

## Potential For Religious Exploitation of Conflict in Indonesia

Winuhoro Hanumbhawono<sup>1</sup>, Syamsul Maarif<sup>2</sup>, Yoedhi Swastanto<sup>3</sup> and M. Adnan Madjid<sup>4</sup>

### Abstract

*In Indonesia, the problem of inter-religious relations seriously needs attention. Conflicts that use religious sentiment mostly exploit religious diversity to hide the real intention. The exploitation of religion in the form of falsifying religious identity is used as an effort to destabilize Indonesia, and religious interpretations are used as justification for discriminating against and dominating other religious groups, which is often found in conflicts in Indonesia. Potential adversaries likely use hybrid war to break unity and trust among Indonesians, to disintegrate the Republic of Indonesia and ultimately to control Indonesia's natural resources. Cross-institutional and civil group cooperation is needed to strengthen tolerance and affirm harmony in diversity, where Indonesian people embrace mutual understanding, care for diversity, and strengthen unity between people of different religions.*

**Keywords:** Religious Conflict, Social Conflict, Hybrid War, Hybrid Threats, Religion Exploitation

### INTRODUCTION

Indonesia's ethnic, religious, racial, and cultural diversity, with a population of more than 269.6 million people, is a national treasure that can either directly or indirectly make a positive contribution to create social welfare, or risk national interest, if there are conditions of development inequality, injustice and social, economic inequality, poverty and uncontrolled dynamics of domestic politics. The democratic transition to the open world also resulted in increasingly rapid social dynamics, including foreign intervention. These conditions make Indonesia prone to conflict, both horizontal and vertical conflict.

In Indonesia, the problem of inter-religious relations is still an issue that needs attention. Conflicts that use religious sentiment mostly take advantage of religious diversity to hide the real intention. When such conflict cannot be managed, this has an impact on Indonesia's national security. Indonesia has formulated various policies for managing religious conflicts, but these need good implementation to achieve the expected goals. *Hybrid Warfare* or HW is currently widely discussed in various narratives, discussions, and international forums, especially those related to national security and defense issues. Although there is not yet an agreed definition to explain HW, almost all definitions of HW have similarities in the combination of various forms of warfare, exploitation of vulnerabilities, and synchronization of forces to achieve a goal, and the patterns are clearly visible so that its existence cannot be ignored in Indonesia.

Seeing that the problem of inter-religious relations is one of Indonesia's points of vulnerability, it is necessary to analyze possible scenarios in which religion is exploited in conflict within Indonesia's society.

### METHODOLOGY

The analysis was carried out using *the Estimative Methodology* described by Clark (2019). This methodology uses three prediction mechanisms: extrapolation, projection, and forecasting. All three mechanisms use an assessment of the forces acting on the entity to be studied. Extrapolation assumes that forces do not change between present and future states, projections assume that forces change, and forecasting assumes that forces change and that new forces may emerge. The analysis is carried out in the following steps:

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<sup>1</sup> Doctoral Program, Republic of Indonesia Defense University, Bogor, Indonesia. E-mail: winuhoro@gmail.com, (Corresponding Author).

<sup>2</sup> Republic of Indonesia Defense University, Bogor, Indonesia.

<sup>3</sup> Republic of Indonesia Defense University, Bogor, Indonesia.

<sup>4</sup> Republic of Indonesia Defense University, Bogor, Indonesia.

Determine at least one past and current state as a target model.


Determine the forces acting on the target to bring it to its current state, where unchanged forces will produce a future state as a form of extrapolation.

To project, estimate the change in existing forces likely to occur, where a change in one of the existing forces causes a projection of a future state different from the extrapolation.

To make a forecast, start from an extrapolation or projection, identify new forces that may act on the target model, and combine their effects. The new forces will produce a forecast of a future state that is different from the extrapolation and projection of the future state.

Determine the possible future state of the model target based on a strength assessment. Strong and certain strengths are given the greatest weight, while weak and less reliable strengths with a high level of uncertainty are given the smallest.

This model is designed as an iterative process, each building on the results of the previous model. This estimation technique involves identifying existing forces and how they are changing, in what direction, and how quickly. Then, the analyst must identify new forces likely to emerge to make a forecast. The most essential forces will probably emerge from feedback mechanisms. An analyst may make a mistake in judgment by concentrating only on some forces and ignoring or underestimating the significance of others.



**Figure 1.** Estimate Methodology

Source: Clark (2019)

The target of the model is the exploitation of religion in conflict. To identify what forces are at work, how they change, in what direction, how fast, and what new forces might emerge, it is necessary to understand the concept of threat, the various arguments used to explain religion in conflict, the phenomenon of religious conflict in Indonesia, regarding external factors in the form of HW including various thoughts regarding future trends and how to deal with and anticipate them, as well as internal factors in the form of policies currently being implemented to handle religious-based conflicts in Indonesia.

## **THE CONCEPT OF THREAT FROM AN INDONESIAN PERSPECTIVE**

The threat in the Indonesian perspective refers to the concept of threat in Indonesia's state defense. The 2015 Indonesian Defense White Paper (Ministry of Defense, 2015) explains that threats are the main factor, both actual and potential, that is the basis for preparing the design of the country's defense system. This design is based on strategic analysis and identification of the very dynamic nature of threats, making it possible to combine different types of threats.

