

RELIGION AND CULTURE: The Dynamics of Religious Life among the Muslim Community in Peresak Village, Sakra, East Lombok

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Abstract

Lombok is a region of Indonesia known as the island of a thousand mosques. The Lombok Islamic community also respects the religious practices taught by the ulama. However, on November 14 2010, a mosque in Peresak, Sakra, East Lombok Regency was attacked by fellow Muslims. This article aims to understand the occurrence of attacks on mosques by fellow Muslims and their resolution. Based on observations and in-depth interviews using conflict and integration theory, this research found that there were differences in religious practices between the Salafi As-Sunnah group and the local community, which were exacerbated by certain political interests. Through a cultural approach, each group realizes that the meaning of religion not only regulates the relationship between humans and God but also between humans. This research is useful for providing inspiration for stakeholders in maintaining harmonious relations between religious communities.

Keywords: Religion. Culture. Conflict, Harmony, Dynamic

INTRODUCTION

Indonesia's unique characteristic lies in its multiculturalism, religiosity, and diversity in ethnicities and tribal languages. While these features are advantageous, they make this country more prone to conflict. In Lombok, for example, intolerance against other religious views and practices led to violent clashes. Conflict is social interaction at odds due to physical, emotional, and cultural differences and dissociative behavior (Kamarulzaman et al., 2021). Since Indonesia became a nation-state, this issue has never been fully resolved. Recently, one of the main factors that trigger social conflict is religious intolerance, either in inter-religious or intra-religious scope. In the past decades, Indonesia has witnessed the proliferation of Islamic movements and competing religious doctrines developed from an ideological basis and strategies which are different from existing Islamic social organizations (Syahnan & Ja'far, 2021). Internal conflicts among Muslim communities in this country include hostilities between *Mubammadiyah* and NU, *Ahmadiyah* and non-*Ahmadiyah*, Sunni and Shite, JIL (Islamic Liberal Network) and non-JIL, FPI (Islam Defending Front) and the local community.

The internal conflict among Muslims has also been increasing in Lombok, particularly in Peresak Village, District of Sakra, East Lombok, and West Nusa Tenggara. It is ironic since people of this region are well-known for their high level of religiosity. Lombok itself is popularly called a thousand-mosque island. Also, Lomboknese, in general, highly respect local wisdom and traditions. The tragedy on Monday, November 14th, 2010 was very shocking for Peresak and East Lombok villagers as the Ahmadiyya mosque was under siege and destroyed by the masses. They threw the mosque with stones and demanded that it be demolished. It was an unforeseen event for some parties since the villagers of Peresak were Muslims, and they complied with religious teachings.

Since the Indonesian Reformation in 1998, various ideologies and religious doctrines emerged, establishing numerous Islamic organizations (Assyaukanie, n.d.). One of them is *Salafi As-Sunnah*. Each Islamic organization rises with its respective characteristics, vision, and mission and attracts loyalists seeking their identity. The dissimilitude with the support of their loyalists often causes friction or conflict. This article examines the dynamic social relations between *Salafi As-Sunnah* adherents and the local community in Peresak Village. The writer seeks to understand the meaning of religion for the Lomboknese and to make sense of how religion can simultaneously be the source of conflict and harmony.

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Scholars have extensively researched religious conflicts, including communal and sectarian conflicts, as well as ones escalated by politics. The different views of inter-religious groups potentially cause communal conflict. The Maluku sectarian conflict between 1999 and 2000 is valid evidence of this (Safi Jamin, 2017). It began with a dispute between a Christian public transport driver and a Muslim from Batu Merah Bugis but then turned into a religious conflict between Muslims and Christians in the area. Also, the conflict between *Ahmadiyah* and other sects escalated from 2005 until 2015 (Rasyid, 2016). Based on the research performed by the Research and Development Center of Short Course (Balitbang Diklat) in the Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia, there were 12 cases of sectarian conflict in 2019.

