circumstances, may be a threat to the national interests of state, stable development of society and realization

of inalienable rights and freedoms of citizens (Shapravskiy, 2010). It is a condition of protection of vital religious interests of the Ukrainian society (persons, groups of believers, and the whole state) from internal threats and external interference, and a system of social and political measures providing this protection. It is possible to use the concept of “religious security” for institutionalizing the links between religious sphere and national security. Thus, our working definition of religious security is addressed to protection of both individual and state from internal and external threats arising in religious sphere, necessary for resilience of society.

It is taken to allocate the following methodological approaches when studying religious security:

Comparative method aimed at analyzing common and specific elements used to affect the believers.

Systematic method used for comprehensive study of processes of religious impact.

Typological method used to describe social manifestations of religion.

Phenomenological method used to analyze religious meanings generated by interaction of religious ideas and consciousness.

Despite a broad palette of ideas related to tasks and functions of religion, there is still a problem in the post-Soviet space of biased research distinguished by fragmented ideas about religious security. We should note academic as well as public discourse on religious security issues, which occurs under conditions of an information warfare, is based on methodology dividing religious associations into the friend-or-foe ones. At the same time, public concern to research emphasizing that some religions do, while others do not pose a danger to society, affects both development of science and sphere of inter-faith relations (Dvorkin, 2014; Gandrabur & Chebotaru, 2012; Hvylya-Olinter & Lukyanov, 1996; Lutsenko, 2016; Parahonskyi & Somin, 2000). We assert that to consider the problem of religious security, it is necessary to separate concepts of “religion” and “religious organizations”, as their social practices may go beyond religious prescriptions and be destructive by nature.

The main subject of national security in religious sphere is Ukrainian state, which, as well as religious organizations, pursues a policy targeted at ensuring spiritual unity of Ukrainian people, sustainability and dynamism of progressive development of society. The result of such public policy depending on a model of church-state relations should come through realization of national interests in religious sphere: strengthening sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, effective and socially oriented state administration of humanitarian processes, freedom of expression of will and realization of religious interests of individuals and groups of believers, constructive solutions of inter-church conflicts (Zdioruk, 1993). At the same time, Chuprii (2011) highlights the most important factors of national security in the religious sphere:

Internal stability (inter-church and inter-faith harmony, and ability to resolve religious conflicts primarily by non-violent means);

External stability (strengthening international image of Ukraine as European state, preserving its national, religious and cultural identity and independence, as well as availability of effective mechanisms for that);

Full satisfaction of religious needs, freedom of will and religion for individuals and groups of believers;

Availability of comprehensive strategy of socio-political and spiritual development of the state, including the sphere of religious security of Ukraine.

Our research toolkit includes (1) process tracing for legislative provision of religious component of the national security of Ukraine, (2) document analysis, and (3) foresight analysis considering some probable scenarios of what may happen to religious situation in Ukraine. We used methods of process tracing and document analysis to investigate the process of developing religious security through the Ukrainian law. This helped us identify trends and problems in the relevant state institutions. Furthermore, a foresight analysis, based on the current wartime conditions, shed light on some probable scenarios for further development of religious security in Ukraine.

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### Legislative Provision of Religious Security in Ukraine

It is interesting to note that the Ukrainian intellectual and managerial elites in general are rather indifferent to religious dimension of their own culture. And if in the first decade of Ukrainian independence this apparent rudiment of the Soviet attitude led to an inadequate understanding of the Ukrainian history and, due to this misunderstanding, attempts to rebuild material body of culture in a Marxist style to change it, current underestimation of religious problems is turning considerably more disastrous consequences and unprecedented costs no Ukrainian citizen is yet aware of.

Despite an urgent need, conceptual understanding of religious principles as factors of national security has not yet taken place. The urgency of this problem caused by several important factors characterizing the current mood in the Ukrainian society. The crisis of ideological ambushes promotes erosion of traditional values of the Ukrainian people and causes spiritual marginalization of certain part of population of the country. This creates possibility of imposing to the Ukrainian peoples' mass consciousness irrelevant values, such as enabling manipulation of consciousness of citizens in the interests of certain political groups or non-religious, quasi-religious organizations.