Threats in form of military threats, non-military threats, and hybrid threats, which are mixed in nature and are a combination of military threats and non-military threats, where threats can take the form of aggression, terrorism, communism, separatism, armed rebellion, natural disasters, environmental damage, territorial violations borders, piracy and theft of natural resources, disease outbreaks, drug trafficking and abuse, cyber-attacks, nuclear attacks, biological attacks, chemical attacks, or other forms of threat that endanger the sovereignty of the country, the territorial integrity of the Republic of Indonesia, and the safety of the entire nation (Republic of Indonesia, 2019). Non-military threats have ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural, technological, public safety, and legislative dimensions originating from within the country and abroad, and each has different types of threats (Republic of Indonesia, 2021b).

These threats can be actual and potential (Republic of Indonesia, 2021b). Actual threats are military threats, non-military threats, and hybrid threats, as they are currently developing and tend to continue in the next few years, both originating from within the country and abroad, with implications for state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the safety of the entire nation, These include border violations/foreign intervention, separatism and armed rebellion, piracy, hijacking and hostage-taking of Indonesian citizens, terrorism and radicalism, cyber threats, intelligence or espionage threats, threats of psychological warfare, biological weapons attacks, natural and environmental disasters, theft of natural sources, disease outbreaks, drug distribution, and abuse, as well as the impact of the birth of the Industrial Revolution 4.0 and society 5.0 (Republic of Indonesia, 2021c). *Potential threats* are threats that have not yet occurred but can occur at any time and, in certain situations, become actual threats. These threats are in the form of conventional war or open conflict (foreign invasion), the threat of nuclear weapons, the economic crisis, the threat of pandemics, and foreign immigrants (Republic of Indonesia, 2021c).

## RELIGION IN CONFLICT

Conflict is something we often encounter in everyday life. John Burton (in Susan, 2012) said that conflict can appear when someone has a desire to fulfill *basic human needs*, which the sources are limited. The conflict for fulfilling simple needs can be managed easier and faster to make a deal, while more complex needs like a desire to gain power, status, and identity make it difficult to reach common ground. The complexity of this kind of conflict influences how institutional management conflict must be created and executed.

According to Paul Wehr (in Susan, 2012), the complexity of the conflict also encourages groups of interest to mobilize the power needed to win the conflict. Mobilization of such power appears as a conflict strategy to create advantages for one side.

Dahrendorf (1958) said: "*... the problem of conflict is no less complex than that of integration of societies*". Dahrendorf(1958)explains that society is based on conflict of power, which is not simply due to economic reasons but also various existing aspects, including social conflict. He argues that society is an arena of constant conflict and integration taking place; because of that, conflict and social conflict are always present in everyday life.

Coser (1956) illustrates conflict as a dispute about values or demands regarding status, power, and wealth, which are limited in supply. The dispute or conflict can take place between individuals, groups, or between individuals and groups. However, conflict between groups and intra-groups also exists where people live together.

The social conflict between groups of people is explained in the theory of social identity. The theory of Social Identity is the theory which explains prejudice, discrimination, social change and conflict between groups. According to Tajfel (1982), social identity is a part of an individual's self-concept which is constructed from their knowledge of their membership of a social group correspondingly with the value and emotional significance linked to the membership. Social identity is related to involvement, a sense of caring, and a sense of pride from membership in a certain group. Abrams and Hogg (1990) explain that social identity as a sense of connection, care, and pride can originate from various social interactions with other members, even without the need for one's own close personal relationship. By identifying oneself in a group, then the status and prestige possessed by the group will influence the perception of every individual inside the group. Generally, an In-group can be interpreted as a group in which someone has a feeling of "common identity", "while an out-group

is a group that is perceived differently from "in the group." There is a certain feeling of "in-group," which often rises to "in-group," for instance, considering their group is the best. "In-group" bias is the reflection of the feelings that do not favor the "out-group" and feelings of favor for the "in-group." This feeling exists primarily because of the loyalty to the group while simultaneously devaluating another group. Prejudice usually happens because of "in-group favoritism," which is the tendency to discriminate against the "out-group" in order to gain a special advantage for their own.

The theory of social dominance explains how conflict and inequality between groups (group conflict and group-based inequality) could occur as a result of domination in the social hierarchy within the society (Pratto et al., 2006; Berg et al., 2015). This theory states that society minimizes conflict in groups by creating consensus on myths, specifically known as 'legitimizing myths' which favor one group over another. The myth became a tool to legitimize discrimination, which then the myth widely accepted in society as a truth, often called 'hierarchy-legitimizing myths' (Pratto et al., 1994).

Social dominance theory differentiates between two types of functional from 'legitimizing myths,' the one that increases hierarchy (Hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing myths /HE-LMs), and the other is legitimizing myths that weaken hierarchy (Hierarchy-attenuating legitimizing myths /HA-LMs). HE-LMs provide moral and intellectual excuses for oppression and inequality; temporarily, the HA-LMs are opposing ideology dominance (Pratto et al., 2006). Similar to legitimizing myths, social institutions in society are too classified as improving institutions' hierarchy (Hierarchy Enhancing/HE) and weakening institutions' hierarchy (Hierarchy Attenuating/HA). Institutions that improve hierarchy (HE) support and maintain inequality by allocating more positive social values to groups or dominant individuals. Meanwhile, the institution that weakens the hierarchy (HA) is group or individual subordinate (group bottom), such as those underprivileged society, as well as ethnic and religious minorities. (Pratto et al., 2006). Individuals who are in the hierarchy that have higher power tend to have more positive values, which means they can channel values to another individual inside the hierarchy and other powers to ensure that negative social values are distributed to other individuals outside their hierarchy. Individual discrimination is the different treatment carried out by one individual to other individuals because membership in a certain group is different in ethnicity, nationality, social class, orientation, sex, or gender (Pratto et al., 2006).

