

Waves of Islamic Radicalism

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Abstract

Islamic radicalism has become a constant disturbing issue in world politics. Since the early 1980s, the dormant madness of Islamic radicalism has exploded in vicious waves of terrorist attacks around the world. Previous studies, though they contributed enormously to understanding this issue, fell short in analyzing the process that led to the dominance of Islamic radicalism and the damping of Islamic moderateness. This article (a) models the rise and fall of Islamic radical/ moderate waves utilizing Fourier series and the damping notion of waves (2) Identify and test empirically the factors that advance/ hamper radicalism using time-series and panel data from 1980 to 2015 across six Islamic countries: Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Turkey.

Keywords: *Waves, Radicalism, Moderateness, Damping, Fourier, Series, Islamic, Al-Banna, Qutb, Kharijites, Hanafites, Al-Qaeda, Jihad, Taymiyya, Wabbab, and Fourier*

INTRODUCTION

Waves and Politics

Samuel Huntington's (1961) *The Third Wave* offers an interesting approach to studying political transitions over time. According to (*ibid*, p.15), "a wave is a group of transitions that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumbered transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time." The interaction between Islamic radical and Islamic moderate waves (IR&IM) began with the murder of Uthman ibn Affan in 656 and ended with the assassination of Hassan al-Bana in 1949. The IR& IM waves are best described by the noted jurist Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi in his book *Al- Moafaqat* (p.167) (as cited by Waris, 2014) who suggests if the one perceives principles of sharia as leaning towards a certain extreme, then one should know that this is in opposition to another existing or expected extreme. The ideological 'balance of power' between Islamic radicals and moderates curbed a unidirectional interpretation of Islamic religion, consequently, saved Islam from being reduced to a powerhouse of extremism. Hence, radicalism becomes a menace when losing its moderate counterbalance.

Early Islamic Radical Wave

In (656 A.D) a group of mutinous warriors returning from Egypt and their collaborators in Mecca murdered the third Rashidun (Guided) Caliph Uthman ibn Affan. Uthman was the first Caliph to be chosen from the Umyyad clan who were the power contenders of Banu Hashem (the clan of Prophet Mohammad and Ali bin Abi Taleb). Ali succeeded Uthman as the fourth Rashidun Caliph. Suspicious of Ali's role in the Uthman murder, the Umyyads disapproved him and swore revenge if he failed to turn in Uthman's killers. Warfare erupted between the two factions at the battle of Siffin in 657. Ali halted the fight and accepted an initiative for arbitration (Tahkeem). Some of Ali's followers repudiated his leadership because they thought the only arbiter should be Allah "la hukma illa li-llah". This group came to be known as the Kharijites (the outsiders). The Kahrijites represented the peak of radicalism in Islamic history (see al-Attar 2010, pp. 31-37; Kenney 2006, pp. 47-48). Later, the constructionist interpretation of Islam by Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (780-855) turned him to be the archetype of Islamic radicals. Despite the fact that neither al-Tabari included Ibn Hanba in his *Iktibalaf al-Fuqah*, nor Ibn Qutaiba in his *Ma'arif* among the founders of the various madhhabs (school of theologies), Ibn Hanbal remains one of the most celebrated sunni theologians. He personified the theological views of the early orthodox. He was the compiler of the traditions of Prophet Muhammad in his *Musnad* and formulator of the Hanbali doctrine, the most strictly traditionalist of the four orthodox Islamic schools of law. His doctrine

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influenced such noted followers as Taymiyyasim, Wahhabism, and Salafism. The Hanbali School represents the sunni's dogma and the strict non-interpretive adherence to the Quranic text (see Spectorisky1982, p.507; Wesley, p. 442). The following discussion tracks the motional waves of early moderates and radicals as represented in figure (1).




Figure 1. Early Islamic Radical and Moderate Waves

In his book *Averroes et l'Averroïsme* (1852), Ernst Renan identified *Tabāfut al-Falasifa* by al-Ghazali and *Tabāfut al-Tabāfut* by Ibn Rushd as the two key texts that explained the difference between Islamic and Western nations. According to Renan, the Islamic world accepted al-Ghazali and fell into decline, while Europe accepted Ibn Rushd (Averroës) and experienced the Renaissance and Enlightenment. Al-Ghazali has always played a leading role in Western attempts to explain the assumed decline of philosophy in Islam (see Griffle 2009, p. 5; Renan 1864; Wright 2012). Al-Ghazali (1058–1111) was a Muslim theologian, jurist, philosopher, and mystic of Persian descent. He was the most important refuter of the rationalist Mutazilites. His 11th century book entitled *The Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tabāfut al-falasifa)* marks a major turn in Islamic epistemology. The encounter with skepticism led al-Ghazali to embrace a form of theological occasionalism, or the belief that all causal events and interactions are not the product of material conjunctions but rather the immediate and present will of God. According to Goodman, (1978, pp. 87-88), “This talk about God creating one event after another in sequence may sound suggestive of the occasionalism of the Kalam (method of reasoning), but the notion of a causal nexus within nature is foreign to the occasionalists, and the reference to divine pre-ordination of events is quite different from the Kalam method of dismissing natural causality.” Ghazali’s book marked a turning point in Islamic philosophy in its vehement rejections of Aristotle and Plato. Al-Ghazali took aim at the *falasifa*, a loosely defined group of Islamic philosophers from the 8th through the 11th centuries (most notable among them Avicenna and Al-Farabi) who drew intellectually upon the Ancient Greeks. Al-Ghazali bitterly denounced Aristotle, Socrates and other Greek writers as non-believers and labeled those who employed their methods and ideas as corrupters of the Islamic faith (see *ibid*, p. 89).