Meanwhile, religious conflict due to political escalation is increasing because of conflict of interest among political parties or groups in seizing power. Some illegitimate managers of the religious-social organization usually take their institution name in supporting specific political power (Sembiring et al., 2023). Moreover, certain political parties actively support religious-social organizations directly supporting their power. This situation uses religion as political interest and power, meaning it can dismiss humanity in the name of political difference. The politicization of religion occurred in Indonesia during the general election and local elections between 2017 and 2019 (Pamungkas & Arifin, 2019).

In addition, the research related to religious conflict happened in Pasaman Barat and Dharmasraya, West Sumatra. The conflict was due to Regional Regulation that obliged permit to establish Christian church and Muslim outfit for all students and employees (Burhanuddin et al., 2020). In fact, of 10 churches existing in this region, only one church had a permit. This situation caused communal conflict since the minority of Christian was deemed non-compliance with the existing local regulation. Also, the partial implementation of regulation to wear Muslim outfits for students and employees as drafted in the Regional Regulation of 2003 had vulnerably caused religious conflict. Thus, all parties, mainly governmental officers, must be sensitive to conflict potency.

Zuhdi conducted another research related to religious conflict in East Nusa Tenggara. According to Zuhdi, the Province of East Nusa Tenggara is considered potential for radical and terrorist groups due to the misinterpretation of Islam by a network of terrorist groups, such as Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia Timur. Furthermore, the emergence of radical and terrorist groups as the source of conflict is also caused by the reluctance of moderate Muslims to provide awareness to the terrorist group (Zuhdi, 2019).

RESEARCH METHODS

Different from the previous studies, this research tries to focus on the conflict of religious life in Peresak Village, District of Sakra, East Lombok. The religious conflict in this community is too complex. It is not only due to communal and sectarian conflict but also caused by political escalation. Further, the research analyzes the underlying factors that caused religious conflict in East Lombok and how conflict settlement was conducted to prevent a prolonged dispute.

The inter-religious relationship is closely related to the differing views or attitudes of an individual and a group. The difference often causes various communal conflicts. A difference can uphold and maintain the identities and limits of a social group (Bate et al., 2022). This means that there is a connection between conflict, morals, religion and ritual (Setiawan et al., 2020). The difference can dismiss disintegration elements and re-uphold unity among conflicting parties. The correlation among those elements is mutually connected in society and does not destroy the social system. Human clashes in a particular social context can affirm the social system (Holland, 2023). The adhesive of the social system is tradition performed by society.

Community groups that have differences are actually related to each other in a complementary way and are together in the wider social structure of society. This social structure is bound by the culture of society (Vertovec, 2021). During a conflict, the integrated condition occurs among different believers. The integration is conducted by organizing and establishing created symbols or activities. The organization of the existing differences depends on elements of social structure, such as social identity, social situation, social classification, and social roles (McDoom, 2019).

Methodologically, the research employed the participant observation method through staying with the community at the research site for a month to comprehend the religious life and community culture of Peresak

Village, District of Sakra, Regency of East Lombok. Further, the in-depth interview is conducted with some selected informants and the public, actively and directly involved in various events of local religious life.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Salafi Movement in East Lombok

Salafi Movement developed in Nusantara during the Colonial period of the 18th Century. One of the outstanding *Salafi* movements during the Netherland colonialization was Paderi. This movement caused the Battle of Paderi led by Tuanku Nan Tuo from Koto Tuo Angkek Candung in West Sumatera (1784-1803). Various sources stated that the movement was influenced by pilgrimages of Nusantara, domiciling and learning in Makkah, and Islam reformists in Egypt (Syafriana, 2021).

The following development of Islam reformation gave birth to various Islam organizations, such as *Muhammadiyah* (1912), *Syarikat Islam* (1912), *Al Iryyad* (1914), *Jong Islamiten Bond* (1925), and *Persatuan Islam* (1923). Principally, these organizations aimed to request Muslim to leave religious practices not deriving from the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Also, followers of these movements suggested that Muslims in Nusantara immediately release from religious practices that contradict Islam. Such practices were believed as *bid'ah*, *keburafat*, and *taqlid*. They proposed that Muslims take *ijtihad* and return to pure teachings as the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) did.