There has been countless research and studies done focused on the essence of religion. Emile Durkheim, for instance, in the book *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, defines religion from a sociological perspective to provide ideas, rituals and feelings that will guide somebody in social life as something really naturally social (Muzir, 2003). Wilfred Cantwell Smith (in Yewangoe, 2009) emphasized that the essence of religion is faith. What is called faith, in Smith's view, is something distinctive characteristic of humankind. Smith emphasized, "Standard man is a man of faith," and "faith as a global human characteristic is man's responsive involvement in the activity of God's dealing with humankind. "

Yewangoe (2009) explains that faith in Smith's understanding is contrasted sharply with belief. He shows that the meaning of 'beliefs' has shifted. Therefore, to believe it for somebody is to believe in a proposition. The shift in meaning is also visible in belief at first, then turns into an expression of uncertainty. As a result, "belief systems" gain character subjective or not certain. Smith states that if the method-seeking belief is messed up with faith, then the consequence is dangerous; that is, faith is dragged into a belief crisis and belief systems. Smith's understanding in this context is obvious; he wants to differentiate between belief (to have faith) as one category important from humanity, on one side, a belief system, namely all teachings and views of life passed on by tradition, on the part of the other. As explained by Azra (2009), religions contain exclusive claims. Through the author's view, the exclusive claims are related to identity as a draft self, someone who comes from their knowledge about membership in something group social simultaneously with significant values and emotions from membership the, in matter This identity as a member of certain religious communities that have the same faith. It can be the actual religious factor. No factor is main in conflict, but in its development, the religious factor is used as part of conflict strategy in form mobilization power based on religious identity. Religious interpretations are a legacy of the past, displaying an exclusively religious character by claiming the real truth as one's own, often accused of being one of the conflict factors. In an exclusively religious interpretation, other

beliefs outside one's own beliefs are seen as mistaken or have experienced distortion through human intervention. Not just that, confidence in what is seen as wrong is considered a necessary enemy eradicated or converted. It's not difficult to trace exclusivism of this kind among religious communities (Amal, 2009).

These religious interpretations can act as *belief systems* which then give rise to "*ingroup bias*," namely the tendency to think favorably of one's group as a reflection of feelings of dislike for that out-group and feelings of favoring *the in-group* which may occur due to loyalty to the group one belongs to which is generally accompanied by a devaluation of other groups. Prejudice usually occurs because of "in group favoritism," such as the tendency to discriminate in the form of considering other views as wrong and considered enemies that must be eradicated or converted into *legitimate myths*. Conflict happens when legitimizing myths makes the justification for discriminating against and dominating groups of others who are faced with resistance to domination.

Religion as a factor of conflict present in one or combination from: (1) *religious identity* used as part of conflict strategy as effort mobilization source Power; (2) *religious interpretations* make justification to discriminate and dominate other religious groups. Both are forces that influence the intensity of religious exploitation in conflict. If there are still indications *that religious identity* is being used as part of a conflict strategy in an effort to mobilize resources and religious interpretations are used as justification for discriminating against and dominating other religious groups, this means that the exploitation of religion in conflict also still exists with the possibility of increasing intensity.

## RELIGIOUS CONFLICT IN INDONESIA 1998 - 2021

Data from *Violent Conflict in Indonesian Studies* or ViCIS (in Barron et al., 2014) shows that from 1998 to 2012, there were 135,000 social conflicts in 16 provinces in Indonesia. One of them is social conflict, which involves religious and internal factors in the form of intolerance of religious expression.

Based on data reported by the Wahid Institute (2015), in the period 2009-2014, attacks on religious intolerance were still considered very worrying. During 2009-2014, there were 1,249 incidents of religious intolerance attacks recorded. These conflicts occurred both between group identity within a religion, such as the conflict between the Shiite and Sunni communities in Sampang, as well as conflicts between religions, such as the conflict between Muslims and Christians in Maluku, North Maluku and Poso.

Despite the trend in the number of incidents showing a decline, conflict still exists. Throughout 2015-2016, attacks of religious intolerance continued to occur in various regions in Indonesia. On October 13, 2015, there was an attack of religious intolerance in Aceh Singkil, Aceh Province, in the form of the burning of a number of churches (tempo. co, 2015; tempo. co, 2015). This is not the first time it has occurred in Aceh Singkil Regency because, on August 18, 2015, burning of GKPPD Church also occurred in District Suro by an unknown suspect (Tempo. co, 2015).

This incident occurred only about three months after the incident conflict in the District Tolikara West Papua Province on July 17, 2015, which began with a letter from the Tolikara Regional Working Body of the Gospel Church in Indonesia (GIDI) which essentially said that a prohibition on Muslims holding Eid al-Fitr prayers in Tolikara on the grounds that seminars and KKR (*Kebaktian Kebangunan Robani*) or *Spiritual Revival Services* were held. GIDI Youth International was held from 13 to July 19 2015, then when Eid prayer was held, riots occurred. (kompas.com, 2015; cnnindonesia.com, 2015).

