

The Politicization of Religion in Indonesia (The Use of Hadith on Jihad and Hijra in General Election in Indonesia)

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Abstract

Religion was often used as a political media to win the battle for power, including politics in Indonesia. The terms "Jihad" and "Hijrah" contained in the Qur'an and Hadith are also used by Islamist groups as a campaign tool to win the presidential or gubernatorial elections, as happened on Jakarta's gubernatorial election 2017 and Indonesia's presidential election 2019. Jihad which was originally meaningful generally interpreted by this group only as a hard effort to defeat the party or potential leader of the opponents who was considered un-Islamic or not in favor of Islamic interests. Hijrah is also interpreted as a move from a lifestyle that have not been "shar'i" to "shar'i life", Islamic, halal, and good life. The concept of understanding and practice like this will certainly have an impact on the life of the nation and religion in the pluralistic Indonesia. This study used qualitative research, the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) theory to be developed in critical hermeneutics. The finding is that the concepts of jihad and Hijrah were misused on the presidential and gubernatorial elections in Indonesia, especially on 2017 and 2019. The motive is to win the group and defeat opponents who are considered un-Islamic, shar'i, and siding with the interests of Muslims. Identity politics based on narrow and one-sided perceptions has proven to cause unrest and endanger the life of the nation and religion, because it will be cause disharmony and disintegration.

Keywords: Politicization, Jihad, Hijrah, Islamist, Disintegration.

INTRODUCTION

The politicization of religion used religion or religious symbols as means to achieve political goals and not for religion itself. The political objectives can be in the form of power, position, mobilizing the masses and provoking the religious emotions of the people for political purposes, bringing down opponents, for building power in parliament, which are more dominated by material or worldly goals. Such political goals are certainly very contrary to the noble values of the Qur'an and the Prophet's traditions as a guide to Allah swt. and Muhammad saw. Peace be upon him in realizing mercy, goodness, and peace for all humans.

Manipulation and politicization were clear deviations and misuse of the verses of the Qur'an and hadith from their true purpose, namely to be indicative of goodness (hudan) and compassion (rahmatan lil 'alamin). The misuse of the Qur'an and hadith for worldly desires has undermined the sacred value of religion and was very vulnerable to cause divisions in society and scientists (Muassomah, 2023). The religious concepts in Islam that were often used for practical political interests are "Jihad" and "Hijrah" in general elections (Fernando, Larasati, et al., 2023; Hidayat, 2024), both for presidential elections, gubernatorial elections, and legislative candidate elections. Jihad which was a noble concept in Islam is sometimes interpreted only as a hard effort to win certain political parties or certain presidential candidates or regional heads. The concept of Hijrah also experienced a shift, or saving, from its initial meaning as a transition from a bad life to a better one, to a change from an ordinary lifestyle to more "shar'i life", from party voters or prospective leaders with national insight into voters Islamic party or prospective leaders, from wearing hijab or veil, or choosing the style to become user of non-alcoholic cosmetic products.

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The Jakarta's gubernorial Election 2017, which then became a clear stage, has occurred the politicization of religion in the form of verses of the Qur'an and the Hadith. Surah Al-Maidah 51, for example, which has various meanings and comes down with special conditions, turns out to have been used as the proposition with the sole meaning of ban on choosing non-Muslim leaders. Because Qur'an was merely politicized, the practice of Qur'an verses becomes inconsistent, depending on where the wind of victory blows and the general currents take sides. This was evident in some areas where the majority of the population is Muslim precisely the parties that claim Islamic "champion" and win the pair of non-Muslim candidates.

As the result of the blasphemy of this verse of Qur'an, the actual mosque was open to all groups, then it was claimed as if it belongs to itself and its group, while other people who do not support his choice or who have different religions and beliefs, may be driven out of the mosque, as if the mosque was his own, as if Allah Almighty could only be claimed as his god, and even worse as if he had fenced and restricted his Paradise Allah was limited to his mind and will. Even the threat of not offering the corpse prayer was also used to frighten people who choose non-Muslim candidates. Mosques and prayers in mosques can be used to expel other worshipers who are not by their political choices. This was proof that religious motives can be used for political purposes.