The *Salafi* movement had Islam's fundamentalist-radical ideology (Arifin, 2017). There were minimally seven doctrines of *Salafi* as their basic movement, such as 1) return to the Koran and Hadith, 2) *Taubid*, 3) *Ablus Sunnah wal jamaah*, 4) *al-wala' wa al-barr*, 5) rejecting *hiz'biyah* or sectarian, 6) *hakimiyah* or God sovereignty, and 7) *Jihad*. In line with Indonesian Independence on August 17th, 1945, the fundamentalist-radical *Salafi* movement shifted and turned more moderate. It was caused by the approval of the initial figures of *Salafi* in Indonesia to the first pillar of Pancasila, such as One God, which replaced the Jakarta Charter, stating Divinity by performing Sharia for its followers. Since then, the preaching of the *Salafi* group was not directly aimed at the public since it was against the provisions of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (Ali-fauzi & Paramadina, 2023).

In 1980, as King Saud University opened its branch in Jakarta under Arabic Teaching Institution, there was contact between followers of *Salafi* ideology. The opening of this institution was an effort to spread Salafi teachings to the Islam world through educational institutions, such as universities, higher schools, or institutes.

The changing of Islam's character in *Salafi* continuously happened from the period of Indonesian independence to the end of the New Order in 1998. Since the post-Suharto regime, the reformation era in Indonesia had brought a new wave of the birth of the contemporary Salafi movement. In line with government policy on freedom of speech in public life, the development and spreading of Islam *Salafi* in Nusa Tenggara intensified at a high level (Sosiologi et al., 2012). Since 2000, there have been Salafi-based education institutions and religion studies, such as Pesantren Abu Hurairah, Pondok Pesantren Abu Dzar al-Ghifari, Pondok Pesantren Darus Syifa, and Pesantren al-Madinah.

The first figure teaching *Salafi* in West Nusa Tenggara was Ustaz Akhmad Khumaidi and Ustaz Sufyan Bafein Zein. Both figures stayed in Makkah and continued their study at LIPIA (Islamic and Arabic Science Institution), Jakarta. In 2004, they came to Lombok to teach *Salafi*. In presenting their teachings, both *ustaz* blamed various religious practices performed by the local majority. They prohibited the celebration of *Maulid Nabi Muhammad SAW*, conducted by most Muslims in Lombok. This activity was considered an exaggeration and caused poverty. Local traditions, such as *nelung*, *mitub*, and *nyiwah*, performed to commemorate the deaths were forbidden, and foods provided during these events were haram. Sending prayers to the deaths was also prohibited due to an unclear theorem.

The prominent social life of these people was their exclusivity to other Islam followers. Their religious doctrine was solid, and they believed their group was the truest. The *Salafi* group considered that other groups were misleading, *bid'ah*, and not following the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH); and they had to be re-directed to the right path by following *Salafi* teachings. Their exclusive attitude caused pros and cons among

the community of Lombok since the people of Lombok had embraced Islam and followed their charismatic master teacher (*tuan guru*) or Islam scholars (*ulama*) long before Salafi came.

In his preaching, *ustaz* Akhmad Khumaidi formed a *taklim* assembly, called as *As-Sunnah*, in the mosque of his father's inheritance in West Lombok. Initially, this assembly was only a hundred people, but it was outnumbered until East Lombok. In East Lombok, *ustaz* Sufyan Bafein Zein and Salafi followers established *Pondok Pesantren As-Sunnah* in the Village of Bagek Nyaka, District of Aikmel. *Pondok Pesantren As-Sunnah* developed tremendously where its students (*santri*) came from various areas in Nusa Tenggara, Java, and other islands in Indonesia. Most Islam teachers (*ustaz*) in *Pondok As-Sunnah* were alumni from the Middle East. Only a tiny portion of alums came from a university in Indonesia. Globally famous scientists in Islamic studies visited *Pondok As-Sunnah* in East Lombok. In 2011, *Pondok As-Sunnah* was granted operating permits from the Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia, starting from Kindergarten, Elementary, Junior High School, and Senior High School until University or *Ma'had Ali*. *Pondok As-Sunnah* had a preaching (da'wah) radio channel to improve its preaching program.