On July 29, 2016, there was burning, and destruction occurred in 15 monasteries and temples, seven of them heavily damaged, in Tanjung North Sumatra Hall. At that time, the Chief of the Indonesian National Police, General Police Tito Karnavian, mentioned the case had exploded due to "provocative calls" via social media following a misunderstanding at the start of the commotion. (bbc.com, 2016; bbc.com, 2016).

The damage caused by the conflict triggered by religion, especially the inter-religious conflict, is very powerful. Religious conflict in North Maluku has killed 3,257 people, injured 2,635 people, and destroyed 15,004 buildings. Meanwhile, the religious conflict in Ambon, Maluku, has killed 2,793 people, injured 5,057 people and destroyed 13,843 houses. On the other hand, the Poso conflict has killed 517 people, injured 579 and destroyed 6004 houses (Barron et al., 2014). Even if religion does not play a major role in inciting various riots

in a number of regions in Indonesia, its role in justifying and expanding the conflict field looks real (Amal, 2009).

From 2017 to early 2021, it seems that there were no large-scale religious conflicts. However, there are still various issues that have the potential or become the source of conflict where the religious factor is involved in it.

On 9 May 2017, the Jakarta court sentenced Basuki "Ahok" Purnama, a Christian who is a former Jakarta Governor, with two years in prison for blasphemy against Islam. The sentence follows the Islamist militant group's success in making blasphemy charges the centerpiece of efforts to defeat it in the Jakarta gubernatorial election in April 2017 ( Human Rights Watch, 2018).

In 2018, an Indonesian court sentenced six people to prison terms of one to five years for violations of religious blasphemy laws (Human Rights Watch, 2019), including an ethnic Chinese Buddhist in Tanjung Balai in North Sumatra who received an 18-month prison sentence in August for complaining about noise levels at the local mosque (bbc.com, 2016; bbc.com, 2016).

In March 2018, a Christian association in Jayapura, the capital of Papua province, issued a stark 14-day ultimatum to city authorities to dismantle the city's Al-Aqsa mosque minaret by the end of February or the group would "take action itself." However, the group does not take action when the 14 day period has passed (Human Rights Watch, 2019). On 26 March 2018, the Indonesian Supreme Court rejected former Jakarta Governor Basuki Purnama's appeal on 2017 religious blasphemy charges for which he ultimately had to serve a two-year prison sentence (Human Rights Watch, 2019).

In 2019, Indonesian authorities tried three women for alleged violations of the country's blasphemy laws, namely Aisyah Tusalamah, who had a psychosocial disability in prison for posting allegedly blasphemous videos, Suzethe Margareta who had paranoid schizophrenia for bringing her dog to a mosque in Bogor in June, Eka Trisusanti Toding, an English teacher, was accused of blasphemous comments on Facebook about Islam (Human Rights Watch, 2020). In April, the Supreme Court rejected a Buddhist woman's appeal against a blasphemy ruling in Medan, North Sumatra (Human Rights Watch, 2020), regarding the complaint on the sound decibel level of the prayer call at a mosque in 2016 which then provoked riots (bbc.com, 2016; bbc.com, 2016).

As quoted from *Human Rights Watch* (2021), 2020 Indonesian Police arrested at least 38 people for blasphemy in 16 provinces in 2020. They included Doni Irawan, who was sentenced to three years for tearing up the Koran inside a mosque in Deli Serdang. In August, Bandung police arrested Apollinaris Darmawan, a retired Catholic, who had written a book and uploaded videos on YouTube questioning Islamic teachings. Indonesian Christians in Muslim-majority provinces continue to experience difficulties opening new churches or keeping existing ones open in facing pressure from conservative Muslim groups. In January, the Saint Joseph Catholic Church in Tanjung Balai, Karimun Island, had its building permit revoked after a group of local Muslims protested the renovation. On September 7, a regent in Jonggol, West Java, ordered Pastor Donfri Polli, a Pentecostal Christian minister, to stop Sunday services, stating that he did not have a license to run a church. On September 21, a village chief in Mojokerto, East Java, prohibited Sumarmi, a Christian woman, from renovating and organizing religious services in her home unless she agreed "not to put up a cross in her house."

Lastly, in April 2021, the Indonesian Police named Joseph Paul Zhang, whose real name is Shindy Paul Soerjomoeljono, as a suspect in a religious blasphemy case (tribunnews.com, 2021). This has caused a reaction among Muslims and even among other religions because it is seen as having an impact on efforts to maintain diversity and will trigger conflict between religions (cnnindonesia.com, 2021; jppn.com, 2021)

These incidents are an indication that the exploitation of religion in the form of *religious identity* is used as part of a conflict strategy in an effort to mobilize resources, and *religious interpretations* used as justification for discriminating against and dominating other religious groups is still happening in Indonesia and seems to show signs of continuing to happen in the future.