Emanuel Sevan (1983, p. 41) wrote, “Six months before President Sadat's assassination, his ruling Party's weekly, *Mayo*, singled out Ibn Taymiyya (together with his major contemporary disciples) as the most pervasive and deleterious influence upon Egyptian youth. From him they learned that “violence and seizure of power are justified by Islamic law and tradition”—and that fellow Muslims could become the target of a ‘holy war in the cause of Allah’. Ibn Taymiyya has become the symbol of extremism, or the “father of Islamic Revolution” as Sevan (1983) depicted him. Taqi ad-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328) lived during the troubled times of the Mongol invasions. He was a member of the school founded by Ahmad ibn Hanbal, and is considered as the most significant proponent of Hanbalism. What has been called Ibn Taymiyyah's “most famous” fatwā was issued against the Mongols in the Mamluk's war. Ibn Taymiyyah declared that jihad upon the Mongols was not only permissible, but obligatory. Thus, based on Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwa, the Yasa laws of Genghis Khan,

brought by his hordes from Central Asia, invalidated the Islam of the Mongols, making it into something worse than heresy. Their Islam becomes the polytheism of the Jahiliyya (pre-Islamic pagan ignorance). Apart from that, he led the resistance of the Mongol invasion of Damascus in 1300. Ibn Taymiyya has become a role model for current Islamic radical movements (see Sevan 1983, p.43).

Imam Mohammad Hayyat al-Sindi (d 1750) was a prominent Muslim scholar, chancellor of Al-Masjid al-Nabawi and Chief Justice of Medina in the eighteenth century during the period of Ottoman Empire. According to John Esposito (2003, p. 159), al-Sindi, like Ibn Taymiyya opposed taqlid (imitation), which was commonly accepted by the followers of the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence. He felt the urgent need to reform the socio-religious situation of Muslims in Najd-Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. His teaching had a great impact on Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703 – 1792), who began to take more aggressive attitude toward the establishment; denounce rigid imitation of medieval commentaries, and utilize informed individual analysis (ijtihad). Al-Sindi also taught Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab to reject popular religious practices associated with 'saints' and their tombs (see also, Amiri, 2002). His pact with Muhammad bin Saud helped to establish the first Saudi state and began a dynastic alliance and power-sharing arrangement between their families which continues to the present day. The descendants of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, the Alash-Sheikh, have historically led the ulama (scholars) in the Saudi state, dominating the state's clerical institutions. Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab began to attract followers, including the ruler of Uyyayna, Uthman ibn Mu'ammār. With Ibn Mu'ammār's support, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab began to implement some of his ideas for 'reforms'. First, citing Islamic teachings forbidding grave worship, he persuaded Ibn Mu'ammār to level the grave of Zayd ibn al-Khattab, a companion of Muhammad, whose grave was revered by locals. Secondly, he ordered that all adulterers be stoned to death.

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab was invited to settle in neighboring Diriyah by its ruler Muhammad bin Saud. Upon arriving in Diriyah, Muhammad bin Saud and Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab concluded an agreement that, together, they would bring the Arabs of the peninsula back to the "true" principles of Islam as they saw it. According to al-Rasheed (2002, p.16) when they first met, bin Saud declared: "This oasis is yours, do not fear your enemies. By the name of God, if all Nejd was summoned to throw you out, we will never agree to expel you." Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab replied, "You are the settlement's chief and wise man. I want you to grant me an oath that you will perform jihad (holy war) against the unbelievers. In return you will be imam, leader of the Muslim community and I will be leader in religious matters" (see also Abu Hakima 1960, p. 30 as cited by Al-Rasheed, 2002). The agreement was confirmed with an oath in 1744. This agreement became a mutual support pact and power-sharing arrangement between the Al-Saud and the Alash-Sheikh, which has remained in place until nowadays. Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab considered his movement, Wahhabism, an effort to purify Islam by returning Muslims to what he believed were the original principles of that religion, as typified by the salaf rejecting what he regarded as corruptions introduced by Bid'ah and Shirk. As with the early salafis, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab was criticized for disregarding Islamic history, monuments, traditions and the sanctity of Muslim life. His own brother, Sulayman, was particularly critical, claiming he was ill-educated and intolerant, classing Ibn Abd al-Wahhab's views as fringe and fanatical (see Islahi, 2008; al-Rasheed pp. 17-18).