On Indonesia's presidential election 2019, the politicization of religion was increasingly high, as evidenced by the widely used concepts of Islam in the campaign, both in the open space and through social media (Airlangga PH et al., 2024; Azhar et al., 2024). The concept of jihad, for example, is widely used by supporters of presidential candidate number 02 to increase enthusiasm and campaign in defeating their political opponents. The term Hijrah is also used to show the awareness of moving from the evil system of the ruling regime to the good system that is expected to be realized through the presidential election earlier. Hijrah was also used to show the existence of a new religious awareness, in physical appearance for example, so that it looks more sharia, and leave the old model which was considered no longer Islamic.

Many reseachers before, like Ahyar & Alfitri (2019) explained that there is a new vehicle for the politicization of religion. This action continue to be voiced through the internet and social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and so forth with the jargon "212 spirit". If with "spirit 212" they successfully won the Jakarta's Gubernorial Election 2017 so with this same enthusiasm they want to repeat the victory to win a higher seat, the president's position as head of state. The voluminous actions of "Aksi Bela Islam (Defending Islam action) 212" sound like an authoritative propaganda jargon which are exhaled to spread the Islamic identity through the internet. this article argues that Islamic social movement in the millennial age—especially in the post 212 movement—has consistency to play a role in political contestation through the Islamic clicktivism (Ahyar & Alfitri, 2019).

Azra (2018) explained that Indonesia has experienced a transition from a model of authoritarianism to a reformation that has been exploited by political Islamic groups that tend to politicize religion, since 1998 until now. Likewise, Islam, which was the religion of the majority of Indonesia's population, also continues to experience 'resurgence' (resurgence), since the 1980s in Indonesia until now. Democracy has reached the point of no return. Azyumardi Azra (2018) discusses the influence between religious piety and political behavior in Indonesia. Where quantitatively 99% of Indonesian Muslims believe that religion is an important element in their lives. But in reality, in terms of political choice, this fact has little implication for the votes obtained by political parties based on Islam, especially in the post-Suharto general election until now. The result is that religious devotion in Indonesia is essentially unrelated to the main problems in political and economic life (Fernando et al., 2024; Fernando, Galuh Larasati, et al., 2023; Galuh Larasati et al., 2023; Salleh et al., 2024).

The political behavior of Indonesian Muslims is more influenced by socio-economic transformation (rather than politics). Azumardi Azra (2021) argues that the victory of Anis-Sandi in the 2017 DKI Jakarta election era was a victory of Islamic Populism which was rising through the multi- volume Islamic Action Movement (ABI), especially the 212 actions. These movements began with 14 actions October 2016 (1410), 28 October 2016 (2810), 4 November 2016 (411), 2 December 2016 (212), 11 February 2017 (112), 21 February (212 volumes 2), 31 March 2017 (313), and action May 5, 2017 (Action 55). These actions have been triggered by Basuki Tjahaja Purnama alias Ahok's statement during a working visit to the Thousand Islands (9/27/2016). At that

time Ahok gave a speech in front of the people by quoting Surat al-Maidah verse 51 which stated that the voters were not "deceived" by using the verse to not choose leaders from the Christian community, including Ahok himself. Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar (2010) identified the term radical with the Islamic populism groups by borrowing the term *Vedi R Hadiz*. This article argues that the emergence of radical groups that form as terrorists in Indonesia was not from theology, but came from economic politics. The solution offered is to alleviate the poverty of the Indonesian people.

Garadian (2017) analyzed the origins of the Islamic populism groups, which comes from people who have an interest in power or economic benefits have proved to make political power in the society, rather than religious ideology or teachings itself. The Islamic populism groups often arises and positions itself as the oppressed. The rise of the new Islamic populism model in the Muslim world is actually just another version of populism occurring in the West, as happened in the case of Donald Trump (United States) and Brexit (United Kingdom). The new Islamic populism model is only a form of expression in responding to the development of an economic system that often changes and tends to be detrimental, or even excludes some groups. This study is presented in order to clarify the phenomenon that has occurred in the event of Ahok's defeat in the Jakarta's Governorial Election 2017.