## HYBRID WARFARE IN FUTURE WARFARE AND DEFENSE STRATEGIES TO COUNTER IT

At first, HW was generally considered a term used to describe modern conflicts, which has slowly gained traction and is now not only a subject of national security discussion but also a common topic of discussion in state affairs and political discourse in general (Najžer, 2020). Although the name may be new, the conflicts described as HW are not new. They can be traced back to the Peloponnesian War of the fifth century BC, England's attempt to conquer Ireland around 1600, the American Revolution, Spain's Peninsular War against Napoleon in 1807–1814, the Franco-Prussian War in 1870–1871, the Japanese experience in North China in 1937–1945, and the Vietnam War (Murray & Mansoor, 2012). Various discussions regarding modern warfare, there were actually found the fact that hybrid principles in warfare have been applied for a long time (Kassimeris & Buckley, 2002; Fridman, Kabernik, and Pearce, 2019), and even the conflicts that occur today often use HW principles (Korybko, 2015). Modern war is the result of three different types of change, namely administrative, technical, and ideological. It goes beyond just military operations, where in modern war, it involves every aspect of life above all (Townshend, 2005). Traditional military history has evolved into a broader and deeper approach to the relationship between war and society (Townshend, 2005).

Murray and Mansoor (2012) define HW as a conflict involving a combination of conventional and unconventional military forces (*irregulars*) such as guerrillas, insurgents and terrorists, which can include state and non-state actors which aim to achieve common political goals, are part of a coherent strategy used to fight invaders or occupying forces, and occurs at all levels of War, from tactical, operational, to strategic. Lovelace (2016) explains that the term HW includes conventional warfare, irregular warfare, cyber warfare, insurgency, criminality, economic extortion, ethnic warfare, "legal wars," as well as the effective application of low-cost technology to defeat technologically advanced and high-cost forces. *Hybrid War* can be defined as a conflict involving regular and irregular forces involved in symmetric and asymmetric battles. Hybrid War appears as a unique package of domination in intangible and tangible forms over various battlefield variables, which is manifested in an indirect way Mansoor (in Hartley III, 2021). Overall, it is *structured chaos* that is then exploited to achieve certain foreign policy goals as a strategy and a weapon, multiplying its effectiveness in *proxy battles* and simultaneously destabilizing its targets (Korybko, 2015).

The HW concept is similar to the unrestricted concept of Warfare (Liang & Xiangsui, 1999), which means that any method can be prepared for use, battlefields are everywhere, and any technology can be combined with other available things, and that the boundaries between war and non-war as well as between military and non-military affairs have been fade; even non-state groups increasingly gain access to types of weapons that were previously the exclusive rights of the state. Hybrid warfare combines the deadly impact of state conflict with the spirit of fanaticism and irregular warfare, which was protracted (Hoffman, 2007; Hoffman, 2009). Monaghan (2019) explains that the Hybrid Warfare (HW) concept is different from the Hybrid Threat (HT), and each has different instruments. However, both can occur and be implemented at the same time as part of an intense campaign or during war. HT combines a variety of violent and non-violent strategies that target society's vulnerabilities to undermine the functioning, unity, or goals in fulfilling their will while degrading and subverting the *status quo*; such strategies are used by actors to gradually achieve their goals without triggering a decisive response, including armed response. In contrast, HW is a challenge presented by the increasing complexity of armed conflict, where adversaries may combine multiple types of warfare coupled with non-military goals to neutralize conventional military forces (Monaghan, 2019).

Table 1. Types of HT and HW instruments.

HT		HW	
Type of instrument	Source	Type of instrument	Source
Cultural	Liang and Xiangsui's trans-military and non-military forms of warfare in <i>Unrestricted Warfare</i> (1999)	Conventional warfare	Hoffman's original definition of hybrid warfare
Diplomatic		Irregular warfare	
Network		Terrorism	
Intelligence		Criminality (large-scale)	
Psychological		Information warfare	Mattis and Hoffman's 2005 definition of the 'four block war'
Technological		Nuclear warfare	Liang and Xiangsui's military forms of warfare in <i>Unrestricted Warfare</i> (1999)
Smuggling		Bio/chemical warfare	
Drug 'warfare'		Ecological warfare	
Fictitious/fabrication 'warfare'		Space warfare	
Financial		Electronic warfare	
Trade		Concussion warfare	Liang and Xiangsui's trans-military forms of warfare in <i>Unrestricted Warfare</i> (1999)
Resources		Network warfare	
Economic/economic aid incentives		Intelligence warfare	
Legal/moral/regulatory Sanctions		Cyber warfare	The UK's Future Force Concept (2017)
Media/propaganda		Urban warfare	
Ideology/religion	Unmanned warfare		
Forced population shifts/migration			
Covert means	RAND study, <i>Modern Political Warfare</i> (2018)		
Unconventional warfare			
Proxy warfare			
Domestic networks	Dubik and Vincent, <i>America's Global Competitions: The Gray Zone in Context</i> , ISW (2018)		
Military coercion (short of war)			

(Source: Monaghan (2019))

Liang and Xiangsui (1999) wrote that everything changes. They believe that the era of revolution in operational methods, where all the transformation involved in the technological explosion, the replacement of weapons, the development of security concepts, the adjustment of strategic targets, the vagueness of battlefield boundaries, and the expansion of the scope and scale of non-military means and non-military personnel involved in warfare focused on a single point, has arrived and is unlikely to disappear any time soon. HW will likely stay because it is a reflection of the nature of the international order; the number of hybrid conflicts around the world will likely increase over the next two decades since hybrid wars exploit specific weaknesses of the international order and will persist as long as those weaknesses can be exploited, the costs of HW will continue to increase for the actors who use it and those who are its targets. (Najžer, 2020).