Early Islamic Moderate Waves

Abu Hanifa Nu'man Ibn Thabit is a towering figure in the early history of Islamic law. He was the first to employ the method of legal reasoning. Abū Ḥanīfah was born 67 years after the death of Muhammad. First generation of Muslims after the Prophet had a much easier time understanding what is expected out of them as Muslims because they had access to the companions of the Prophet. As history progressed, however, a need arose to codify Islamic laws.

Through Abu Hanifa's efforts the first school of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) developed. Abu Hanifa was a firm believer that a code of laws cannot stay static for too long as it ran the risk of no longer meeting the needs of the people. Thus he advocated interpreting the sources of Islamic law (usul al-fiqh) in response to the needs of the people at the time. A major aspect of his methodology was the use of debate to derive rulings. He would commonly pose a legal issue to a group of his students, and challenge them to come up with a ruling based on the Quran and Sunna. Students would at first attempt to find the solution in the Quran. If it was not clearly

answered in the Qur'an, they would turn to the Sunna, and if it was not there, they would use reason to find a logical solution (see Dickinson 1996; Tsafirir, 1996; Nadwi, preface). Concurrently with the Hanafi rationalist school, the Mu'tazilah emerged as the challengers of mystical thoughts. Early Mu'tazilite scholars are distinguished from the Kharjites on the belief in the power of intellect as opposed to the Kharijite belief in the power of the sword. Thus, they established and developed what became known as *Ilm al-Kalam*, which reflected the intellectual legacy of the Mu'tazilites and their substantial efforts to form reasonable theoretical bases that identified what they believed to be true Islamic thought based on reasonable argument that could be rationally defended and explained and thus capable of facing the theoretical challenge of opponents. The adherents of the Mu'tazili school asserted that the perfect unity and eternal nature of Allah is evidence that the Qur'an must have been created. From this premise, the Mu'tazili school of Kalam proceeded to posit that the injunctions of God are accessible to rational thought and inquiry. Accordingly, since knowledge is derived from reason, reason is the "final arbiter" in distinguishing right from wrong. It follows, in Mu'tazili reasoning; that "sacred precedent" is not an effective means of determining what is just, as what is obligatory in religion is only obligatory by virtue of reason". (See al-Attar 2009, pp. 44-62, Griffie 1971).

Modern Moderate Waves

According to Amir, Shuriye & Isamil (2012, p. 66), "Muhammad 'Abduh is the first advocate and pioneer of Islamic reform in Egypt and a great modernist of the 20th century with immense contribution to the revival and reform of Islamic intellectual thought and movement. The principle characteristic of reform movement inaugurated by 'Abduh was chiefly determined by three individuals: Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad 'Abduh, and Muhammad Rashid Rida."

Muhammad 'Abduh (1849 - 1905) was an Egyptian Islamic jurist, religious scholar and liberal reformer, regarded as one of the key founding figures of Islamic Modernism sometimes called Neo-Mu'tazilism after the Medieval Islamic Mu'tazilah. He broke the rigidity of the Muslim ritual kerygma. He wrote among other things, "Treatise on the Oneness of God", and a commentary on the Qur'an. In 1899, he was appointed Mufti of Egypt, the highest Islamic title, and he held this position until he died. As a judge, he was involved in many decisions, some of which were considered liberal such as the ability to utilize meat butchered by non-Muslims and the acceptance of loan interest. He travelled a great deal and met with European scholars in Cambridge and Oxford University. He studied French law and read a great many European and Arab works in the libraries of Vienna and Berlin. The conclusions he drew from his travels were that Muslims suffer from ignorance about their own religion and the despotism of unjust rulers. Abduh argued that Muslims could not simply rely on the interpretations of texts provided by medieval clerics; they needed to use reason to keep up with changing times. He said that in Islam man was not created to be led by a bridle, man was given intelligence so that he could be guided by knowledge. His Muslim opponents refer to him as an infidel; on the contrary, his followers called him a sage, a reviver of religion and a reforming leader. (See Hourani, pp. 130-160).

Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935) was deeply influenced by the Salafi movement founded by Abduh. Rida is said to have been one of the most influential and controversial scholars of his generation. Rida was critical of what he termed "blind following" of traditional Islam. He encouraged both laymen and scholars to interpret the primary sources of Islam themselves. Applying this principle enabled Rida to tackle a number of subjects in a modern way and sometimes led him to hold unorthodox ideas that were considered controversial by some and progressive by others. The controversial beliefs held by Rida included his view that usury (*riba*) may be permitted in certain cases, that building statues is permissible in Islam as long as there is no danger of their being devoted to improper religious uses, and his support of the British against the Ottomans. Rida's ideas were foundational to the development of the modern "Islamic state". He "was an important link between classical theories of the caliphate, and 20th-century notions of the Islamic state". Rida promoted a restoration or rejuvenation of the Caliphate for Islamic unity, and "democratic consultation on the part of the government, which he called *shura*. In theology, his reformist ideas, like those of Abduh, were based on the argument that *shari'a* consists of *'ibadat* (worship) and *mu'amalat* (social relations). In one hand, Muslims should adhere to the dictates of the Qur'an and hadith. On the other hand, the laws governing *mu'amalat* should conform to Islamic ethics but on specific points may be continually reassessed according to changing conditions of different

generations and societies. he did not call for the revolutionary establishment of an Islamic state, rather advocating gradual reforms of the existing Ottoman government (see Mahdi, 2014, p. 2).

Ali Abdel Razzaq (1888-1966) was the scholar who articulated the Islamic moderate wave methodically and propose a clear zone of the role of religion in Islamic societies. His 1925 book *Islam and the Foundations of Governance* argued against a role for religion in politics or the political prescriptive value of religious texts. He argued that Islamic texts were and should remain neutral in political debate and civil institution building. He attended Oxford University and was a scholar and jurist at al-Azhar University in Cairo. The years that followed the popular debate on his 1925 book, al-Azhar stripped him of his office. The years that followed Abdel Razzaq's *Islam and the Foundations of Governance* and Taha Hussein's *The Pre-Islamic Poetry*, the ideological debates have been dampened; the secular wave has been suppressed, while the religious wave has risen. The post-debate has been a debate of resources not ideas. The religious wave has dominated the scene, especially, after the discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia and Gulf states, moreover, the Saudi adoption of fundamentalist movements around the world. Over time, these movements developed their own resources and strategies and imposed their organizational culture and will on society. These movements, in its turn, apply their own coercive methods of suppressing all other social forces using violent, criminal, and terrorist tactics.

Modern Radical Islamic Waves

According to Emerson (2008, p. 1), The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) (al-Ikwan al-Muslimun), was founded as an Islamic revivalist movement in the Egyptian town of Isma'ilia in March 1929 by a school teacher Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949). Al-Banna endeavored to bring about the changes he hoped for through institution-building, relentless activism at the grassroots level, and a reliance on mass communication. Al-Banna relied on pre-existing social networks, in particular, those built around mosques, Islamic welfare associations, and neighborhood groups. This weaving of traditional ties into a distinctively modern structure was at the root of his success. Directly attached to the brotherhood, and feeding its expansion, were numerous businesses, clinics, and schools. The services and organizational structure around which the society was built were intended to enable individuals to reintegrate into a distinctly Islamic setting, shaped by the MB's principles. Writing in 1980, Ibrahim (p. 640) notes that "In its sixty years, the Brotherhood has managed to politicise (*sic*) Islam as no other indigenous popular movement has ever done in Egypt's history." Prime Minister Nukrashi Pasha disbanded the MB in December 1948 due to its vast growth and popularity which made it a menace to government. The organization's assets were impounded and scores of its members sent to jail. A student belongs to the MB assassinated Nukrashi Pasha in December 28, 1948. Although al-Banna condemned the killers and denied any connection to them, he was shot and killed in 1949 (see *ibid*). The Secret Apparatus, which Al-Banna established to be the military wing of the MB was uncovered in 1948 following the so call the "jeep incident"; the Egyptian Secret Police seized an automobile which contained various kinds of documents and evidence pertaining to the Secret Apparatus including infamous assassinations carried out during the monarchist era (see Al-Zayadi Mashari, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat newspaper, <https://eng-archive.aawsat.com/mshari-al-zaydi/opinion/opinion-the-return-of-the-muslim-brotherhoods-secret-apparatus> cited on May 25, 2018). The Secret Apparatus affair marked the beginning of the modern radical waves that still propagates to these days as shown in figure (2).

Ala Maududi formulated active radicalism In *his Jihad fi Sabilillah*, which became one of the fundamental sources of Islamic extremists, particularly in Egypt. Ala Maududi (*ibid*, pp. 13-14) states' "Those who propagate religion are not merely preachers or "missionaries; they are the functionaries of Allah (so that they may be witnesses for the people, and it is their duty to wipe out oppression, wrongdoing, strife, immorality, arrogance and unlawful exploitation from the world by force of arms. It is their objective to shatter the myth of the divinity of "demi-gods" and false deities and to reinstate good in the place of evil". Laurent Murawiec in his *The Mind of Jihad* (2008, p. 258) suggests that Ala Maududi is, one of the most influential figures of Sunni radicalism in the 20th century." However, Murawiec argues of the confluence of Ala-Maududi and Leninist-Marxist ideologies. According to Murawiec (p. 17), "Based on his sociopolitical reading of the Quran, Maududi redefined Islam from faith to ideology and converted religion into a mass movement fostering the drama of world Islamic Revolution." In order to carry out his Islamic revolutionary ambitions, Maududi founded Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) in 1941 to promote Islamic values and practices. Maududi believed that the sovereignty of God (*hakimiya*) and

the sovereignty of the people are mutually exclusive. Maududi believed that the Islamic state should not be limited to just the "homeland of Islam". It is for the entire world. 'Jihad' should be used to eliminate un-Islamic rule and establish the worldwide Islamic state.