Garadian (2017) describes the emergence of a political Islamic group or a new Model of Islamic Populism in Indonesia today that has been practiced through the preaching movement at the grassroots by the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) under the banner of the National Fatwa Guard Movement - Indonesian Ulema Council (GNPF-MUI). The da'wah movement by confronting (opposing, opposing) the ugliness of the secular state system that has been practiced succeeded in gathering many masses. While social media also facilitates GNPF-MUI in smoothing its agendas. Even though Ahok has been imprisoned, they still use the same fuel as the series of Islamic Defending Action they did. For example, to thwart Jokowi to win the 2019 Presidential Election (Pilpres), political Islamic groups that are still under the umbrella of the GNPF-MUI issue issues through WhatsApp Messenger regarding the position of the Jokowi regime that is not pro-Muslim. The issuance of Perppu Ormas, the regime's tendency in defending Ahok the religious blasphemers. began with 14 actions October 2016.

Ahmad Rizky Mardhatillah Umar (2010) identified the term radical with populist by borrowing the term *Vedi R Hadiz*. This work questions that the emergence of radical groups that manifest as terrorists in Indonesia is not from theology, but economic politics. The solution offered is the alleviation of poverty of the people of Indonesia. Garadian (2017) analyzes the origins of Islamic populism, that is, those who have an interest in power or economic benefits have proven to be able to produce Islamic political power amid society, instead of ideology or religious teachings. own. Islamic populism often emerges and positions itself as the oppressed. The rise of a new model of Islamic populism in the Muslim world is just another version of populism that occurs in the West, as happened in the case of Donald Trump (United States) and Brexit (United Kingdom). The new model of Islamic populism is only a form of expression in response to the development of an economic system that is often volatile and tends to harm or even exclude some groups. This study is presented to clarify the phenomena that have occurred in the defeat of an Ahok on Jakarta's governor election.

Abd Wahed Gufron (2017), "Contextualization of hijrah and jihad in the Qur'an; Study of the interpretation of al-Jami' li Ahkamil Qur'an al-Qurthubi ". This thesis examines the interpretation of hijrah and jihad in terms of interpretation literature and especially the view of Imam al-Qurthubi. So this thesis sees the meaning of jihad and hijrah in terms of texts or texts especially from the view of Imam al-Qurthubi. The researchers before have analyzed that the rise of Islam began to develop since the 1980s and thrived since 1998 until now has given rise to the new Islamic populism model. This group believes that only their religion (Islam) is the most righteous, and only Muslims are entitled to become leaders in Indonesia. For this reason, they have legalized "Aksi Bela Islam 212" movement to oppose and reject the regime; and even try to thwart the opponents of political figures who have succeeded, either on the Jakarta's Governorial Election 2017 or the Presidential Election April 2019. The gap is that in research to find the motive for using "jihad" and "Hijrah" to achieve a political victory of power.

The solution offered is to re-explain the meaning of jihad in sharia and realign it the motive for using jihad as propaganda tool that has been misinterpreted. Where jihad has been interpreted as fighting for the sake of the people for the Rida Allah, but for the sake of political power in order to win the political figure, and vice versa, namely defeating political opponents.

Theoretical Framework

The politicization of religion is the practice of using religion or religious symbols as a means to achieve personal or group political goals and not for the purpose of religion itself, for example the purpose of gaining power and position, so that it can move the masses and provoke the religious emotions of the community for political purposes. own. The politicization of religion can also be used to bring down political opponents or to establish power among pragmatic political parties. Such practical and pragmatic political goals are certainly contrary to the noble values of religion as teachings of peace, brotherhood, equality, compassion, courtesy, and serenity.

There are eight indicators of the politicization of the Koran and Hadith in Indonesia, among others by turning the meaning of the Koran and al-Hadith from the intrinsic meanings to other meanings, and forcing one meaning on the text which actually has many meanings, and discarding the 'legal and legal wisdom' from the text whereas the text is very bound shariih manshushah with illat at and wisdom.

For the motives for the emergence of the interpretation of the verses of the Koran and the understanding of traditions, both in literature and speeches in public places, the critical theory of Hassan Hanafi is used in stating that the interpretation of the contemporary Qur'an is loaded with interests, including politics and social religion. Therefore, according to him, the interpretation of holy verses, including data on the life history of the prophet, must be read critically (Hanafi, 2003).