Conflict of Salafi As Sunnah in East Lombok

After establishing the Islamic Religion Center (*Pondok Pesantren*) and massive development in the Village of Bagek Nyaka, District of Aikmel, the group of Salafi As-Sunnah promoted its teachings in the Village of Peresak, District of Sakra. Similar to other areas, the emergence of the Salafi group was accompanied by upheaval in society since this group was considered bothersome and undesirable. Not once did the horizontal conflict occur between the community and Salafi group. Figures of Salafi As-Sunnah were inspired to “purify” the religious faith of the local community as they claimed full of bid'ah (Koadhi, 2018).

From various teachings, mainly related to religious practices and issues, the Salafi group judged that tradition believed and inherently conducted by the local community was wrong and bid'ah. For example, according to the Salafi group, tarawih praying could be only conducted eight raka'ah, not twenty raka'ah, and dzikir jahr was unnecessary. They prohibited the celebration of Maulid Muhammad, traditional ceremony or zikr to the deaths on the third day (nelung), seventh day (mitu), and ninth day (nyiwa), and foods served during these traditional ceremonies were haram by fiqh (Faizah, 2012).

The Muslim community of Sasak was relatively religious, but they were firm in upholding their local tradition. There were always cultural elements inserted in the religious practices of the community of Sasak. Islam's adaptation to local culture always developed from time to time. Generally, both aspects could not contradict Sasak Muslims in terms of a dichotomy. They preferred the collaborative-creative Islam model, symbolized by their reluctance to eliminate local tradition. In contrast, Sasak Muslims still appreciated a means of critical-acculturation way, so moderate Islam emerged. This condition was preserved in line with the characteristics of Islam deployment in Lombok. Religious teachings were conveyed gradually in line with their ability to receive. It was a non-negating cultural dialogue and adaptation model.

At first, the majority of the community of Peresak followed teachings massively developed in West Nusa Tenggara, such as comprehension developed by Nahdlatul Wathan and Nahdlatul Ulama. By the beginning of 2004, one of the local religious leaders, Ustaz ID introduced the ideology of As-Sunnah to the people of Peresak mosque. Some interested people were invited to follow Islamic learning in *Pondok Pesantren As-Sunnah*, Village of Bagek Nyaka, District of Aikmel. During this study, religious practices conducted by the community of Peresak deviated from the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). After this event, Ustaz ID always reminded the people of Peresak mosque after maghrib praying to leave ancestor teachings against Islam. He wanted to return the pure teachings of Islam to the Village of Peresak. It means Muslims in the Village of Peresak would be saved from ancestor teachings.

There were many differences between As-Sunnah and non-As Sunnah, such as preaching (da'wah) model, religious doctrine, and daily worship practices. These accumulated differences resulted in suspiciousness, jealousy, and tension among various groups. In addition, these worsened due to several other factors, such as competition of influence, politics, and the economy (Islam et al., 2023).

The striking difference between the people of *As-Sunnah* and non-*As-Sunnah* was visible in their physical appearances. Men had a beard and wore third-quarter pants or cloth. Half of their forehead was black like a mark of *sujud*. They wore *gamis* (Arabic clothing style) and white *peci* (beret). Women usually wore an ample black hijab covering half of their bodies. Some of them wore *niqabs*, gloves, and socks. The doctrine of going back to the Koran and Hadith had become a slogan for the group of *As-Sunnah* (Baharuddin & Zain, 2019). In their studies, they always conveyed back to "pure" Islam by performing worship in line with what the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) did.

A textual religious doctrine did not provide the opportunity to interpret verse or hadith contextually, especially when it had contact with local wisdom and culture considered deviating from Islamic culture. The impacts of this literal doctrine turned its followers exclusive and anti-social (Inayatillah et al., 2022). Usually, the first step conducted by the people of *As-Sunnah* in spreading their ideology was taking over the possession of the grand mosque.