For a long time, religious factor remained on a periphery of Ukraine's understanding its national security. As factor of state security, religious factor itself did not fall into the concept (public policy framework) of the national security in 1997 (Resolution No. 3/97-BP, 1997), as it referred to spirituality in general. The place of religion was also indeterminate in recent documents related to the national security: Strategy of the National Security of Ukraine (Presidential Decree No. №287/2015, 2015), the Law "On the National Security of Ukraine" (Law of Ukraine No. 2469-VIII, 2018a), and by and large Strategy of the National Security of Ukraine (Presidential Decree No. 392, 2020) (Table 2).

Table 2. Religious Component in Legislation on The National Security of Ukraine

Document	Mention of the religious factor
Concept of the National Security (Resolution No. 3/97-BP, 1997)	Ukraine's priority national interests are as following: ... development of the Ukrainian nation, historical consciousness and national dignity of Ukrainians; development of ethnic, cultural, linguistic and <i>religious identity</i> of citizens of all nationalities that constitute the Ukrainian people The main possible threats to Ukraine's national security in the most important areas of life are: ... escalation of interethnic and <i>interfaith relations</i>
Law "On Basic Principles of the National Security of Ukraine" (Law of Ukraine No. 964-IV, 2003)	Article 7. threats to national interests and national security [in the internal policy] of Ukraine are: ... <i>the possibility of emergence of conflicts in the field of inter-ethnic and inter-faith relations, radicalization and manifestations of extremism in activities by certain associations of national minorities and religious communities</i> Article 8. The main directions of public policy on national security are: ... <i>ensuring interfaith stability and preventing escalation of conflict on religious basis, preventing confrontation of various churches including division of spheres of impact in territory of Ukraine</i>
Strategy of the National Security (Presidential Decree No. 105, 2007)	3.2.1. Inefficiency of public authorities: ... inadequate governmental response to conflict escalation in the field of political, economic, social, interethnic, <i>interfaith relations</i> , radicalization of public sentiment and spread of extremism externally inspired 4.3. Key tasks of national security policy in the internal sphere: ... removal of barriers of cultural, <i>confessional</i> , linguistic, and regional nature based on unconditional respect for constitutional guarantees of human and civil rights and freedoms
Strategy of the National Security (Presidential Decree No.287/2015, 2015)	-
Law "On the National Security" (Law of Ukraine No. 2469-VIII, 2018a)	-
Strategy of the National Security (Presidential Decree No. 392, 2020)	10. The state adheres to: ... <i>strongly oppose attempts to inflame national, racial or religious hostility and hatred</i> , humiliate national honor and dignity, <i>insult citizens' feelings through their religious beliefs</i> , and restrict rights or establish privileges, based on race, color of skin, political, <i>religious and other beliefs</i> , sex, health, ethnic and social origin, property status, residence, language or other characteristics

Only in the Law of Ukraine “On Basic Principles of the National Security of Ukraine” (Law of Ukraine No. 964-IV, 2003) religious factor was distinguished from general “spiritual values”, while the latter fell into category of the “national interests”. However, this Law did not consider the threat to national security could come not only from conflicts between confessions in Ukraine but also from linking activities of local religious communities with foreign religious centers in case they were hostile to sovereignty of Ukraine. Back in 2010-2011 they put forward several legislative initiatives, in particular, with regard to adoption of a new version of the Law of Ukraine “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations” (Law of Ukraine No. 987-XII, 1991); a bill was submitted to the Verkhovna Rada providing for amendments to the Tax Code of Ukraine with a view to granting tax privileges to one of churches; they set a precedent for submitting an internal church document to the Parliament of Ukraine for its legal approval. The State Committee for Nationalities and Religions provided for that law to have been abolished. Finally, in August 2010, a draft Declaration “On Dignity, Freedom and Human Rights” (Draft Declaration No. 7055, 2010) was submitted to the Verkhovna Rada. The Declaration aimed to translate the basic principles of Doctrine of the Russian Orthodox Church (hereinafter – ROC) on Dignity, Freedom and Human Rights. Thus, an unprecedented attempt was made to implement an internal document of one of churches operating in territory of the secular state, which is Ukraine, into its domestic law. It is noteworthy that neither the ROC, nor deputies of the Federal Assembly of Russia have attempted on implementing the church documents in legislation of the Russian Federation.