To be able to uncover the motives and background of interpretation as suggested by Hassan Hanafi above, this study borrows critical hermeneutic theory, especially in reading various interpretations of the contemporary, written or oration of the Qur'an. In this critical hermeneutics, it is imperative that a critical discourse analysis or CDA (Critical Discourse Analysis) approach be used which explores the emergence of an ulama or scientist's interpretation or understanding in depth and detail, so that his ideological, cultural, or practical interests are exposed.

Misuse of Religion on Indonesia's Elections

Abuse of religion on elections and local elections includes violations of SARA (Ethnic, Religious, Racial, Intergroup) that are prohibited in the election constitution, including constitution 10/2016 on the elections. Election organizers both the General Election Commission (KPU) and the Indonesian Election's Supervisory (Bawaslu) are currently reviewing campaign regulations, especially related to the use of ethnic, religious, racial and intergroup issues (SARA) for the elections 2018 and 2019. This was done as a step Anticipation of election organizers so that the use of SARA issues will not re-emerge during the gubernorial election campaign. Several regulations (Bawaslu) were being audited to further strengthen oversight of campaign materials including those containing SARA and also hoaxes that have developed a lot lately (Nur Aivanni, 2017) . Also, Bawaslu will map the index of local election vulnerability, where one indicator is about the issue of SARA. According to him, the use of the SARA issue that was used on the Jakarta's elections was followed on Indpnesia's presidential election April 2019.

In the political world, many use religion and its symbols to facilitate the legitimacy of their interests. The politicization of religion is the politics of manipulation of religious understanding and knowledge or beliefs by means of propaganda, indoctrination, campaigning, dissemination, dissemination in the public sphere reported or interpreted so as to migrate understanding, problems and make them appear to constitute religious knowledge or belief in efforts to put the interests of something on a political agenda of community manipulation or public policy (Hidayat, 2024; Santoso et al., 2023). From this understanding, it can be understood that the politicization of religion is something negative or bad.

Muhammad Said Al-Asymawi (in Al-Islam Al-Siyasi 1987) said: "Allah wants Islam to be a religion, but humans want it to be a political [power]". From the following sentence, Al-Asymawi hints us that religion was universal,

not partial and short-term politics to smooth power. The politicization of religion will stunt religion that has universal and long-term goals, not short and limited dimensions. This politicization of religion makes religion lose its universality and only becomes a tool to seize short-term power. Religion becomes the basis of solidarity to seize political power. As a result, conflicts between interests are often unavoidable.

The position of religion was very high and becomes a source of truth, a source of morality and ethics, developed by human beings. But this is where often followers of religious revelation are easily trapped, due to worldly or practical political considerations. In the Qur'an, Allah reminds believers not to sell cheap verses of Allah in trivial worldly rewards. This means it is not permissible for a believer or even more a religious person to exploit the verses of Allah or - in the context of Islam - the traditions of the Prophet, to become merely a vehicle for achieving practical worldly interests.

Norris in his book concluded that there was a relevant relationship between religion and politics in influencing all lines of life. This can be seen from the increasingly widespread religious movement in the United States with the emergence of many New Age spirituality in Western Europe, fundamentalist movements and religious parties in the Muslim world, as well as the rise of ethnoreligious conflicts at the international level (Ahmad, 2011).

During the New Order era, according to Azra, although the regime had a policy of de-Islamization of Indonesian politics, political practitioners still used certain verses of the Qur'an to win public sympathy. In the lead up on election 1971, two political parties used this strategy, Golkar and PPP. On the contrary, in the reformation era, the politicization of religion by using verses of the Qur'an or Hadith was free to be carried out by political Islam groups. The climax occurred during the Jakarta's gubernorial election 2017, concerning the case of al-Maidah 51.

Hadiths were also not free from acts of misuse in political activities such as gubernorial or presidential elections in Indonesia. Among the traditions that are popularly used as an excuse to bring down political opponents or defeat other party leaders are the hadiths about "the loss of a people who appoint women as their leaders". This incident occurred on the elections 1999 and 2004. This time, Megawati appeared as one of the candidates for the presidential candidate from the PDI-P. This nomination provoked a response from many parties, one of them was from the PPP. They reject Megawati based on surah al-Nisā' verse 34 which states that men are the protectors of women. They also cite the hadith which explains that women's leadership will not lead to success.