Ustaz ID and some people who were interested and believed in the teachings of *Salafi As-Sunnah* invited ustaz from *Pondok Pesantren As-Sunnah* to provide religious study in the mosque of Peresak. Initially, the Islamic learning presented by Ustaz H from *Pondok As-Sunnah* ran well without any issues. The given materials were only limited to general Islamic teachings. However, in the third meeting and so forth, ustaz from *Pondok Pesantren As-Sunnah* started to criticize religious traditions followed by the local community. Ustaz H firmly stated that the inherited customs and traditions of the community of Peresak were *bid'ah*. According to Islam, all traditions conducted by the community of Peresak, such as the celebration of *Maulid*, traditional ceremonies, *dzikir* to the deaths on the third day (*nelung*), the seventh day (*mitu*), and the ninth day (*nyiva*), were forbidden due to the absent of hadith. Furthermore, it was haram for those who ate foods served during those ceremonies. Knowing that they performed religious practices considered haram, the people of the mosque started uncomfortably with the statement of Ustaz H.

Though they disagreed with the materials and method of preaching by Ustaz *As-Sunnah*, they still attended the sermons. It was due to their reluctance to Ustaz ID considered the leader of Islam teaching. For various reasons, some people of the mosque did not come to the religious study presented by Ustaz *As-Sunnah*. It did not change the materials and method of preaching by Ustaz *As-Sunnah*. Contrastingly, the materials and methods of preaching by Ustaz *As-Sunnah* bothered the local community. Particularly as Ustaz H had started to blame ancestors and master teachers (*tuan guru*) for teaching Islam since the beginning of the community of Peresak. This situation continued several times, and the people of the mosque were non-sympathy and left the religious study presented by Ustaz *As-Sunnah*.

Public unrest increased at the end of 2006 when Ustaz ID led the prayer and said *basmalah* in a low voice (*sir*). Whereas so far people know that the priest of prayer must say *basmalah* loudly (*jabr*). The *As-Sunnah*, represented by Ustaz ID, insisted that the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) said *basmalah* in a low voice. However, on the one hand, *non-Sunnah* also does not want to give in; they still defend their opinion that *basmalah* should be read loudly (*jahr*). As a result, a debate arose between the *As-Sunnah* and *non-Sunnah*. According to one source, the conflict between the communities was also exacerbated when one of the *As-Sunnah* worshipers died and was going to be prayed at the Grand Mosque (village mosque) but was not allowed by *non-Sunnah* community. From this incident, the desire of the *As-Sunnah* to build their own mosque came up.

According to K, tensions between the *As-Sunnah* and the local community often occur, even more than 10 times in the last 2 years. The matter is differences in views on the issue related to customs and the problem of *kebilafiyah* in Islam. When tensions occur, usually the village government and leaders from both parties can make a peace agreement, but after a while, there is another conflict. Finally, the village government allowed the *As-Sunnah* to build their own mosque. The village government also took the initiative for the task of preachers and imams for Friday prayers to be imported directly from Sakra to the Peresak Mosque. This was done to avoid the reoccurrence of tension. Even in carrying out *da'wah*, the village government also prohibits *As-Sunnah* from using loudspeakers. These various methods were carried out as an effort to prevent conflicts that might emerge.

Since then, different worship between both groups was seen and led to social life. According to the confession of Mr. P, the relationship between the people of *As-Sunnah* and Non-*As Sunnah* was still opposed in 2012. When one of the members of *As-Sunnah* died, the people of *As-Sunnah* had to bury him. Meanwhile, the group of Non-*As Sunnah* was permitted to attend the funeral if they were the nuclear family of the corpse. Another example was in marriage. The marriage had to conduct among a similar group. As one of the followers of *As-Sunnah* constructed a house, workers ought to come from the people of *As-Sunnah*, and vice versa. Voluntarism activity between both groups was never conducted. The group of *As-Sunnah* only interacted with its group, and the group of Non-*As Sunnah* did the same way.