The emergence of HW does not represent the end of traditional or conventional warfare, but it does introduce complexity in defense planning in the 21st century (Hoffman, 2007; Hoffman, 2009). The element of ambiguity in HW adds a new dimension to how coercion, aggression, conflict, and war should be understood. In this case,



new geostrategic contexts, new technological applications, and new organizational forms indicate the possibility that HW will survive and continue to develop into the future (Reichborn-Kjennerud & Cullen, 2017).

In the HW context, developing a defense strategy can involve one or a combination of two options: First, developing a defense strategy to face threats from HW or HT; Second, developing a defense strategy to use HW to protect national interests.

For the first option, two aspects can be done, namely, the military aspect and the non-military aspect. Based on Hoffman's notion (2007) regarding the implications of HW for the armed forces, which need to be considered in developing defense strategies covering Force Planning, Intelligence, Cross-Agency Approach, Organizational Ethos or Culture, Doctrine, Training and Education, Operational Planning or Military Campaign Design, and Comparative Narratives. Force planning is needed to prepare personnel capable of carrying out tasks other than traditional military missions, where HW requires a multipurpose, professional military force with flexibility and credible combat power. Intelligence is needed to ensure future commanders have the necessary insight into adversaries with intelligence processes that leverage available information and a fusion of data from a wider range of non-traditional sources. A cross-agency approach is needed because the hybrid nature of HW requires handling from all national forces.

In the non-military aspect, by referring to Reichborn-Kjennerud, Erik., & Cullen, Patrick J. (2017), HW is designed to exploit national vulnerabilities across the political, military, economic, social, informational and infrastructure (PMESII); therefore, the government must assess critical functions and vulnerabilities in all sectors, and take action accordingly. HW uses coordinated military, political, economic, and information power that goes beyond the military domain. National efforts must enhance traditional threat assessment activities by integrating non-conventional elements and capabilities on political, economic, civil, and international aspects. This analysis must consider how attack methods can be shaped in a synchronized manner tailored to the specific vulnerabilities of the target. HW occurs in a synchronized and systematic manner; thus, the response should be as well. The government must develop a process to coordinate national threat assessment and analysis, where this process requires a comprehensive cross-agency effort to understand, detect and respond to "Hybrid Threat." Hybrid threat is an international problem and must be addressed with an international approach. Governments must coordinate a coherent approach between countries to understand, detect and respond to HW in their collective interests. Institutional multinational frameworks must be developed to facilitate cross-border cooperation and collaboration.

For the second option, Korybko (2017) wrote what is called *the Law of Hybrid War* as structured chaos where the main goal behind each hybrid war is to disrupt multipolar transnational elements through externally provoked identity conflicts (ethnic, religious, regional, and political, etc). In the initial stage, the actor will determine which targets will be geo politically and economically profitable for the actor. Furthermore, actors will explore socio-political vulnerabilities to be manipulated into *separation* of certain demographics from the existing national order and thus will legitimize rebellion against authorities, such as ethnicity, religion, history, administrative boundaries, socio-economic disparities, and geography. Hybrid War is always preceded by a period of social and structural preconditions. The first type relates to informational aspects and *soft power* that maximizes acceptance of key demographic aspects of destabilization and to guide them to believe that some type of action is necessary to change the current state of affairs. The second type concerns the various ways in which the target inadvertently exacerbates the various socio-political differences that have been identified, with the aim of creating hateful divisions of identity that are then more susceptible to societal preconditions and ultimately lead to political organizing. The most commonly used and globally recognized structural preconditioning tactic is sanctions whose implicit aim is always to "make life more difficult" for citizens so that they then agree with the idea of regime change and are therefore more easily led to act.

This is in line with the HT concept presented by Monaghan (2019) which combines various non-violent means that target vulnerabilities in society to undermine the function, unity or will of their targets, while degrading and overthrowing *the status quo*. As stated by Reichborn-Kjennerud and Cullen (2006; 2017), actors will use all instruments of power in a synchronized manner (MPECI: *military, political, economic, civilian and informational*) to exploit the vulnerabilities of the target (PMESII: *political, military, economic, societal, informational and*

infrastructure ). According to the *Unrestricted Concept Warfare* (Liang and Xiangsui , 1999) any method can be prepared for use, and anyone , both civilian and military, can be involved systematically.

Another concept that is generally used to describe what instruments of national power are DIME: Diplomacy or Politics, Information, Military and Economics (Clark, 2019). Clark (2019) explains that in the 1960s a concept was developed to establish four top-level levers through which the state exercises its power to influence events or deal with opponents, or instruments of national power, namely political, military, economic and psychosocial. Another argument is that technology is the fifth major instrument of national power or business power on the same level as the other four. The four instruments that are widely used today are DIME, namely diplomatic (or political), information, military and economic, which can be expanded to include financial, intelligence and law enforcement elements), abbreviated to DIME-FIL ( Rodriguez et.al, 2020 ).