After the start of Russian aggression in Crimea and the East of Ukraine, Ukraine has fixed the amendments to the Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations” in order to respond to Russia’s hybrid actions and set mechanisms for changing the membership of religious communities. The amendments made, while saving the previous norm stipulated in Article 8 of the Law of Ukraine “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations” (Law of Ukraine No. 987-XII, 1991) that the State recognizes the right of a religious community to its subordination in canonical and organizational matters to any religious center (authority) acting in Ukraine and abroad, and the free change of this subordination (taking into account the changes), regulate the procedure of changing by the religious community its subordination to religious centers operating in Ukraine and abroad. The Law extends to all religious communities in the state and involves avoiding their double registration (actively used by the Russian side to “increase” the number of communities of the ROC).

The Law of Ukraine “On Basis Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy” (Law of Ukraine No. 2411-VI, 2010) undertakes public authorities to ensure restoring full-fledged dialogue between representatives of various social and ethnic groups, cultures and religious denominations, provide conditions for developing tolerant society, guaranteeing freedom of conscience and religion. However, this application of law did not specifically cover Orthodoxy. It is enough to read monographs or articles on issues of state security in religious sphere published in Ukraine where data on possible threats from Protestants, Charismatics, Muslims, new religions, pagans, etc. could be presented (Korniievskiy, 2009; Kulin, 2020; Tymoshenko, 2002). However, threats associated with Orthodoxy in Ukraine as to sovereignty of the state, and its national revival had not actually been covered by any of theoreticians of security issues, as well as current officials. Consequently, this picture almost directly reflects the system of protection of Ukrainian borders—most of forces and fortifications at the border were concentrated in the West, while the danger came from the East and the South.

### **Religious Security of Ukraine: Challenges and Scenarios**

Religious processes, as well as social, political, etc., are characterized by great stochastic, high unpredictability, and patchwork thinking of reality against the backdrop of increased politicization of religion and clericalization of politics (Iytarenko, 2017). The fusion of political and religious spheres, religion and security, especially in light of current war in Ukraine, becomes crucial for an impact on religious situation. In this regard, the Ukrainian experts (Iytarenko, V. & Iytarenko, O., 2019) define granting autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (hereinafter – OCU) as an equally important event and achievement like a visa-free regime, an Association Agreement with the EU, aspiration to become a member of the EU and NATO, that is, obtaining autocephaly is an issue of national security.

At the same time, religious situation, with adoption of *tomos*, retains some social and political challenges considered as a fan of probable evolutionary ways to develop religious situation in Ukraine. Among them, the

following ones could be distinguished: *internal*: 1) the church itself which would be related to religious policy implemented by the OCU to the extent that it would be able to realize new opportunities, consolidate its status by forming a leadership, developing religious policy, etc.; 2) political challenges, as for political forces there is a temptation to use the “fracture line” of society, fed by existing tension in Orthodoxy, in their own interests. It tends to support interest of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Moscow Patriarchate (hereinafter – UOC-MP) by those political parties that had been loyal to the Kremlin for a long time. Aggressive comments in media and both by representatives of some political circles and by the UOC-MP could increase conflict potential in the Ukrainian multi-confessional society; 3) socio-political risks including messages addressed to formatting negative image of Ukraine, in the context of interpreting the desire to formulate the OCU as state intervention in church affairs and violation of rights of other confessions. The following challenges could be attributed as *external*: 1) tension between the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the ROC, due to the loss by the latter of Ukrainian parishes and status of one of the largest Orthodox churches; 2) incitement by the ROC not to recognize the OCU by other Orthodox churches; 3) probability of a “domino effect” in desire to have their own national churches for Moldova, Belarus, North Macedonia, Montenegro, etc., and situation when leading centers of other Orthodox churches in Ukraine are located in the aggressor country.

On 24 February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the Russian troops constantly shelled both military objects, as well as residential buildings, objects of energy infrastructure, and cultural heritage including at least 415 religious buildings damaged within a year, from 24 February 2022, till 24 February 2023 (Religion on fire, 2023). This is not an ultimate figure, since many religious buildings are located in the currently occupied territory or near the front-line zone, therefore final calculations seem possible only after the complete de-occupation of the territory of Ukraine.

Under the wartime conditions, we consider some probable scenarios of what may happen to religious situation in Ukraine. Based on the assumption of Center for Countering Disinformation (2023), the Russian-Ukrainian war can have one of the following endings: 1) Absolute military victory of Ukraine and its allies over Russia; 2) Protracted multi-year confrontation without serious front line movements; 3) Military victory of the Russian Federation over Ukraine and its allies; and 4) Involuntary loss of power by Putin (palace mutiny, sudden death or revolution).