After the group of *Salafi As-Sunnah* had their mosque, their social issue had not been finished. The issue was from internal of *As-Sunnah* followers, such as Ustaz ID, the head of *Jamaah As-Sunnah*, and head of Mosque Organizer (*Takmir*), and Mr. S, one of the existing figures of the group. As a religious figure in the Village of Peresak, the influence of Ustaz ID was significant in the community, mainly the group of *As-Sunnah*. Therefore, Ustaz ID tried to direct his followers and people to support specific figures in General Election, either members of the House of Representatives (DPR) or executive leaders. He introduced and campaigned for his favorite political figure in every Islamic learning. The people of *As-Sunnah* did not expressively refuse this activity, but most were passive. Nonetheless, Ustaz ID consistently campaigned for his favorite candidates. His reason was that if they voted candidate in General Election with a similar vision and mission to theirs, the community would get benefits in return.

Ustaz ID socializing candidates of the general election via religion studies in mosque bothered other figures of *As-Sunnah*. One of them was Mr. S, previously a loyalist of Ustaz ID. As one of the figures of *As-Sunnah*, Mr. S felt that the people of *As-Sunnah* had been utilized for the personal interest of Ustaz ID. According to Mr. S, the mosque was a place for religious study and knowledge, not for gaining political interest. Also, they argued that the general election was haram since the democratic system applied in Indonesia was similar to America. Their basic argument was from hadith stating that “those who follow a certain group, they shall belong to such group”.

The attitude of Ustaz ID using mosque and Islamic learning for his practically political interest caused pros and cons among the people of *As-Sunnah*. Some supported actions done by Ustaz ID for the reason to cast and gain the nominee of the qualified Islam leader, but some assumed that they were used to achieve personal interest or power. It disappointed many members of *As-Sunnah* followers to the leadership of Ustaz ID.

As a result, many members of *As-Sunnah* followers disliked with Islamic learning done by Ustaz ID. They preferred ustaz invited by Mr. S. Knowing high enthusiasm from the people to ustaz invited by Mr. S, Ustaz ID requested the organizer (*takmir*) of Peresak mosque to stop the event and not invite ustaz from *As-Sunnah*. However, this request was rejected, and Ustaz ID decided to resign with some people from the group of *As-Sunnah* and return to the Great Mosque of Peresak.

Another version was stated by Ustaz ID related to the reasons for his resignation from his religious group. After the mosque of *As-Sunnah* separated from the mosque of Peresak Village, the people of the mosque preferred to attend Islamic learning presented by ustaz invited by Mr. S. Almost ustaz defamed local ustaz and Master Teacher (*Tuan Guru*), who were not their group. The group not following the teachings of *As-Sunnah* was deemed wrong and haram. After finishing worship, they gossiped and offended religious practices done by the local community taught by Islam scholars (*ulama*) in the past. They considered that local religious practices deviated from Islam teachings. Also, they stated that the local community had accustomed to wasting gifts from God for useless traditional feasts. Noticing and hearing the statement of Ustaz ID during presenting Islamic learning, some people of *As-Sunnah* were upset and came to the house of Ustaz ID. At that time, Ustaz ID said that this mosque (mosque of *As-Sunnah*) was inappropriate for worship since it had been used as a place of gossip, defamation, and insulting Islam scholars (*ulama*) and master teachers (*tuan guru*) opposing the group of *As-Sunnah*.

Based on Ustaz ID, worship activity in this mosque had mixed good and bad deeds. Ustaz ID also heard from the people of *As-Sunnah*, stating that one ustaz of *As-Sunnah*, Ustaz M, said: “only the group of *As-Sunnah* has right to enter heaven and other groups will enter to hell”. The people were deemed haram if studying or learning

other than ustaz *As-Sunnab*, and it was haram to vote in the general election. These were based on 4 hadith, one of which was related to the analogy of a group, as stated previously. Hearing this statement, Ustaz ID was angry and stopped to give Islamic learning in the mosque of *As-Sunnab*. To replace him, he invited ustaz from the nearby village, such as Lekong Village, to give Islamic learning. However, one of the figures of *As-Sunnab*, such as Mr. S, disliked the ustaz, so he invited a “rival” ustaz. Then, the internal conflict of *As-Sunnab* caused the establishment of two opposing factions.