On the Jakarta's gubernorial election, from 2012 to 2017 many issues of SARA emerged through religious sermons, social networks; Facebook, Twitter, leaflets, SMS and other communication media. The results of the survey report of the Indonesia Media Monitoring Center (IMMC), the highest development of the SARA issue occurred during the second round of the voting campaign on July 11, 2012. This was also confirmed by the report of the Election Supervisory Committee (Panwaslu) which found leaflets, SMS and BBM, which had discredited (black campaign) Jokowi-Ahok couple. (KPU, 2012).

The high level of human resources and the demographic location of Jakarta on the metropolitan line with an increasingly advanced economic and industrialization level, the issue of SARA was still an option to bring down political opponents (political opponents) as a strategic step to increase the electability of candidates in the eyes of voters. However, the SARA political conspiracy that occurred in the Election of the Governor of DKI Jakarta, led to the defeat of Foke-Nara. Where the success team and sympathizers were intensely attacked by SARA to the Jokowi-Ahok couple with the support of the majority from the community and religious leaders.

The use of religious symbols such as the title of Hajj, hijab, cap, surban and koko clothing certainly never left the body of the politician when the political party campaigned. This would later be done by Islamic parties or secular parties. Are these religious symbols still used even when not campaigning? It seems that only during the campaign was used so that religious parties could be identified. This will create a hypocritical impression when a political party that has a religious image is ensnared in a corruption case or other case that defames the party's good name. When we look at the banners on the roadside, there are many legislative candidates with Islamic attributes. For example in front of the name added the title of Haji, wearing a cap or skull cap for men or a veil

for women. Of course, this is a question for the public why these candidates who might initially in the community look mediocre suddenly when running for legislature suddenly appear religious. This is a politicization of religion that is used to portray themselves as religious people so that people believe in it. This was the true politicization of Islam because it makes the Qur'an and hadith as a political tool for a group of elites who act in the name of Islam in Indonesia to express their support for one of the candidates for Jakarta's gubernatorial election 2017 (Akmaliah, 2017).

In addition to the hypocritical stigma, the mosque which is also dubbed "Baitullah" has been misused as an aspect of channeling political aspirations and contributing to campaign activities in the form of *tausiah* that corner and influence Muslims to choose a particular candidate pair. "In fact, there were banners that contain messages not to bury the bodies that support non-Muslim regional head candidates. This is too much, the politicization of religion must be prevented and watched out for" (Rumaidi, 2017). There was another politicization of the mosque or place of worship. One of the politicized mosques was the Istiqlal Mosque. This mosque was one of the historic mosques in this republic. This mosque was often touted as the largest mosque in Southeast Asia, because it can accommodate hundreds of thousands of worshippers. Muslims, anyone, would want to set foot while praying or praying in this magnificent mosque (Misrawi, 2017).

In essence, the statement asks Muslims not to elect non-Muslim leaders on Jakarta's gubernatorial election 2017. The figure in question was none other than Basuki Tjahaya Purnama popularly known as Ahok (Toha, 2016). In the midst of religious societies such as in Indonesia, the politicization of religion was the most practical, inexpensive, and easiest way to win the sympathy of the people. The candidates also didn't need to be very good. The important thing was he is supported by religious leaders who are ready to peddle verses and fatwas for political purposes. The politicization of religion was also one-sided because by doing so, candidates can bind the voter candidates in an emotional bond. The Jakarta's gubernatorial election 2017 can be a realistic example of how politicization of religion was played in such a way that it produces maximum impact.

Reflecting on The Jakarta's gubernatorial election 2017 and the Indonesia's presidential election 2019, it seems that the trend will continue to be played. The reason is that politicians get two benefits at the same time: get the sympathy of religious people who also receive financial support in the form of *infaq* from their supporters. So, don't expect the politicization of religion will decrease in the future. For candidates whose achievements are zero percent such as a down payment (DP) home, it is the most effective and inexpensive way to get a vote.