HW targets entire societies, not just a state's military force, in which case, in many cases, aggressors use elements of HW to achieve goals without resorting to politically and economically expensive traditional ways, either in actions that are just below the enemy's response threshold, or in ways that making attributions that are too uncertain to justify a response, which is called the *Gray Zone Zone* ( Lovelace , 2016). *Grey Zones* are generally understood as hostile interactions that are below the threshold of conventional war and above the threshold of peaceful competition, and have a pattern of: Gradual Escalation, Maximum Denial, and Strategic Effects ( Dubik and Vincent, 2018)




Figure 2. Pattern of Gray Zone Operation

Source: Dubik and Vincent (2018)

In the history Indonesia's fight for independence, the concept of HW has actually been applied by Indonesia, such as the use of guerrilla warfare strategies, the involvement of people's troops (militia), and the use of diplomatic means during the war to defend independence 1945-1949 (Kahin, 1952; Moedjanto , 1988; Ricklefs , 2008 ; Limpach , 2019; Kartodirdjo et.al, 1975; Reid , 1974), even after 1945 until now ( Korybko , 2017). This reinforces the argument that the existence of HW cannot be ignored, so Indonesia needs to prepare itself to face threats from HW or HT.

## POLICY ON MANAGING RELIGIOUS CONFLICT IN INDONESIA

Managing conflict with religious matter in Indonesia's national development policy for 2020 - 2024, has becomes the scope of development in the field of mental revolution and cultural development, in the fields of

Politics, Law, Defense and Security or Polhukhankam , as in the 2020-2024 RPJMN document ( Republic of Indonesia, 2020a), as well as part of Indonesia's national defense strategy.

In the field of mental revolution and cultural development, this covers environmental and strategic issues related to the lack of strong religious moderation to strengthen tolerance and harmony (Republic of Indonesia, 2020a). Religious moderation is a strategic effort in order to strengthen tolerance and affirm harmony in diversity , where Indonesian people who embrace various religions need to develop insight and attitudes of religious moderation , to build mutual understanding, care for diversity, and strengthen unity between people of different religions (Republik Indonesia, 2020a).

In the field of Political, Legal and Security Affairs , this covers strategic issues related to the consolidation of democracy and maintaining national security stability (Republic of Indonesia, 2020a). In realizing democratic consolidation, one of the issues of concern is related to issues of equality and freedom, such as threats to freedom of opinion, intolerance and discrimination against various differences, which will weaken national unity and integrity (Republic of Indonesia, 2020).

Managing conflict with religious matters can also be said to be part of the country's defense strategy. National defense is an effort to create a unified national defense to achieve national goals, namely to protect the entire nation and all of Indonesia's blood, promote welfare, educate the life of the nation and participate in implementing world order based on independence, lasting peace, and social justice.

National defense is carried out in an integrated manner by utilizing all national resources including military defense and non-military defense in a defense system characterized by people, universality and regionalism, where military defense is defense to face military threats that use organized armed forces which are considered to have dangerous capabilities. state sovereignty, the territorial integrity of the state, and the safety of the entire nation, are implemented by placing the Indonesian National Army as the Main Component supported by Reserve Components and Supporting Components, while non-military defense is defense to face non-military threats that can endanger or have implications for threatening defense state, implemented by placing ministries, institutions and regional governments as the main elements adapted to the form and nature of the threats faced, supported by other elements of national strength (Republic of Indonesia, 2021c).

## ANALYSIS

Throughout history, Indonesia has faced the fact that national diversity in terms of geography, ethnicity, culture and religion has become a modality and strengthening element for the building of the Indonesian nation. The founders of the Indonesian nation positively succeeded in making the differences in the elements that make up the Indonesian nation a potential that enriches Indonesia, especially in making Indonesia an important factor in regional and global contexts. However, history also records that differences can be exploited to become a factor that has the potential to break the national brotherhood. The visible impact of the conflict is shown in the large loss of life and property. If this conflict is supported by real, organized power, it will certainly become a potential enemy for the Republic of Indonesia.

Exploitation of religion in the form of *religious identity* is used as part of a conflict strategy as an effort to mobilize resources; and/or *religious interpretations* are used as justification for discriminating against and dominating other religious groups, which is often found in conflicts in Indonesia. This conflict has been proven to have resulted in a loss of security, created fear in society, environmental damage, loss of property, loss of life and psychological trauma such as revenge, hatred and feelings of hostility, all of which have the potential to hinder the realization of general prosperity.

*The religious identity* used as part of the conflict strategy as an effort to mobilize resources, and *the religious interpretations* used as justification for discriminating against and dominating other religious groups are forces that influence the intensity of religious exploitation in conflict. If there are still indications *that religious identity* is being used as part of a conflict strategy as an effort to mobilize resources and/or *religious interpretations* are used as justification for discriminating against and dominating other religious groups, this means that the exploitation of religion in conflict also still exists with the possibility of increasing intensity, where incidents of conflict with religious nuances in the past which are still occurring today are a strong indication of this argument.

### *Potential For Religious Exploitation of Conflict in Indonesia*

As a first scenario, predictions that can be made are that *religious identities are* used as part of conflict strategies as an effort to mobilize resources, and *religious interpretations* that are used as justification for discriminating against and dominating other religious groups continue to occur in Indonesia so that conditions of religious exploitation in conflict continues to occur as currently indicated.

The next scenario development is the existence of internal and external factors that influence the intensity of the use of *religious identity as* part of a conflict strategy as an effort to mobilize resources, and the use of *religious interpretations* as a justification for discriminating against and dominating other religious groups.