Figure 2. Modern Islamic Radical Waves

Maududi's ideas have had a great influence on the notable Egyptian radical thinker Sayyid Qutb, particularly the Maududian's notion of *Hakimia* (God's Sovereignty). Qutb is best known in the Muslim world for his work on what he believed to be the social and political role of Islam, particularly in his book *Social Justice in Islam*, late in his life, Qutb synthesized his personal experiences and intellectual development in his famous *Milestones*, a religious and political manifesto for what he believed was a true Islamic system. This work, more than any other, established Qutb as one of, if not the premier radical Islamists of the 20th century. Throughout his *Milestones*, Qutb argues that Muslims should resist any system where men are in "servitude to other men as un-Islamic and a violation of God's sovereignty (*Hakimiya*) over all of creation. The way to bring about this freedom was for a revolutionary vanguard to fight *jahiliyya* (he calls the pre-Islamic era *jahiliyya*; ignorance in Arabic) with a twofold approach: preaching, and abolishing the organizations and authorities of the *Jahili* system by "physical power and Jihad." The vanguard movement would grow with preaching and jihad until it formed a truly Islamic community, then spread throughout Islamic homeland and finally throughout the entire world, attaining leadership of humanity. Qutb insists on "the necessity of revolution as the only proper remedy for decaying societies. *Zalzalab* (shaking/earthquake) or revolution is the word used to describe the first step in the process of building a new society." Prophet Muhammad led the greatest revolution, Qutb argues, and this should be repeated. He calls for "the comprehensive revolution in the government of man in all its forms, shapes, systems and situations, and the complete rebellion against every situation on the whole earth." (see *Milestones* 2007, pp. 69-71).

Qutb had influence on Islamic insurgent/terror groups in Egypt and elsewhere. One of Qutb's followers is Ayman Zawahiri, who paid homage to Qutb in his work *Knights under the Prophet's Banner*. Zawahiri became the ideological mentor of Osama Bin Laden and the Chief of al-Qaeda organization after the liquidation of Bin Laden on March 2, 2011. The impact of Qutb ideology was influential long before the founding of al-Qaeda organization. The Qutbist ideology influenced another powerful figure in the Jihadist network, Muhammad abd-al-Salam Faraj (1954-1982). Faraj was an Egyptian revolutionary and theorist who embodied the Qutbist ideas and led the Cairo branch of the Islamist group al-jihad and made a significant 'contribution' in elevating the role of jihad in radical Islam with his book *The Absent obligation*. He was executed in 1982 for his role in coordinating the assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat the previous year. Faraj argued that modern Muslims had specifically neglected jihad, which he placed after the five Islamic pillars as the most important aspect of Islam. He followed Qutb in arguing that jihad was a *fard al-ayn* (an individual duty incumbent upon every Muslim). He built on Qutb's idea that modern Islamic societies represented *Jahiliyya*, and used the ideas of ibn Taymiyya to blame this on modern "apostate" Islamic rulers. In his turn, Shukri Mustafa (1942-1978), led the extremist Islamist group *Jama'at al-Muslimin*, popularly known as *Takfir wal-Hijra*. Mustafa began his

path toward Islamist thoughts by joining the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1960s. After being arrested for activities related to the group he became interested in the works of Qutb and other radical thinkers. After being released in 1971 he gathered followers and withdrew from contemporary society. By 1976 Shukri's followers numbered two thousand, mostly living in poor neighborhoods of Cairo. He was executed in 1978 after kidnapping and killing the Egyptian minister of religious affairs Mohammad al-Dhahabi.

The Model

I argue that the repetitive alternating behaviors of radical-moderate waves in Islamic history maintained a dynamic equilibrium of Islamic societies and prevented the monopoly of a single group over the interpretation of Islam. According to Pain (1978, p.239), “Any function which repeats itself regularly over a given period of time is called a periodic function as shown in figure (3). This may be expressed by writing it as $f(x) = f(x \mp \alpha)$, Where α is the interval or period.” According to (ibid), any periodic function may be approximated by equation (1) using the Fourier series method, $f(x) = a_0 + \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} (a_n \cos \frac{n\pi x}{L} + b_n \sin \frac{n\pi x}{L}) \dots(1)$

that is, a constant plus sine and cosine terms of different amplitudes, having frequencies which increase in discrete steps.