The Politicization of Hadith on Jihad

Hadis-hadis tentang jihad banyak digunakan dalam aktifitas politik di Indonesia. Tujuannya adalah untuk mengalahkan lawan politik dan memenangkan pemilihan umum. Di antara hadis yang paling banyak digunakan adalah hadis tentang jihad yang paling baik. Tariq ibn Shihab reported: A man asked the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, "What is the best jihad?" The Prophet said, "A word of truth in front of a tyrannical ruler. The propaganda of hadith on the jihad used by Islamic populism in the period before and after the Indonesia's presidential election 2019 was a continuation of the euphoria on Jakarta's gubernatorial election 2017.

Islamic populism groups, such as Front Pembela Islam (FPI) or the Islamic Defenders Front, a puritanical salafist groups, are already confident and confident that a successful jihad propaganda strategy on The Jakarta's gubernatorial election 2017 will be repeated at the Indonesia's presidential election 2019. Dahnil Anzar, a speaker of president candidat of Prabowo Subianto, used too the hadith to fight the Joko Widodo, a president candidate in Indonesia's presidential election 2019 (Aditya, 2019). Jihad propaganda in the form of demonstrations titled Action in the Defense of Islam has also been carried out in volumes. The Islamic Defendant Action Volume I, which was fronted by hundreds of members of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) or the puritanical Salafist groups under the leadership of Rizieq Shihab, was held from October 14, 2016, to May 2017. The reason, according to Rizieq Shihab was that the Islamic Defender Action was carried out solely seek the pleasure of Allah, even though it was done during a political event.

With this Jihad Propaganda, many people are persuaded to become militants to this political view of religious populism, both from the mothers and fathers, from young and old to children. Prabowo seduced the 212 movements (Prabowo courted the 212 Movement assiduously) diligently (Fealy, 2019). They want a brighter Islamic society. (they want a more overtly and devoutly Islamic society and believe that the state should intervene in religious and social affairs to bring this about. The results of jihad propaganda for getting of Rida Allah greatly ignited the spirit of hardline Islamists, so Habib Rizieq Shihab, founder of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) wanted the Prabowo camp to reuse that strategy to overthrow Jokowi. But Jokowi was vigilant and realized that he might lose his efforts for the second term, and decided to protect himself by working with the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). "According to Greg Fealy, NU has two main reasons for backing Jokowi: the first is patronage. NU, despite its vast size, is a relatively asset and program-poor organisation. It has historically placed great store on using politics to increase the flow of funds and lucrative positions to the organisation and its leaders. Jokowi has been willing to dispense favours to NU. Crucially, the organisation's president, Ma'ruf Amin, was picked, albeit reluctantly, by the president to be his running mate.

Jokowi's decision to choose Ma'ruf Amin as his vice-presidential candidate was widely seen as an attempt to appease Islamists as the NU president, who was also chairman of the National Ulema Council (MUI), had played an enabling role in the 212 Movement by issuing a MUI fatwa that Ahok was a blasphemer. But the over-riding reason Ma'ruf Amin was selected was because NU threatened to withdraw its support from Jokowi's candidature if one of its own leaders was not picked (Fealy, 2019). The second and perhaps more important factor in NU siding with Jokowi is ideological. NU regards itself as the central pillar of moderate, pluralistic Islam in Indonesia, something that it regards as integral to the nation's identity" (Fealy, 2019). Jihad was used as propaganda tool by the Islamic populism groups in order to win the struggle for Muslim votes in the contestation of the Presidential Election 2019, and to legitimize their claims as true "Islamic fighters".

The goal, the first, is to make lies, undermine democracy, divide NKRI or Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (united state of Indonesian Republic) against the truth (Kompas, 2019). The second, brainwashing of the community to receive an awareness that is not objective, starts with creating information or news. After that the supporting facts were created so that the news began to be believed to be true (Nainddolan, 2019). The third, is to benefit from political position, while at the same time dropping the political position of his opponent. The fourth, is to win the struggle for Muslim votes in the contestation of the Presidential Elections 2019 and to legitimize their claims as true "Islamic fighters".