At the same time, there are two churches dominating throughout Ukraine by number of believers and religious organizations – the OCU and the UOC-MP. It is clear that both the Ukrainian and Russian authorities have been considering and developing certain strategies for the future. In our opinion, the key factor in the development of events is a success of the warring parties on the battlefield. The success of Ukraine’s armed forces has an inverse correlation with efforts of the UOC-MP to remain part of the ROC. Incidentally, here we omit considering the nature of motivation of these efforts in the UOC-MP environment. Assuming that the Orthodox Church will stay as the most common denomination in Ukraine, we can draw two scenarios in this regard.

*Trojan horse.* The state takes a passive position regarding the solution of the church issue. This is a situation when, after Ukraine’s military victory, the ROC will use Polish (1948) or American (1970) precedent when realizing that the UOC-MP will begin to collapse, they declare the autocephaly of the UOC-MP in order to still keep some impact on church life in Ukraine. As a result, the process of “whitening” the Moscow Patriarchate among Ukrainian people and calls for the restoration of relations starts. Therefore, the option of declaring the UOC-MP autocephaly will definitely have negative consequences over time in case of tolerating ties with the ROC, since it generates acceptability of communication with people who destroy a neighboring country and kill its people. If the Ukrainian authorities follow such a scenario, they will postpone the solution to the church issue for years thus leaving a bridgehead for Russian interference and a source of conflict. However, this question will arise after the war not only to the Orthodox but also to representatives of other denominations since most religious organizations in Russia either support the war or do not oppose it in public.

*We are all brothers.* The Ukrainian Orthodoxy is united in one autocephalous church, taking *tomos* as a basis of its canonical status. It largely depends on efforts and policies of various players in the religious sphere. What do the government and society take to advance this union? First, the name of the UOC-MP is changed, that is,

the Law of 2018 (Law of Ukraine No. 2662-VIII, 2018b) is implemented, so that its connections and information narratives are clearly visible, and people consciously choose which church they belong to. Secondly, due to the definition of concept of “religious community” in legislation, a fixed membership is indicated as its characteristic, as it actually works in case of the Protestant communities. This makes statistical data manipulation impossible and eliminates an issue of accusations of church raiding, when depending on situation, the concepts of territorial and religious communities are replaced. Thirdly, a powerful information campaign regarding different visions of the Ukrainian Orthodoxy is carried out. So, the state marks certain “red lines” related to the national security and defines clear boundaries between the use of freedom of speech and pro-Russian propaganda but the main activities take place within the church, through discussions and convictions. Finally, the role of laity in church life is strengthened (due to changes in statutory documents) since the practice of interchurch transitions shows that clergy are guided by the opinion of bishops, not their own community.

## CONCLUSION

Religious sphere covers a huge area of public relations, and the whole national security depends on security of that relationship. The global world is generating new threats to religious security that need to be tackled comprehensively. In this sense, religious security is one of the key elements of national resilience and needs to be separated into a separate institution.

The religion may become a driver of developing both resilience and extremism, and one should always keep in mind that one or another result depends on interaction with various factors including specific circumstances, e.g., political, social, military, etc., so that the very impact of religion is not direct, or religion itself can turn into the driver of conflict situations.

Religious sphere appears to become an important part of the Ukrainian national resilience paradigm as component of new public policy making. The main indicators and marks of that influence should be defined and investigated.

There is an urgent need for drafting up the concept of church-state relations in Ukraine, based on current developments given the national particularities and long-established traditions of inter-faith relations. The objectives are to shape operation algorithm of civil servants within the church-state relations; transit to partnership scenario between confessions and state; depart from the Russian model, where state has all leverage over religious life, and church-state relations are compromised.

Depending on particular ending of the Russian-Ukrainian war as a key factor, we can draw two probable scenarios for further development of religious situation in Ukraine: 1) the state takes a passive position regarding the solution of the church issue, and it is postponed for years, thus enabling another Russian interference; and 2) Ukrainian Orthodoxy is united to one autocephalous church, the only question here is the time it happens, as well as duly efforts and policies of various players in the religious sphere.

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