The internal factors taken into account are various policies for handling conflict with religious nuances in Indonesia in the field of mental revolution and cultural development and in the field of Political, Legal and Security Affairs as in the 2020-2024 RPJMN document, as well as as part of Indonesia's state defense strategy. to achieve national goals, namely to protect the entire nation and all of Indonesia's blood, promote general welfare, educate the life of the nation and participate in implementing world order based on freedom, eternal peace and social justice , which is universal by involving all citizens of the country, region , and other national resources. By referring to the principle of universality in national defense, all efforts to defend state sovereignty, the territorial integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, and the safety of the entire nation from threats and disturbances to the integrity of the nation and state, must involve all citizens, territories and other national resources. , and prepared early by the government and implemented in a total, integrated, directed and continuous manner. Efforts to protect national interests, namely securing the integrity of the national territory, securing economic resources, and protecting the safety of citizens, are carried out with national defense efforts that need to be managed systematically.

The external factor that is taken into account is that the problem of inter-religious relations is one of Indonesia's points of vulnerability. It is not impossible that this can be exploited as part of the HW strategy with various operational methods so that it can become a potential threat to Indonesia. What is happening in the international world and the lessons of Indonesian history confirm that HW is an actual thing and is likely to experience development in the future. HW has many definitions but almost all of them have in common the combination of various forms of warfare, exploitation of vulnerabilities, and synchronization of forces to achieve a goal. Although HW and HT are different things, understanding HT as a combination of various violent and non-violent methods that target vulnerabilities in society to cause damage, it is important to be able to anticipate HW as a challenge presented by the increasing complexity of conflict by combining military and non-military methods. Indonesia already has a basic reference for identifying HT by exploring vulnerabilities and identifying and using all the strengths it has to deal with it . Understanding and the existence of a conceptual framework regarding HW including the types of warfare that may occur in the future which are integrated with an understanding of HT need to be developed. The ability to identify HT by exploring vulnerabilities as well as identifying, using and developing the capacity of all the strengths possessed to deal with HW also needs to be developed.

For the second scenario, we assume that the policy for handling religious conflicts in Indonesia in the field of mental revolution and cultural development and in the field of Political, Legal and Security Affairs as in the 2020-2024 RPJMN document, as well as as part of Indonesia's state defense strategy, is running optimally. We also assume that understanding and the existence of a conceptual framework about HW including the types of warfare that may occur in the future are integrated with an understanding of HT, including the ability to identify HT by exploring vulnerabilities as well as identifying, using, and developing the capacity of all existing forces to facing HW can be developed. Both have an impact on Indonesia's resilience to be able to face the potential threat of religious exploitation in conflict as part of the HW strategy.

For the third scenario, we assume that the policy for handling religious conflicts in Indonesia in the field of mental revolution and cultural development and in the field of Political, Legal and Security Affairs as in the 2020-2024 RPJMN document, as well as as part of Indonesia's state defense strategy, is running optimally. However, for the understanding and existence of a conceptual framework regarding HW including the types of warfare that may occur in the future which is integrated with an understanding of HT, including the ability to identify HT by exploring vulnerabilities as well as identifying, using and developing the capacity of all existing

forces to face HW cannot be developed properly. Both have an impact on Indonesia's resilience to be able to face the potential threat of exploitation of religion in conflict as part of the HW strategy to be less than optimal.

For the fourth scenario, we assume that the policy for handling religious conflicts in Indonesia in the field of mental revolution and cultural development and in the field of Political, Legal and Security Affairs as in the 2020-2024 RPJMN document, as well as as part of Indonesia's state defense strategy, is not running optimally. However, for the understanding and existence of a conceptual framework regarding HW including the types of warfare that may occur in the future which is integrated with an understanding of HT, including the ability to identify HT by exploring vulnerabilities as well as identifying, using and developing the capacity of all existing forces to face HW can be developed properly. Both also impact Indonesia's resilience to be able to face the potential threat of religious exploitation in conflict being less than optimal, as is the case in the third scenario.

For the fifth scenario, we assume that the policy for handling religious conflicts in Indonesia in the field of mental revolution and cultural development and in the field of Political, Legal and Security Affairs as in the 2020-2024 RPJMN document, as well as as part of Indonesia's state defense strategy, is not running optimally. Understanding and the existence of a conceptual framework about HW including the types of warfare that may occur in the future are integrated with an understanding of HT, including the ability to identify HT by exploring vulnerabilities as well as identifying, using and developing the capacity of all existing forces to face HW.

## CLOSING

The analysis carried out shows that the worst scenario that may occur is the intensity of the exploitation of religion in conflict in the form of *religious identity* which is used as part of the conflict strategy as an effort to mobilize resources, and *religious interpretations* which are used as justification for discriminating against and dominating other religious groups became high because the policy for handling conflict with religious nuances in Indonesia was not running optimally. Inter-religious relations as one of Indonesia's points of vulnerability was then exploited as part of the HW strategy with various operational methods for Indonesia which were successfully carried out because Indonesia did not have an understanding of HW including the types of warfare that may occur in the future which are integrated with an understanding of HT, including the ability to identify HT by exploring vulnerabilities as well as identifying, using and developing the capacity of all existing forces to deal with HW.

Conflicts that use religious sentiments usually make religious diversity to hide its real intention, and when the conflict cannot be managed, this has an impact on Indonesia's national security so the efforts to ensure policies for managing conflict with religious nuances in Indonesia should put in place.

The previous conception of the national security formula had to be formulated precisely based on the philosophy and way of life of the Indonesian people to guarantee the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia in order to achieve national goals, namely to protect the entire nation, achieving welfare, and participating in implementing world order based on independence, peace and social justice, as well as to protect national interests.

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