The spirit of jihad as true warrior defended the people, for the sake of the people, as always said by supporters of candidate pair number 02 Prabowo -Sandi. If there were no other interests except just to defend the people. This is the populist style that was practiced by Prabowo and his supporters on the pre and post-Presidential Elections 2019. Jihad has been used as propaganda tool for The Islamic populism groups in the fight for victory and resistance to violence and accuses KPU of cheating. Behind the spirit of jihad, there is actually meaning behind the meaning, namely that between the Islamic populism groups and Prabowo-Sandi were mutually wanting to be in power. The reason is that the Islamic populism groups really want Indonesia to be won and controlled by Muslims in order to practice their programs that have been delayed, namely making Indonesia sharia. Whereas Prabowo-Sandi definitely wants to be won on the Presidential Election 2019 defeating their rival Jokowi-Ma'ruf, just for the seat of power, namely the Indonesia's president position.

Hijrah Propaganda as a Form of Politicization of Religion

One trend that was loved by the current millennial generation in Indonesia is the Hijrah trend. Ajaran hijrah memang bersumber dari al-Qur'an dan hadis Nabi (Al-Qur'an surat an-Nisa' ayat 100). Dalam sebuah hadis dijelaskan bahwa Nabi Muhammad bersabda, " .. dan orang yang berhijrah adalah orang yang meninggalkan (berhijrah) apa-apa yang dilarang oleh Allah" (Hadis diriwayatkan oleh imam an-Nasa'i dalam kitab Sunan al-Nasa'i dalam Haleb, 1986). Hadis tersebut lalu dipahami secara tekstual oleh sebagian kalangan muda muslim di perkotaan sebagai ajaran untuk memulai gaya baru yang "islami" dan meninggalkan perilaku atau kelompok yang dianggap tidak sesuai dengan ajaran-ajaran Islam.

Where Hijrah has been interpreted by the term, first, for women begins with closing the true genitals, namely: (1) Wearing a robe that was loose (not strict); (2) Wear long pants as a skirt, so that if the skirt was lifted by the wind or when stepping, the aurat was maintained; (3) wearing socks, because feet were also aurat; (4) Wearing long-sleeved clothes that cover up to the wrist, because the wrist was also aurat; (5) Wearing a wide veil or veil, not wrapped around but stretched out, covering the chest, and also the back to cover the hips; (6) wearing a deep veil so that hair did not come out because hair was aurat; (7) Hair buns may not be made. Hair should be tied lower; (8) Should wear sandals or low shoes, or do not have high heels (Amna, 2019). Second, migrations for men, identical to lengthening beards, male artists usually appear with beards that are allowed to grow thick and long. Their pants were confused, with a black foreh religious knowledge.

Hijrah with the appearance of clothes that are very closed certainly lead to communication relationships that are not good even can cause uncertainty or doubt about who people are invited to communicate. In some Western countries in Europe, these all-covered clothes (veil or burqa) are prohibited from doing in public for security reasons. This policy is not excessive, because many incidents of perpetrators of violence such as suicide bombings, apparently carried out veiled people, both men and women. In some cases, it turns out that the veil users are not women but men as some ISIS forces did when escaping from the Syrian Government army siege or Kurdish forces supported by the United States.

The reality is the propagation of Hijrah is a strategy to realize one's religious obedience to entrusted by someone who is recognized as an ulema in his group, namely political Islam groups. If someone is considered obedient and truly migrated, then any orders and suggestions will be obeyed, including in raising votes for the victory of political power. Both women and men who have been successfully migrated, then they will become true militants for the figures they support. This is the link between Hijrah and power politics that has happened so far according to our observation.

CONCLUSION

The results of this study found that the politicization of religion was carried out by Islamist groups in practical politics in Indonesia. The object of the politicization is the concept of Jihad and Hijrah to win the race for voting among Muslims in the contestation in the selection of legislative candidates, presidential candidates, and gubernatorial candidates. In this election, religion was often used to win and defeat opponents. The concepts of Jihad and Hijrah contained in the verses of the Qur'an and the Hadith have been used as campaign tools to defeat the party or prospective leader of the opposing group. Jihad is defined as a hard effort to defeat all parties or presidential candidates or gubernatorial candidates who are non-Muslim or who do not side with Muslims. Hijrah was also interpreted as attitudes and actions to move from a life that was less Islamic or not under shar'i to choices and life styles that are shar'i, Islamic, and halal. If this meaning is intended to show identity politics and exclusive relations, it can result in a narrow and intolerant understanding of Islam. The further consequence is that it will cause religious life that is not in harmony, can be divided and can cause national disintegration.

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