The two contrasting narratives indicate that the causal factor of this conflict was not only due to differing opinions but also competition to seek influence among the *As-Sunnab* members themselves as well as other political factors. A few days before Eid Mubarak in 2010, on Sunday dated November 14th, 2010, the incident in Peresak Village happened. Around 7.00 pm, the mosque of *As-Sunnab* was sieged and destroyed by the masses. A group of men dressed in black came to the mosque of *As-Sunnab*. According to Mr. W, the head of the Village of Peresak, the mass attacking the mosque of *As-Sunnab* came from sub-villages and villages surrounding Peresak.

Mosque destruction was started by throwing stones and other hard objects, where the people of *As-Sunnab* had just finished their Isha prayer. Hearing the sound of stones throwing, the people of *As-Sunnab* directly ran away and saved their lives. A group of fierce people directly entered the mosque's yard and destroyed the house of the mosque guard in front of the mosque. They also damaged all facilities located in the mosque of *As-Sunnab*. Different equipment was smashed and broken, such as the speaker, cupboard, shelves containing holy books, and other goods. The walls of the mosque were torn down by mass. Luckily, there were no casualties.

Police did not do much as society was brutal and an outnumbered mass. Based on the police report, the attackers of *the as-Sunnab* mosque were more than 50 people, and they came from other villages. Within a few hours, police had succeeded in disbanding mass and installing a police line at the crime scene to protect evidence. The mass not only attacked the mosque but also destroyed the house of Mr. S, the head of *the as-Sunnab* group replacing Ustaz ID.

The conflict of mosque destruction was considered the climax of the conflict between the people of *as-Sunnab* and non-*As Sunnah* in the Village of Peresak. The situation in the village after the conflict was not immediately safe, and some members of the local police department guarded the crime scene for almost two months to conduct preventive actions in case the following conflict occurred. Many parties were interrogated at police headquarter.

According to the confession of N, they attacked the mosque spontaneously since they did not stand anymore with preaching conducted by the group of *As-Sunnab*, usually accusing infidel to those outside their group. This group did not appreciate and always blamed Islam scholars (*ulama*) preaching Islam in Lombok in the past. They accused Islam scholars (*ulama*) of using local culture in preaching had misled Muslims in this region. Also, they stated that people still practicing Islam inherited by Islam scholars (*ulama*) and master teachers (*tuan guru*) would not enter to heavens since they deviated from the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).

However, some parties considered that this conflict resulted from provocation conducted by figures of *As-Sunnab* having an internal conflict. This argument was abruptly denied by Ustaz ID. According to him, the community had been angry with the followers of *As-Sunnab* insulting and defaming Islam scholars (*ulama*) and master teachers (*tuan guru*) in Lombok, who had devoted their lives to preaching Islam. Moreover, mosques have been used to conduct actions prohibited by religion and are a source of defamation (*fitnah*).

Conflict Settlements

A few days after the conflict, a meeting was held in the official house of the Regent. The Regent suggested not using the mosque of *as-Sunnab* and requested the people of *as-Sunnab* to pray in other villages. Consequently, many followers of *as-Sunnab* commuted from one mosque to another to conduct five-times praying and Friday praying. The events lasted for two years, 2010 – 2012. The post-conflict tension was escalated by both conflicting parties, partially.

After the tension cooled down between both parties, for approximately two years, the village government initiated to conduct mediation between both groups, *as-Sunnah* and non-*as Sunnah*, in Local House Representatives in the Regency of East Lombok. It aimed to bridge the interest of both parties and find the best solution. The result of this mediation was that the group of *as-Sunnah* was permitted to build a new mosque, but it was not in the previous mosque site. In the mid of 2012, the location of the previous mosque site was taken over by the local government to build a new village government office in Peresak, and the village government granted a sum of money of Rp 250 million. The compensation was divided into two by considering both parties. For people of *as-Sunnah* led by Mr. S, they were given Rp. 125 million, and the rest was for Ustaz ID to build a new mosque of *as-Sunnah*. Therefore, people of both parties, *as-Sunnah* and non-*as Sunnah* could conduct their worship peacefully.