Figure 3

I utilize the logic of this model in the analysis of the radical-moderate conflict in Islamic history during the period from the mid-600s to 2015. Let’s assume that the radical forces represent the sine waveform and the moderates forces represent the cosine waveform in the periodic function. The period from the mid 600s to the late 1940s represents coexistence of both wave-forms. Although there were profound contradictions between Islamic radicals and moderates during that period, neither group was able to eliminate the other from the functional form. Thus, their development trajectories follow the superposition principle of two simple harmonic vibrations in one dimension as represented in Equation (2) and Figure (4) (see Pain, p.12; Zitzewitz 2005 et al., p.388).

$$f(x) = a_0 + a_1 \cos x + a_2 \cos 2x + \dots + a_n \cos nx + b_1 \sin x + b_2 \sin 2x + \dots + b_n \sin nx \dots(2)$$

Radical Wave	Radical Function	Moderate Waves	Moderate Function
The Kharijites	$b_1 \sin x$	The Mu'tazilites	$a_1 \cos x$
Ibn Hanbal	$b_2 \sin 2x$	Al-fghani	$a_2 \cos 2x$
Al-Ghazali	$b_3 \sin 3x$	Abduh	$a_3 \cos 3x$
Ibn Taymiyyah	$b_4 \sin 4x$	Rida	$a_4 \cos 4x$
Ibn Abe Al-Wahab	$b_5 \sin 5x$	Abdel Razzaq	$a_5 \cos 5x$
Al-Banna	$b_6 \sin 6x$	Hussein	$a_6 \cos 6x$

Figure 4

Damping and the Convergence of Radical Sequence

Damping is an influence within or upon an oscillatory system that has the effect of reducing, restricting or preventing its oscillations (see Pain 1978, pp. 29-37; Halliday, Resnick & Walker, pp.397-98). For the purpose of this study, we define damping as an influence that attenuates the Islamic moderates wave, and sustains the

constant motion of the Islamic radicals wave. Figure (4) represents the damping of the moderate wave from the late 1970s to 2015.

The external influence that dampened the moderate secular forces is caused by wealthy regional actors: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Gulf States, and Turkey, or by cultural and education factors such as the madrasah's orientation in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Indonesia, and other part of the Islamic world, in addition to corrupt local governments in the Arab and Islamic world.




Figure 4. Damping Effect from late 1970s to 2015

The damping effect made the structure of the periodic function out of phase with the moderate wave as shown in Figure (6).




Figure 6

Consequently, the radical wave $f(x) = b_1 \sin x + b_2 \sin 2x + \dots + b_n \sin nx$, is the one that models the periodic function as shown in figure (7).

Graph (1) shows the levels of radicalism in Algeria, Bangladesh, Jordan, and graph 2 shows level of radicalism in Pakistan, Tunisia, and Turkey during the damping period 1980 – 2015. The victory of 'Islamic Jihadist' over the Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the late 1970 provided Islamic radical movements with great opportunity to propagandize their ideas and expand their recruiting abilities around the world. On the contrary, the secular forces had shrunk and lost any significant abilities on the ground. Thus, since 1980s the radical forces began its dominance of the political scene in the Middle East and succeeded in dictating their traditions over all niches of societies. Thus, the moderate waves has been eliminated as shown in figure (5).








Figure 7

Radical Waves	Radical Function	Moderate Waves	Moderate Function
Maududi	$b_1 \sin x$	0	0
Qutb	$b_2 \sin 2x$	0	0
Faraj	$b_3 \sin 3x$	0	0
Mustafa	$b_4 \sin 4x$	0	0
Alqeda	$b_5 \sin 5x$	0	0
Alqeda	$b_6 \sin 6x$	0	0
Alqeda(n)	$b_n \sin nx$	0	0

Figure 5



Graph 1. Level of radicalism for Algeria, Bangladesh, and Jordan



Graph 2. Level of radicalism for Pakistan, Tunisia, and Turkey

DATA

Data on radicalism are obtained from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The GTD defines a terrorist attack as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation. In practice this means in order to consider an incident for inclusion in the GTD, all three of the following attributes must be present: (1) the incident must be intentional – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator (2) the incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence -including property violence, as well as violence against people (3) the perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors. The database does not include acts of state terrorism. In addition, at least two of the following three criteria must be present for an incident to be included in the GTD: (a) the act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal. In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of profit does not satisfy this criterion. It must involve the pursuit of more profound, systemic economic change (b) there must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims. It is the act taken as a totality that is considered, irrespective if every individual involved in carrying out the act was aware of this intention. As long as any of the planners or decision-makers behind the attack intended to coerce, intimidate or publicize, the intentionality criterion is met. (3) the action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities. That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law (particularly the prohibition against deliberately targeting civilians or non-combatants). I construct the dependent variable (Radicalism) as a combination of five variables drawn from GTD, and a count variable (number of organizations) that I developed. The four GTD variables are: (1) casualties – number of people killed and injured in the attack (2) target type (3) weapon type (4) attack type, and (5) the number of terrorist organization in each country.

Data on military expenditures are drawn from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security are derived from NATO definition, which includes all current and capital expenditures on the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects; paramilitary forces, if these are judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and military space activities. Such expenditures include military and civil personnel, including retirement pensions of military personnel and social services for personnel; operation and maintenance; procurement; military research and development; and military aid (in the military expenditures of the donor country). Excluded are civil defense and current expenditures for previous military activities, such as those for veterans' benefits, demobilization, conversion, and destruction of weapons. Data on Gross Domestic Product per capita income (GDP per capita), Unemployment, and Urbanization are drawn from the World Bank- World Development Indicators. The GDP per capita is calculated by dividing the value of GDP over population of each conjugated year. The unemployment variable includes the percentage of the youth total labor force of age fifteen to twenty four years-old. And Urbanization is the urban population as percentage of the total population. Data on political regime type is obtained from POLITY-IV dataset as the difference between the score of democracy and autocracy. The variables social fitness and economic fitness are composite variables that obtained form systemicpeace.org, where, social fitness is composed of social efficiency and social legitimacy; and economic fitness is composed of economic efficiency and economic legitimacy.

RESULTS

I conducted three types of analysis: Random Effect GLS Regression Analysis (RE-GLS), Cross National Time-series analysis (Panel data analysis), and Vector Error Correction Model analysis (VECM). The Results of the RE-GLS model shows negative and significant impacts of urbanization, social fitness, and economic fitness on Islamic radicalism. On the other hand, the remaining variables: military spending, gross domestic product, unemployment, and type of political regime exert positive and significant influence on Islamic radicalism. The overall R-squared is 0.79, and the Probability -Chi-square is 0.00.

Table 1. Random Effect GLS Regression Analysis of Islamic Radicalism

Radicalism			
<i>Variables</i>	Regression Coefficients	Standard Error	Significance
<i>Military Spending</i>	1927.10	129.31	0.000**
<i>Urbanization</i>	-312.05	30.86	0.000**
<i>GDP</i>	0.0025	0.011	0.034*
<i>Unemployment</i>	147.94	30.16	0.000**
<i>Regime Type</i>	206.09	53.49	0.000**
<i>Social fitness</i>	-1084.01	304.10	0.001**
<i>Economic Fitness</i>	-471.01	220.60	0.033*
<i>Constant</i>	11263.48	2509.69	0.000

R-Squared within = 0.052, between = 0.97, overall = 0.79

The results of the panel data analysis concur with the RE-GLS model: negative and significant impacts of urbanization, social fitness, and economic fitness on Islamic radicalism; on the contrary, military spending, gross domestic product, unemployment, and type of political regime exert positive and significant influence on Islamic radicalism. The R-squared is 0.79 and the adjusted R-squared is 0.77.

Table 2. Pool Analysis of Islamic Radicalism

Radicalism			
<i>Variables</i>	Regression Coefficients	Standard Error	Significance
<i>Military Spending</i>	1927.1	129.3	0.000**
<i>Urbanization</i>	-312.1	30.86	0.000**
<i>GDP</i>	.0025	.001	0.038*
<i>Unemployment</i>	147.94	30.16	0.000**
<i>Regime Type</i>	206.09	53.49	0.000**
<i>Social fitness</i>	-1084	304.1	0.001**
<i>Economic Fitness</i>	-471	220.6	0.036*
<i>Constant</i>	11263.5	2509.69	0.000**

Note: R-squared = 0.79, Adjusted R-Squared = 0.77, F (7, 68), Probability = 0.05

The results of the vector error correction model (VECM) are specific to Algeria. There is one co-integrated equation and the targeted variable here is radicalism. The speed of adjustment toward long run equilibrium is (-0.0803881) and it is highly significant. Thus, the results show significant long run causality running from Military spending, urbanization, and unemployment to radicalism. Also, the short run influence along the three lags is significant. However, the coefficients of short run three lags of radicalism are negatives. The short run of the Military spending is positive on first lag and negative on lags 2 and 3. The short run influence of Urbanization is negative on the second lag and positive on lags 1 and 3. The short run influence of unemployment is positive along all three lags. The number of observations is 16.