Over time, no significant conflicts occurred between both parties, *as-Sunnah*, and non-*as-Sunnah*. After several dialogues attended by public figures, governmental apparatus, and law enforcement, both parties mutually agreed to respect and appreciate their respective religious practices. Both parties, people of *as-Sunnah* led by Mr. S and non-*as Sunnah* led by Ustaz ID, believed and realized that Islam was life guidance for humans, not merely a vertical relationship with God but also a horizontal relationship among humans. In the horizontal life among humans, Islam taught mutual respect, appreciation, and help in conducting life. The different backgrounds, ethnic, cultures, and religions did not obstruct humans from respecting and helping each other in social life. It was common and had to be accepted. One of the public figures, Mr. Z, reminded both parties to manage their anger and respect differences.

Meanwhile, according to the current head of the people of *as-Sunnah*, Mr. S stated that social communication and relationship between the group of *As-Sunnah* and non-*as Sunnah* was better. The group of *as-Sunnah* had realized that Islam was life guidance and manual to achieve a balanced life between the world and beyond and manage the relationship between humans and God and among humans. Both parties believed that Islam was created in the world as a blessing for all. Among Muslims, they were required to mutually respect and help to maintain common life. As the construction of a new mosque for the people of *as-Sunnah*, the people of non-*as Sunnah* also assisted in making a new road to this mosque. Also, when the Holiday of Eid Mubarak in the last two years, the people of *as-Sunnah* also distributed meat to the group of non-*as Sunnah*. This better condition was also confirmed by other people who felt that the preaching of *as-Sunnah* differed from the previous conflict.

In settling religious conflict and transforming it into awareness and harmony, national and local governmental apparatus must take part, particularly for mediation. Mediation was considered the best way to meet conflicting parties to discuss and decide on an agreement accommodating the interest of all parties. Mediation was difficult to conduct if respective conflicting parties were persistent with their argument. As in the first conflict, the head of the village had to make mediation several times.

During mediation, religious and public figures became role models in maintaining stable conducive conditions. They were figures in promoting and boosting peace and harmony and preventing provocative issues. Also, support was needed from the government, law enforcement, and the public to create safe, peaceful, and harmonious life in the mid of difference.

CONCLUSION

The conflict in East Lombok was triggered by *Salafi as-Sunnah*'s intolerance of the religious practices and traditions that the local people adhered to. The *Salafi as-Sunnah* group accused the local practices as bid'ah or innovation in Islam. They blamed Muslim scholars (*ulama*) and master teachers (*tuan guru*) for having taught such kind of Islamic teachings in East Lombok. On the contrary, the local community who were very respectful for local *ulama*, *tuan guru*, and traditions despised the *Salafi as-Sunnah* group with all their teachings. As a result, the conflict arose, either between *Salafi as-Sunnah* and the local community or among the *Salafi as-Sunnah* followers. The internal conflict in the *Salafi as-Sunnah* group was primarily due to their leader's or ustaz's teaching which is too exclusive or radical such as allowing their followers to attack Muslims with different religious practices. The dispute culminated in the *Salafi as-Sunnah* leaders' political inclination during the general election.

Some efforts have been made by the government and public figures to resolve the conflict. Providing a separate mosque for the *Salafi as-Sunnah* was seemingly not the best solution. Apparently, social harmony in Peresak Village was achieved through cultural and legal approaches involving various elements of society, law enforcement, and local government as well as by raising the local people's awareness of the importance of tolerance and willingness to embrace the difference. Finally, both parties, as-Sunnah and non *as-Sunnah*, not only believe that Islam is the guidance for life in the world and in the Hereafter including human-God relation and social relations but also acknowledge that people should respect and help each other despite all the differences.

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