Table 3. VECM model for Algeria

<i>Radicalism</i>	Coefficients	Standard Error	Significance
<i>Ce1</i>			
<i>L1</i>	-0.0803881	0.01325508	0.000**
<i>Radicalism</i>			
<i>LD</i>	-2.363526	0.337535	0.000**
<i>L2D</i>	-0.7242717	0.0795553	0.000**
<i>L3D</i>	-1.446339	0.2495736	0.000**
<i>Military Spending</i>			
<i>LD</i>	587.3136	286.4827	0.040*
<i>L2D</i>	-3630.115	362.1223	0.000**
<i>L3D</i>	-4323.512	603.5903	0.000**
<i>Urbanization</i>			
<i>LD</i>	263732.8	45067.58	0.000**
<i>L2D</i>	-241901.8	41198.83	0.000**

<i>L3D</i>	10371.95	10213.43	0.310
<i>Unemployment</i>			
<i>LD</i>	142.0618	22.59706	0.000**
<i>L2D</i>	405.1802	64.29195	0.000**
<i>L3D</i>	279.7893	50.68236	0.000**
<i>Constant</i>	1.061998	2305.217	1.000

The Verse of the Sword and the Verse of Peace

One of the most frequently quoted Qur'anic verses is known as "the Verse of the Sword," which states, "when the sacred months have passed, then kill the polytheists wherever you find them and capture them and besiege them and sit in wait for them at every place of ambush. But if they should repent, establish prayer, and give zakah, let them [go] on their way. Indeed, Allah is Forgiving and Merciful" (Qur'an:9-5). Muslim terrorists cite the verse of the sword to legitimize their violent activities. Correspondingly, critics of Islam claim that it commands Muslims to act with offensive aggression towards the non-Muslims of that period, and contributes to Islam's final theological doctrine of aggression towards all non-Muslims of all times. The verse of the sword" has become the most prominent verse in the terrorist literature after it had been popularized by Muhammad abd-al-Salam Faraj in his *The Absent Obligation*. Faraj mentioned the word "sword" thirteen times in his booklet. In order to convey the message of violence further, Faraj cited Prophet Muhammad's Hadiths and Islamic religious authorities. According to Faraj (ibid, p.14), "there is no doubt that the tyrants of this earth will only be removed by the might of the sword". Faraj (ibid) added, "and that is why the Prophet said: "I have been sent before the Hour with the sword until Allah is worshipped alone with no partner, and my sustenance has been placed underneath the shade of my spear, and the disgrace and the abasement have been inflicted on those that oppose my command, and whoever imitates a people is one of them." Defenders of Islam argue that these verses are taken out of contexts. Notwithstanding, the verses provide radical ideologues with fertile ground supporting their claims of using violence in the "path of God".

On October 6, 1981, the whole world realized that *The Absent Obligation* was not abstract words, but rather sharp swords that can mute voices of peace and reason. Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat was assassinated at the hands of four military officers during a military parade. President Sadat frequently cited the Qur'anic verse of peace (Qur'an 9:16) in his speeches, "And if they incline to peace, then incline to it [also] and rely upon Allah. Indeed, it is He who is the Hearing, the Knowing." In effect, terrorist activities have defined Islamic religion, and Islamic terrorism has become the dominant paradigm in the Arab and Islamic world. Unfortunately, this paradigm hasn't encountered significant reactive condemnation by Islamic religious authorities and scholars.

CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The second half of the 20th century witnessed the rise of powerful Islamic radical ideologues, such as Ala Maududi, Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah Azzam, and Abd al-Salam Faraj. The influences of these ideologues have surpassed the boundaries of religious organizations and pervaded Middle Eastern societal strata. The influences of radical ideas have manifested in education, civil associations, social behaviors, dress codes, and ultimately terrorist activities. The proliferation and sustainability of Islamic terrorist organizations in the Middle East since the 1980s attest that radical organizations have grown within societal sectors. Thus, Islamic terrorist organizations reflect one side of the structural deformations of Middle Eastern societies. The other tragic side is the inability of Middle Eastern societies to develop a significant "Thermidorian Reaction" to the "reign of terror" of Islamic organizations. The scarcity of Islamic voices that condemned the horrors and aberrant practices of Islamic terrorist organizations indicates that there is a paradigmatic shift of Middle Eastern societies toward radical interpretation of Islam.

It is generally recognized that a prolonged process of ideological inculcation, indoctrination, and damping makes the reversal process extremely vexatious, and hard. Modern Islamic radicalism has continued to evolve since the early 1950s. Several events, such as the Cold War, the Saudi-Egyptian conflict in the 1960s, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iranian revolution in 1979, offered ample opportunities for Islamic radicals to train, arm, recruit, and expand regionally and internationally. Islamists have tightened their grips on the

institutions of mosques, schools, syndicates, zakat, and almsgiving. In other words, Islamic radicalism has used society as a hostage by using the powers of swords and rewards.

It is urgent for secular civil societies to join the effort to end the religious radicals' monopolies on social institutions including mosques, labor unions, professional syndicates, and media. Middle Eastern states must use their resources to regain control of academic and cultural institutions and impede Islamic radical forces from using them as propaganda outlets. It is essential for Middle Eastern governments to regain control of social welfare programs in order to create mutual trust with their citizens and gain their loyalty. Enlightened citizens are critical frontiers of security. Promoting political participation increases the sense of belonging and contain religious radical influences.

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